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My thesis is concerned with the prospects for finding a solution to what Henry Sidgwick called 
the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. I begin by analysing Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics to 
reveal the assumptions about rationality that led Sidgwick to claim that Ethics is plagued with a 
profoundest problem. I then evaluate the capacity of seven accounts – those of Derek Parfit, Roger 
Crisp, David Brink, David Phillips, William Frankena, Owen McLeod, and Katarzyna de Lazari-
Radek and Peter Singer – to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics; arguing that not one is able 
to solve it. In the conclusion, I indicate that the common problem that prevents all accounts, Sidg-
wick’s included, from solving the Profoundest Problem of Ethics is that they all share the assump-
tions about rationality that Sidgwick himself supposed in defining the Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics. I conclude suggesting that these assumptions are unsubstantiated, and I indicate that, when 
these unquestioned assumptions about rationality are rejected, what Sidgwick called the Profound-




Ethics is, for me and for many others, one of the most important areas of philosophy. Insofar as it 
studies what is right or what ought to be done, so far as this depends upon the voluntary action of 
individuals, it is one of the few areas of philosophy that may help us determine, in our everyday 
lives as well as in moments when we face momentous dilemmas, what is the right way to act: 
Should I treat myself to steak, if I know that a cow, a living being, will be killed for me and others 
to eat her? Should I save a stranger’s life, if by doing so I need to sacrifice my own legs? Ethics is 
supposed to illuminate these types of questions and help us determine what we ought to do in every 
such case.  
But, what if we discovered that Ethics gives us contradictory answers to each of the ques-
tions that we submit for consideration? What if, by appealing to two different – but equally valid 
– rational procedures, we discovered that different actions that cannot be performed at the same 
time can both be regarded as equally right? Ethics would leave us, then, without knowing what we 
ought to do, and many would see this as a reason to disregard Ethics as a useless study.  
Henry Sidgwick claimed in The Methods of Ethics (1907) that Ethics faces precisely this 
problem. He labeled it as “the Profoundest Problem of Ethics”. Sidgwick tried, without success, 
to find a solution to that problem. And many others have attempted the same since. In this thesis, 
I argue that eight distinguished philosophers who have attempted to solve the Profoundest Problem 
of Ethics have left the problem unresolved. In particular, I argue that all these philosophers, Sidg-
wick included, constrained by their unquestioned acceptance of certain assumptions that Sidgwick 
himself established when he discovered the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, have omitted what 
truly makes the Profoundest Problem of Ethics profound. This is why, I argue, they all have left 
the problem unresolved. 
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 1 
Introduction 
When one encounters Henry Sidgwick’s renowned declaration to have found the Profoundest 
Problem of Ethics, for which he himself was not able to find a solution, one finds oneself with dual 
sentiments: on the one hand, one is curious about how Sidgwick arrived at this deep problem, and 
on the other hand, one has the urge to attempt to solve the problem that Sidgwick found. Surpris-
ingly, well-known authors approaching Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics, where Sidgwick pre-
sents the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, seem to me to take only one of the two following alter-
natives: they either take seriously Sidgwick’s claim that Ethics is plagued by a profoundest prob-
lem, but they do not give a proper solution to the problem; or, they understand the Profoundest 
Problem in a particular – in my view, watered-down – way that affords them a solution – a solution 
that does not do full justice to Sidgwick’s original problem.1 No one actually seems to solve the 
original, Profoundest Problem of Ethics when taken in its full force.  
The Profoundest Problem of Ethics, as described by Sidgwick, expresses the conflict be-
tween two different theories, Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence, insofar as they yield 
contradictory dictates about what human beings ought to do – what is right for them to do.2 Sidg-
wick argues that Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence are definite forms of rational proce-
dures that are already implicit in the common moral reasoning – Practical Reason – of human 
beings. However, Sidgwick claims, in what he calls the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics, that if 
two rational procedures yield conflicting conclusions, they cannot both be valid. (6) The problem 
arises because Sidgwick is not able to show that either Rational Egoism or Rational Benevolence 
                                                        
1 I cite any page ‘n’ of The Methods of Ethics as (n). All other references follow the author-date referencing 
system. Here, I try to explain Sidgwick’s background without imposing a particular, non-Sidgwickian in-
terpretation of it.  
2 Sidgwick understands ‘right’ and ‘ought’ as equivalent terms; duty, as Sidgwick’s understands it, refers 
to all right acts.  
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can be rejected or modified; thus, he has to conclude that different valid rational procedures yield 
conflicting conclusions – violating the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics.  
Insofar as these rational procedures are implicit in our moral reasoning, the reliability of 
Practical Reason itself is at stake in the conflict between Rational Egoism and Rational Benevo-
lence. This is why Sidgwick named the problem that he found the Profoundest Problem of Ethics: 
because the apparently intuitive operation of Practical Reason – rationally determining what we 
ought to do – would be revealed as illusory if we discovered that the conflict between Rational 
Egoism and Rational Benevolence cannot be resolved – as Sidgwick could not. In that case, we 
would need to decide what we ought to do relying only on non-rational impulses. (508)  
Sidgwick’s conclusion that Ethics is plagued with a profoundest problem relies on three 
unquestioned assumptions that act as key premises of an argument underlying Sidgwick’s The 
Methods of Ethics.  
Sidgwick’s argument – from now on, Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument – is:   
(1) Principle of Practical Reason’s Authority: Ethics is plagued with a profoundest problem if 
and only if human beings cannot always trust Practical Reason in determining what they 
ought to do. 
(2) Principle of Practical Reason’s Reliability: Human beings can always trust Practical Rea-
son in determining what they ought to do if and only if the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics 
is not violated.  
(3) Fundamental Postulate of Ethics: If two valid rational procedures yield different principles, 
then these principles must not practically or theoretically conflict.  
(4) Two valid rational procedures yield different principles.  
(5) The principles theoretically conflict.  
(6) The principles practically conflict.  
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Therefore: 
(7) The Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is violated.  
(8) We cannot always trust Practical Reason in determining what we ought to do.  
(9) Ethics is plagued with a profoundest problem.  
I call the set of three assumptions that constitute the three key premises of Sidgwick’s 
Underlying Argument – namely, (1) the Principle of Practical Reasons’ Authority, (2) the Principle 
of Practical Reasons’ Reliability, and (3) the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics – Sidgwick’s Un-
derlying Presuppositions.  
Keeping this in mind, the purpose of this thesis is threefold. First, I argue that it is precisely 
Sidgwick’s unquestioned acceptance of Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions that constrains 
Sidgwick into a structure – namely, Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument – within which the Pro-
foundest Problem of Ethics cannot be resolved. Second, I argue that eight of the philosophers who 
have attempted to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics also accept Sidgwick’s Underlying 
Presuppositions. This is the reason why, I argue, these philosophers follow only one of the two 
alternatives stated in the first paragraph. Insofar as they accept Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppo-
sitions, the only way they have to approach Sidgwick’s Profoundest Problem of Ethics is to either 
conceive the conflict between Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence in a way in which either 
the principles or the rational procedures do not really conflict – in that case, either (4), (5), or (6) 
in Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument would be false –; or to fail, with Sidgwick, to offer a solution 
to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. Third, I argue that the Profoundest Problem of Ethics is still 
waiting for a profound solution, and I suggest that this solution can only be articulated if one rejects 
Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions.  
This thesis is divided into five parts, including the Introduction. In Chapter 1, I provide the 
necessary conceptual background to understand why Sidgwick concludes The Methods of Ethics 
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with the claim that Ethics is faced with the Profoundest Problem. This first chapter is crucial: 
without either the conceptual background of The Methods of Ethics, or understanding the order of 
Sidgwick’s reasoning, it is impossible to reveal Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument, and therefore, 
it is also impossible to appreciate how Sidgwick’s acceptance of Sidgwick’s Underlying Presup-
positions limits Sidgwick’s possibility to offer a solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics.  
In Chapter I, I also illustrate that Sidgwick devotes almost all the chapters of The Methods 
of Ethics to show that the antecedent of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics – clause (4) in Sidg-
wick’s Underlying Argument – is true: that is, that two valid rational procedures – namely, Ra-
tional Egoism and Rational Benevolence – yield different principles. In this first chapter, I focus 
primarily on material in Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics; although I occasionally appeal to Sidg-
wick’s article “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies”.   
In Chapter 2, I focus exclusively on the Profoundest Problem of Ethics as Sidgwick pre-
sents it in the last chapter of The Methods of Ethics. In this chapter, I claim, Sidgwick argues that 
the consequent of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics – clauses (5) and (6) in Sidgwick’s Under-
lying Argument – is false: that is, that the principles yielded respectively by Rational Egoism and 
Rational Benevolence do theoretically and practically conflict. This is enough for Sidgwick to 
conclude that there is indeed a Profoundest Problem of Ethics. I argue that Sidgwick’s conclusion 
can only be properly understood in terms of Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument.  
First, relying tacitly on the conditions of the truth of the conditional expressed in the Fun-
damental Postulate of Ethics – (3) –, and having shown that the antecedent of the Fundamental 
Postulate of Ethics is true – (4) –, and the consequent is false – (5) and (6) –, Sidgwick assumes 
that – (7) – the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is violated. Second, relying implicitly on the con-
ditions of truth of the biconditional expressed in the Principle of Practical Reasons’ Reliability – 
(2) –, and once he has shown that the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is indeed violated, Sidgwick 
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deduces – (8) – that we cannot always trust our moral reasoning in determining what we ought to 
do. Third, relying on the conditions of the truth of the biconditional expressed in the Principle of 
Practical Reasons’ Authority – (1) –, and assuming that we cannot always trust Practical Reason, 
Sidgwick concludes that – (9) – Ethics is indeed plagued with a profoundest problem. This is 
precisely Sidgwick’s conclusion to The Methods of Ethics. 
In Chapter 2, I also introduce five distinctions that will be useful in Chapter 3 in framing 
possible interpretations of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. These distinctions are: the distinc-
tion between what Sidgwick said and what Sidgwick ought to have said; the distinction between 
Internalism and Externalism; the distinction between the rationalist’s and the moralist’s problem; 
the distinction between conflict-enhancing and conflict-mitigating interpretations of the Profound-
est Problem of Ethics; and, lastly, the difference between (a) agent-relative, temporally-neutral, 
theories, (b) agent-relative, present-biased theories, and (c) person-neutral, temporally-neutral, 
theories.3  
In Chapter 3, I explain, relying on the aforementioned distinctions, what I call the ‘classical 
interpretations’ of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, along with the solutions, and displaying the 
relationship between how they can be categorized using such distinctions and the respective solu-
tions they provide. In particular, I explain the attempt to solve Sidgwick’s Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics by eight philosophers: William Frankena, David Brink, Derek Parfit, Owen McLeod, David 
Phillips, Roger Crisp, and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer.4 I argue that each of these 
philosophers implicitly accepts Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions. To show this, I use the 
conceptual distinctions mentioned above to categorize each of their interpretations in a way that 
demonstrates that either they fail to offer a solution to the Profoundest Problem, or they make 
                                                        
3 I explain these notions in 2.1.1 Five fundamental distinctions.  
4 Lazari-Radek and Singer offer a solution together in The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and 
Contemporary Ethics. 
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certain conceptual compromises that enable them to show that the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics 
is not violated. By doing so, I argue, they – at best – solve only their watered-down interpretation 
of Sidgwick’s problem but not the original Profoundest Problem of Ethics itself.  
In Chapter 3, I also offer two different types of objections against the classical interpreta-
tions. On the one hand, I provide particular objections against the arguments of the aforesaid au-
thors, to show that some of the premises, proofs, or conclusions are not sound. On the other hand, 
I argue that, even if their arguments are sound, not one of their arguments achieve the purpose that 
they intend: solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. I argue that their shared problem is that, 
constrained by their acceptance of Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions, their options to solve 
the Profoundest Problem of Ethics are limited to begin with. Finally, I try to show that the partic-
ular problems which their arguments incur – which I attack in my first objections – are caused by 
the presuppositions they share with Sidgwick – which I attack in my second objections. 
Keeping this in mind, two points need to be made here. First, it is important here to clarify 
that my interests in this thesis are not primarily exegetical, but philosophical. My objections do 
not attack a solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics for not being plausibly Sidgwickian, 
only for not taking Sidgwick sufficiently seriously; that is, for not understanding Sidgwick in a 
way that those philosopher’s interpretations of the problem provide a philosophically profound 
solution to a problem that, as its name demands, deserves a solution with a certain depth and sub-
stance. 
Second, it is important to say a few words about why I have chosen these seven different 
attempts to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics and not others. As some readers might have 
already realized, all the philosophers that I study in this thesis come from the same tradition: Util-
itarianism. As I explain in Chapter 1, Sidgwick believes that Rational Benevolence coincides with 
Utilitarianism. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics, then, as Sidgwick understands it, expresses the 
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conflict between Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism. It is not surprising that some of the most 
renowned authors that have attempted to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics – to the benefit 
of Utilitarianism – are, then, utilitarians. But, let us not be mistaken. The Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics transcends the conflict between Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism.5  
In the Conclusions, I argue that Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions need to be rejected 
if one wants to provide a profound solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. I argue, first, 
that the relations expressed respectively by the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics and the Principle 
of Practical Reasons’ Reliability need to be scrutinized. While I argue that the Fundamental Pos-
tulate of Ethics is relying on a dubious comparison between mathematics and ethics, I also argue 
that it is not clear that, if the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is violated, it follows that we cannot 
always trust Practical Reason.  
Finally, I argue that, when we reject the assumptions that Sidgwick and the classical inter-
pretations share, the Profoundest Problem of Ethics is cast in a new light. Even when the conflict 
between Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence is understood in its full force, the conflict 
does not appear as an unsolvable problem but as what may be, for all we know, an inherently 
human trait; that our Practical Reason may yield conflicting dictates about what we ought to do. 
Once this is accepted, the solution to the Profoundest Problem Ethics does not depend on satisfying 
our unquestioned demand about what we would like our Practical Reason to be, but about being 
conscious that our acts can always be judged to be wrong from either the perspective of Rational 
Egoism or Rational Benevolence. I finish my thesis suggesting that the Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics does not cast doubt upon the authority of Practical Reason. It is instead our initial situation 
as ethical beings. 
                                                        
5 In Chapter 1, 1.2.3 Utilitarianism, I argue that Rational Benevolence and Utilitarianism do not necessarily 
coincide.  
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Chapter 1. Background to Sidgwick’s Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
The Profoundest Problem of Ethics is silently pervading most of Sidgwick’s The Methods of Eth-
ics, but it is not until Book III, when almost two-thirds of the treatise have already been written, 
that Sidgwick discloses the Profoundest Problem of Ethics for the first time in a note to Chapter 
XIII of Book III, ‘Philosophical Intuitionism’.6 (386n) After this brief reference, it is not until the 
last chapter that Sidgwick actually presents his full account of the problem. But, before I begin 
explaining the Profoundest Problem, it is important to understand how Sidgwick arrives at this 
formulation in the first place. This is why I organize this chapter into two parts. First, correspond-
ing to Book I of The Methods of Ethics, I outline the conceptual background necessary to under-
stand Sidgwick, defining and explaining the following notions: Ethics, method of ethics, Funda-
mental Postulate of Ethics, Practical Reason, Duty, pleasure, desire, moral motivation and volun-
tary action. Also, I present Sidgwick’s explicit purpose in his treatise. Second, corresponding to 
Books II, III, and IV, I explain what Sidgwick considers the three methods of ethics, while delin-
eating his main arguments in each of these books.  
1.1. Conceptual background 
This section attempts to provide the conceptual background necessary to discuss the Profoundest 
Problem of Ethics carefully, extensively, and systematically. It might be useful to start by giving 
two key definitions. According to Sidgwick: 
Ethics: [S]cience or study of what is right or what ought to be, so far as this de-
pends upon the voluntary action of individuals. (4) 
                                                        
6 In the note, Sidgwick claims: “On the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence – which I 
regard as the profoundest problem of Ethics – my final view is given in the last chapter of this treatise”. 
(386) 
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Method of Ethics: [A]ny rational procedure by which we determine what individual 
human beings ‘ought’ – or what it is ‘right’ for them – to do, or to 
seek to realize by voluntary action. (1) 
Sidgwick, in the “Introduction” of The Methods of Ethics, claims that the object of his work 
is not primarily to discover or determine ethical first principles nor to “supply a set of practical 
directions for conduct”. (14) Instead, his aim is to “expound as clearly and as fully as [his] limits 
will allow the different methods of Ethics that [he] find[s] implicit in our common moral reasoning; 
to point out their mutual relations; and where they seem to conflict, to define the issue as much as 
possible”. (14) A few pages earlier, Sidgwick claims “that the plan of the … treatise is” to give an 
explanation to the phenomenon that human beings, while they never ask, ‘Why should I believe 
what I see to be true?’, they tend to ask, ‘Why should I do what I see to be right?’ (5, 6) In Sidg-
wick’s view, only the fact that we find different methods of Ethics implicit in our common moral 
reasoning, “not brought into clear relation to each other,” can give an explanation to this phenom-
enon that separates ethics from, for example, mathematics.7 (6) According to Sidgwick, it is pre-
cisely because there are, in our common moral reasoning, different rational procedures by which 
we determine what we ought to do, or to seek to realize by voluntary action, that “any single answer 
to the question ‘why’ will not be completely satisfactory, as it will be given only from one of these 
points of view, and will always leave room to ask the question from some other”. (6)  
Sidgwick’s object is, then, to study all different methods implicit in our moral reasoning to 
describe (a) what is determined as right from each rational procedure, (b) how these determinations 
relate to each other, and (c) if they conflict, to define the conflict as much as possible, hoping that 
at least one of these determinations will be able to be modified or rejected.  
                                                        
7 I come back to Sidgwick’s comparison between Ethics and mathematics in the Conclusions.  
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Sidgwick’s object in The Methods of Ethics can only be understood in terms of an assump-
tion that structurally underlies Sidgwick’s approach to Ethics. Sidgwick explicitly assumes:  
Fundamental Postulate of Ethics: “We cannot … regard as valid reasonings that lead 
to conflicting conclusions;” as “so far as two meth-
ods conflict, one or other of them must be modified 
or rejected”. (6) 
Sidgwick does not explicitly justify his appeal to such Fundamental Postulate of Ethics. 
However, he suggests that it is rooted in his own conception of rationality and in the relation be-
tween reasons and rightness. According to Sidgwick, insofar as the notions right and ought cannot 
be conceptually divided into simpler notions, they cannot be conceptually defined. (32-33) Instead, 
they “can only be made clearer by determining as precisely as possible [their] relation to other 
notions with which [they] are connected in ordinary thought”. (33) Only in this indirect way can 
we understand their meaning without necessity of a proper definition. From Chapters II, III, IV, 
and V of Book I, we can define five notions that allow us to understand what it means for an action 
to be right or seeking to realize what ought to be.8  
(i) Rationality 
                                                        
8 The notions are: rationality, moral motivation, disinterest, free will, and individuality. From the five no-
tions that we can define to understand what it means for an action to be right, rationality is the notion with 
a stronger “connection,” in Sidgwick’s terms, with rightness. This might be a double-edged sword: on the 
one hand, the connection between rationality and rightness allows us to intuitively understand what it means 
for Sidgwick for an action to be right; on the other hand, as rationality cannot be divided into simpler 
notions, it cannot be conceptually defined either. This is why we need to appeal to the other four concepts 
to understand what it means for Sidgwick to an action to be right.  
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Sidgwick claims that rightness and rationality are interchangeable, equivalent notions. 
When we judge actions to be right, we always judge them as being reasonable or rational; simi-
larly, if we judge that we ought to aim at some end, we judge that it is rational to do so. (23) On 
the other hand, if we judge that an action is reasonable or rational, we judge that we ought to act 
in that way, or that it is the right action to perform. Sidgwick, in this way, discards from the outset 
theories that explain the rightness of actions by appealing to (a) moral sentiments, (b) conformance 
to moral sentiments of other human beings, (c) penalties imposed by the machine of Law of a 
society and (d) penalties imposed by God. (27, 28 29, 31) Sidgwick, then, establishes a fundamen-
tal relation between Ethics and rationality. 
Keeping this in mind, Sidgwick defines: 
Practical Reason:  Faculty “of [ethical] cognition”. (34)  
Duty:  [Refers to all R]ight acts, for the adequate performance of which a 
moral motive is at least occasionally necessary.9 (xxxi)  
It is important here to clarify that in Book I, Sidgwick is not yet displaying his sympathy 
for the kinds of theories of rationality that claim that, other things equal, the rationality – and 
rightness – of an action is proportional to the value the action would produce in terms of welfare. 
For now, Sidgwick is just appealing to an intuitive notion of rationality that he will not scrutinize 
until Book III named “Intuitionism”.  
Under this formal notion of rationality, Sidgwick contrasts rationality with non-rational – 
but not necessarily irrational – impulses. Let us imagine a person in Pisa, Italy and she is lactose 
                                                        
9 Sidgwick differentiates the notions of ‘Duty’ and ‘Virtue’.  While Duty comprehends exclusively Right 
acts, Virtue includes “the performance of duties as well as praise-worthy acts that are thought to go beyond 
strict duty, and that may even go beyond the power of some to perform”. (xxxi) 
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intolerant. She is brought by a friend to one of the best pizzerias of the city, Il Montino. It is 
possible to imagine that not-rational impulses would compel her to eat pizza. Still, what it is ra-
tional for her to do, considering her own health condition, is to not eat pizza. To not eat pizza 
would be, then, the rational action. 
(ii) Moral motivation 
The example above does not explain Sidgwick’s appeal to the relation between rationality, 
rightness, and Duty, and a special kind of motives: moral motivations. To understand this relation, 
it is necessary to provide an exegetical remark. Sidgwick uses the notion morality in two different 
senses throughout the Methods of Ethics: in a wider and in a narrower sense. In the wider sense, 
the word ‘moral’ has an equivalent meaning to the word ‘ethical’. In the narrower sense, the word 
‘moral’ qualifies the method of ethics that Sidgwick calls Rational Benevolence.10 When Sidgwick 
claims that the performance of right acts needs to be caused by a moral motive, I understand that 
Sidgwick is using the word ‘moral’ in its wider sense. In this sense, Sidgwick is just claiming, 
when appealing to moral motivation, that the recognition through reason of the rightness of an 
action gives a certain type of impulse – ethical – to perform such an action:  
I speak of the cognition or judgment that ‘X ought to be done’ … as a ‘dictate’ or 
‘precept’ of reason …[to]… imply that in rational beings as such this cognition 
gives an impulse or motive to action: though in human beings, of course, this is 
only one motive among others which are liable to conflict with it. (34) 
  
According to Sidgwick, then, to recognize an act as right is to recognize a dictate of reason 
to perform that act, recognizing it as a dictate to follow. Although Sidgwick admits that some 
                                                        
10 I borrow this distinction from Maudemarie Clark’s Introduction to On the Genealogy of Morality. (Nie-
tzsche 1998: xviii) These two uses of the word ‘moral’ have created some exegetical controversies. See: 
(Brink 1988; and Phillips 2011: 136-139) 
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human beings might claim that they do not “find in their conscious any such unconditional or 
categorial imperative” imposed by Reason, Sidgwick claims that the “notion of moral obligation”, 
or Duty, cannot be understood without appealing to such dictates. (35) Sidgwick suggests that 
Ethics is not apprehensible for beings who are not conscious of moral motives. 
(iii) Disinterest 
Sidgwick uses the term ‘disinterested’ to specify that actions conforming to Duty are 
prompted by a special kind of moral motive that gives a certain impulse to the realization of right 
actions. Sidgwick does so for two reasons. First, he leaves room, if I may use this expression, for 
motives that are not always directed to our own pleasure. (45) This is crucial for Sidgwick’s treatise 
because, as we will see, at least one method of ethics will aim at universal, and not particular, 
happiness or pleasure.11 To understand why Sidgwick claims that not all motives are directed to 
our own pleasure, it is first necessary to understand how Sidgwick defines pleasure and desire: 
Pleasure: Kind of feeling, which includes “all kinds of agreeable … feelings” (120-
121) and “which stimulates the will to actions tending to sustain or pro-
duce it”. (42) 
Desire: Felt volitional stimulus. (43)  
If pleasure is all kinds of feelings that stimulate desire to sustain or generate such feelings 
in question, one might be tempted to think that all desires are actually directed to our own pleasure, 
ruling out the possibility of an altruistic method of ethics. Sidgwick believes this is not so: “it 
                                                        
11 Sidgwick uses both terms with “equally comprehensible meanings”. (120) 
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appears to me that throughout the whole scale of my impulses, sensual, emotional, and intellectual 
alike, I can distinguish desires of which the object is something other than my own pleasure”. (45)  
The second reason Sidgwick includes disinterestedness as a characteristic of right actions 
is to differentiate moral motives from other “non-rational” desires. (23) Sidgwick suggests that 
one is morally motivated to act as Practical Reason requires because the capacity itself to grasp 
the dictates of Practical Reason rationally binds one to perform in that way. In this sense, right 
actions are impelled by our obedience to Practical Reason, and not by subjective – interested – 
emotions or feelings. To hold that an action is right, it is not just to say that I feel it this way, for 
someone could feel differently; it is to claim that such action is really [that is, objectively] right.12 
(27) 
(iv) Free will 
According to Sidgwick, an action, to be judged as right or wrong, needs to be voluntary.  
Sidgwick claims: “what we judge ‘ought to be’ done, is always thought capable of being brought 
about by the volition of any individual to whom the judgment applies”. (33) Sidgwick defines two 
conditions for an action to be considered voluntary and thus an object of moral approval or disap-
proval. It needs to be: (a) conscious, and (b) intending some particular result. (59, 60) If this is so, 
we can define a voluntary action as follows:  
                                                        
12 This will be clearer in section 1.2.1 Intuitionism. Sidgwick claims that the dictates of Practical Reason 
are self-evident. And it is precisely our capacity to perceive the dictates of Practical Reason as self-evident 
that binds us – namely, morally motivate us – to act as Practical Reason requires. I borrow this way to 
understand Sidgwick’s conception of moral motivation from Peter Singer. (Singer 2015: 81-83) 
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Voluntary action: Voluntary actions are “distinguished as ‘conscious’ from actions 
or movements of human organism which are ‘unconscious’ or ‘me-
chanical’” (59) and “objects of moral approval or disapproval” 
when the “results of a man’s volitions” are “intended”.13 (60)  
(v) Individuality 
Sidgwick, both in the definition of method of ethics and that of ethics, includes the word 
‘individual’ to characterize right actions. Sidgwick’s aim in doing so is to differentiate Ethics from 
Politics. (1)  
Ethics aims at determining what ought to be done by individuals, while Politics 
aims at determining what the government of a state or political state ought to do 
and how it ought to be constituted. (15) 
 
In other words, Ethics and Politics direct the dictates that they determine as right – and 
rational – to different types of subjects: while the ethical subjects are human beings taken individ-
ually, the political subjects are the governments of the States.14 
Now, Sidgwick conceives human beings as temporally extended, numerically distinct, en-
tities that correspond with our commonsensical notion of person. (Sidgwick 1981: 483) In fact, 
philosophers such as David Brink and Derek Parfit have indicated that Sidgwick grounds his con-
ception of identity in what John Findlay labeled as the separateness of persons.15 (Findlay 1961: 
                                                        
13 Sidgwick disregards Determinism because it adopts a point of view that is irrelevant to Ethics. Determin-
ism concerns itself with defining “what the future actions of ourselves or others will be,” but not with 
“endeavoring to ascertain (…) what choice it is reasonable to make between two alternatives of present 
conduct;” only the latter concerns Ethics. (70) 
14 This does not mean that there are not important connections between Ethics and Politics. Ethics, for 
example, needs to “determine the grounds and limits of obedience to Government”. (17) Ethics is related 
to Politics only inasmuch as it needs to determine what human beings ought to do or seek to realize in a 
world in which societies are politically organized. (22)  
15 Parfit claims that the separateness persons is regarded as a fundamental fact of Ethics. (Parfit 2011: 133) 
To be clear, Sidgwick actually indicates that this conception of identity can be challenged by conceptions 
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235-236; Brink 1997A: 103; Parfit 2011: 133) The separateness of persons expresses the fact that 
a human being’s life has a unity throughout time that requires the human being to be regarded, as 
a whole, as only one and the same person throughout her life. Ethics, then, has these persons as its 
subjects.  
Keeping the notions explained above in mind, we can now understand why Sidgwick is 
interested in examining the different methods of Ethics present in our common moral reasoning, 
as well as studying how they relate to each other, and whether they conflict. If Sidgwick finds, 
when analyzing our common moral reasoning, that insofar as two methods of ethics conflict and 
Practical Reason dictates that it is rational to act in two ways that are contradictory, we would find 
ourselves with contradictory moral motives for action. In other words, we would find ourselves as 
rationally pulled in different directions at the same time, and we could not appeal to Practical 
Reason to determine which direction we ought to follow. Insofar as Practical Reason could not 
give us a determinate answer, Sidgwick assumes that the conflict between different methods of 
ethics – rational procedures – would cast a long shadow on the reliability of Practical Reason and, 
by extension, on the validity of the conflicting methods themselves. This is why, I believe, Sidg-
wick assumes that it needs to be a fundamental postulate of Ethics that if “two methods of ethics 
conflict, one or other of them must be modified or rejected”. (6) Otherwise, in Sidgwick’s eyes, 
we will lose our trust in our Practical Reason; and ethics will be in a profoundest problem.   
Sidgwick assumes, then, that there is a necessary relationship between the satisfaction of 
the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics and the possibility to always trust our Practical Reason. I call 
this assumption the Principle of Practical Reason’s Reliability. Similarly, Sidgwick assumes that 
                                                        
that, following David Hume, maintain that “the Ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena, that the 
permanent identical ‘I’ is not a fact but a fiction”. (Sidgwick 1981: 419) However, Sidgwick did not want 
to pursue this challenge insofar as he thought that denying that the identity of persons persists in time would 
be too contrary to Common Sense.  (Sidgwick 1981: 419, 498; also, Sidgwick 1889: 483) 
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if indeed we find that Practical Reason is not always reliable, then Ethics would be plagued with 
a profoundest problem. I call this assumption the Principle of Practical Reason’s Authority. I argue 
that, along with the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics, the Principle of Practical Reason’s Reliabil-
ity and the Principle of Practical Reason’s Authority structurally underlie The Methods of Ethics. 
I call the set of these three assumptions Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions. The Profoundest 
Problem of Ethics arises because, in accepting Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions, and in dis-
covering that the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is violated – two valid methods of ethics conflict 
–, Sidgwick concludes that we cannot trust our Practical Reason. 
1.2. The Three Methods of Ethics 
The Profoundest Problem of Ethics would not arise if: (i) there was only one method of ethics 
implicit in our common moral reasoning; (ii) there appeared to be different methods of ethics, they 
appeared to yield conflicting conclusions, but under closer examination, we discovered that one or 
both of the conflicting methods can be rejected or modified; or (iii) there were different methods 
implicit in our common moral reasoning, but they did not yield conflicting conclusions.16 The rest 
of this first chapter illustrates that, for Sidgwick, (i) and (ii) are false. In the next chapter – Chapter 
2 – I explain that, according to Sidgwick, (iii) is also false.  
In particular, Sidgwick claims there are three methods of ethics implicitly present in the 
common practical reasoning of human beings: Intuitionism, Rational Egoism, and Rational Be-
nevolence. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics, as I explain in the next chapter, expresses the con-
flict between Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence. However, before I explain the Profound-
est Problem of Ethics, it is necessary to, first, explain why Sidgwick considers that there are only 
                                                        
16 These options follow from the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics and the Principle of Practical Reason’s 
Reliability. 
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these three methods of ethics and, then, analyze each of these methods of ethics in particular to 
understand to what extent Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence conflict.  
First of all, though, it is important to clarify that, even though Sidgwick indeed believes 
that these three methods of ethics are present in our common moral reasoning, he does not claim 
that people conceive them as separate, distinct, methods. In the apparent cognitions that most hu-
man beings have “about rightness or reasonableness”, suggests Sidgwick, these three methods are 
simultaneously voicing – if I can use this expression – its dictates. (17) The task of the philosopher 
is precisely, then, to analytically distinguish these implicit methods and bring them under scrutiny 
to define the content and validity of their dictates.  
Now, Sidgwick, in defining Ethics, implicitly introduces a difference between two types 
of actions that are commonly regarded as right: (a) actions that are right inasmuch as the perfor-
mance of these actions appears rational in itself; and (b) actions that are right because they promote 
an end that is regarded as rational to promote.17 (78) Sidgwick derives the three methods of ethics 
from this distinction.  
Regarding actions right in themselves, Sidgwick claims that there are certain unconditional 
rules that human beings see as rational to follow, apparently independently of the results that such 
actions might bring about. When human beings regard actions as right in themselves, Sidgwick 
claims that they are implicitly following a first method of ethics: namely, Intuitionism.  
Regarding actions that are right because they promote an end that is rational to promote, 
Sidgwick explains that there are two ultimate ends which human beings commonly regard as ulti-
mately reasonable to aim: Happiness and Perfection. (9) Although at the outset Sidgwick considers 
                                                        
17 I am aware that according to David Brink’s interpretation of Sidgwick, the Profoundest Problem is a 
conflict between a method constituting a rational theory and a method constituting a theory of morality. 
However, I agree with David Phillips that Brink’s claim is contrary to the basic textual evidence in The 
Methods of Ethics. (Brink 1988: 299; Phillips 2011: 137) Upon doing a careful analysis of The Methods of 
Ethics, I believe it is quite difficult to agree with Brink’s view.  
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Perfection itself as an end that human beings consider rational to promote – both their own Per-
fection and that of the whole of society – Sidgwick finally rejects it as a secondary end, that is: as 
an end which persons promote only to attain another end, which, as we will see when analyzing 
Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence, is Happiness.18 (395) Sidgwick, then, regards Happi-
ness as the only end that human beings recognize as rational to be promoted in itself. Happiness, 
Sidgwick says, can be promoted universally and individually.   
Precisely, when Happiness is taken as an end to be promoted for the individual, primarily 
benefiting himself, Sidgwick claims human beings follow a distinct method of ethics: namely, 
Rational Egoism.  
Finally, when Happiness is taken, instead, as an end to be promoted universally, benefiting 
in this way the whole of a society, Sidgwick claims human beings are implicitly following another 
distinct method of ethics: namely, Rational Benevolence. According to Sidgwick, as I explain in 
the next section, Rational Benevolence coincides with the dictates of a particular ethical theory: 
namely, Utilitarianism. 
According to Sidgwick, then, Intuitionism, Rational Egoism, and Utilitarianism are the 
three methods of ethics present in the ordinary practical thought of human beings when determin-
ing what they ‘ought’ – or what it is ‘right’ for them – to do or to seek to realize. Once Sidgwick 
has established that there are indeed these three methods of ethics, he analyzes the three methods 
to determine if they actually yield conflicting conclusions. I explain Sidgwick’s analysis in the 
next three sections. For now, let us give these three provisional definitions: 
                                                        
18 Although Lazari-Radek and Singer agree with Sidgwick’s claim, in Chapter 8 “Ultimate Good, Part I: 
Perfectionism and Desire-Based Theory” of The Point of View of the Universe, they show that Thomas 
Hurka and John Rawls have offered accounts of perfectionism that overcome Sidgwick’s objection. (Lazari-
Radek & Singer 2011: 236-238) 
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Intuitionism: View of ethics which regards as the practically ultimate end of 
moral actions their conformity to certain rules or dictates of 
Duty unconditionally prescribed. (96)  
Egoism: We must … understand by an Egoist a man who when two or 
more courses of action are open to him, ascertains … the 
amounts of pleasure and pain that are likely to result from each, 
and chooses the one which he thinks will yield him the greatest 
surplus of pleasure over pain. (121) 
Utilitarianism: Ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given cir-
cumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the 
greatest amount of happiness on the whole. (411)  
1.2.1. Intuitionism19 
Sidgwick defines Intuitionism as the method of ethics that determines what human beings ought 
to do by appealing to certain rules that these persons conceive as right in themselves: that is, as 
rules that ought to be obeyed independently of the outcome that following these rules might bring 
about. Sidgwick indicates that there are two senses in which the term ‘intuitional’ is used. In a 
wider sense it refers to our capacity to judge immediately what ought to be done or aimed at. (97) 
In this wider sense, the term ‘intuition’ can be applied to both the methods of Utilitarianism and 
Rational Egoism, as it merely appeals to our capacity of moral re-cognition, Practical Reason, with 
                                                        
19 I start by the Intuitional Method, and not Rational Egoism as Sidgwick does it in The Methods of Ethics, 
because it will be much easier to explain Egoism as it is presented in the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
when the Principle of Prudence, implied in Rational Egoism, has been “discovered” through the analysis of 
the Intuitional Method.  
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which we are able to cognize certain acts as right. In the narrower sense of the term ‘intuitional’, 
the Intuitional Method refers to the capacity “of seeing clearly that certain kinds of action are right 
and reasonable in themselves, apart from their consequences”. (200) In the narrower sense, Intui-
tionism is, by definition, opposed to Utilitarianism and Egoism (because these methods, by defini-
tion, appeal to consequences). Sidgwick, looking for a “distinct ethical method,” starts by confin-
ing himself to Intuitionism in the narrower sense. (201) Sidgwick explains that there are three 
phases in which human beings pursue the Intuitional Method: 
I. Perceptual Intuitionism 
Perceptual Intuitionism is the phase in which human beings claim to have immediate par-
ticular intuitions regarding the dictates of Duty, these intuitions being self-evident by themselves, 
without requiring further moral reasoning. In this phase, Sidgwick explains, human beings claim 
to be able to judge each action individually as right or as wrong, without the necessity to appeal to 
rules of conduct or to discover its rightness or wrongness through reflection. Sidgwick quickly 
indicates that few human beings seem to be satisfied with such intuitions as to remain in the Per-
ceptual phase, though. (100) 
Instead, Sidgwick explains, human beings, inasmuch as their perceptual intuitions some-
times conflict with the intuitions of other human beings, find the need to appeal to the consent 
underlying the “Positive Morality of the community” (or morality of Common Sense), to support 
their own intuitions. (215) Sidgwick defines Morality of Common Sense – or Common-Sense 
Morality – as follows: 
Common-Sense Morality: Collection “of … general rules, as to the validity of which 
there would be apparent agreement at least among moral 
persons of our own age and civilization” and “regarded as 
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a code imposed on an individual by the public opinion of 
the community to which it belongs”. (215)  
II. Dogmatic Intuitionism 
Dogmatic Intuitionism is the second phase, in which human beings claim that the principles 
currently accepted, conforming to the Morality of Common Sense, are, to them, self-evident moral 
intuitions. (101) Again, Sidgwick realizes that Dogmatic Intuitionism is not self-sufficient. After 
closely analyzing the central duties and virtues that Common-Sense Morality prescribes (such as 
Wisdom, Benevolence, Justice, Veracity, Prudence, Purity, Courage, Humility…), Sidgwick con-
cludes that Common-Sense Morality can only give “practical guidance to common people in com-
mon circumstances,” but it is not able to be elevated into a scientific form. (361) 
In Sidgwick’s view, the duties or virtues commonly recognized as self-evident must fulfill, 
at least in their common form, four conditions in order for them to be “in the highest degree of 
certainty attainable”. (338) These four conditions are:  
(1) The terms of the proposition must be clear and precise. (338) 
(2) The self-evidence of the proposition must be ascertained by careful reflection. (339) 
(3) The propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually consistent. (341) 
(4) It needs to be accepted ‘universally’, or produce ‘general’ consent. (341)  
Sidgwick claims, and spends a great length of his book showing, that none of the principles 
recognized by Common-Sense Morality satisfy all four conditions presented above. But Sidgwick 
believes he has discovered something more: Every time that such principles do not offer clear 
guidance, claims Sidgwick, human beings seem to appeal to the consequences of one’s action to 
show that, in case of doubt, the right action is that which yields a better outcome. In this sense, the 
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Intuitional Method, in its Dogmatic phase, appeals to the notion of ‘Good’ to define the notion of 
‘Right’.20  
Sidgwick finds, then, that Intuitionism as a method of ethics cannot be understood in the 
narrow sense of the term ‘intuition’: that is, recognizing certain rules as right in themselves, inde-
pendently from the consequences. Instead, Sidgwick discovers that, when the apparently cogniza-
ble principles of Common-Sense Morality do not offer clear guidance, Intuitionism becomes a 
rational procedure that claims that the rationality of an action is proportional to the value the action 
would produce in terms of welfare. However, Sidgwick explains, insofar as Dogmatic Intuitionism 
does not appeal systematically to certain self-evident principles but just appeals to the benefits 
produced by one’s action to determine its rightness, it is not clear how these benefits ought to be 
assessed.  
If Intuitionism is to be constituted into a system of Intuitional Ethics, Sidgwick claims, it 
needs to be elevated into a third phase in which such principles are provided: namely, Philosoph-
ical Intuitionism. In this phase, as we will see, Sidgwick explains that Intuitionism determines that 
benefits and harms ought to be distributed among persons and among time differently depending 
on the point of view taken by the person determining how the value of an action needs to be ac-
counted. It is here when Sidgwick discovers that Intuitionism yields two principles that structurally 
differ among each other in the way they dictate that benefits and harms ought to be distributed.21 
This is the origin of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. 
                                                        
20 Sidgwick has explained that the object of ethical inquiry can be regarded as the ‘Right’ or as the ‘Good’, 
but the two notions are, prima facie, distinct. (3) The two notions are, in Sidgwick’s view, connected: right 
conduct cannot be defined without a conception of the good. In particular, Sidgwick defines right conduct 
in terms of the Ultimate Good. (391) Phillips presents an “Unfairness Objection” to Sidgwick, as he claims 
that Sidgwick only applies these conditions to the principles of Common-Sense Morality but not to his 
principles. However, Phillips ultimately accepts principles that are very similar to the ones that Sidgwick 
suggests. See: (Phillips 2011: 100) or (Lazari-Radek & Singer 2011: 144). 
21 I have borrowed this way of explaining Sidgwick from David Brink’s classification between different 
types of rational theories. Brink, though, would not agree that Intuitionism unfolds into two rational pro-
cedures that conflict. (Brink 1997A: 98) 
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III. Philosophical Intuitionism 
As Sidgwick explains, Philosophical Intuitionism needs to transcend the descriptive char-
acter of Dogmatic Intuitionism (which expresses the common moral opinions of mankind) and 
provide a normative account of the ethical self-evident principles that human beings ought to fol-
low. (373) To do so, Sidgwick investigates if the principles commonly accepted in Common-Sense 
Morality contain at least self-evident elements that allow them to be elevated to moral axioms.22 
According to Sidgwick, only three principles allow of such an elevation (all other principles held 
by Common-Sense Morality being subordinate to these): the principles of Justice, Prudence, and 
Rational Benevolence. (382)  
The Principle of Justice, Sidgwick explains, refers us to the common notions of ‘equity’ 
and ‘fairness,’ suggesting that human beings ought not to treat differently individuals that are not 
substantially different. The self-evident element contained in the Principle of Justice is, according 
to Sidgwick: 
SEEJ  It “cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner which it would be wrong 
for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different individ-
uals, and without there being any difference between the natures or cir-
cumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for dif-
ference of treatment”. (380)  
From this self-evident element (SEEJ), Sidgwick concludes: 
                                                        
22 Sidgwick warns philosophers against what he calls ‘sham-axioms’: “principles which appear certain and 
self-evident because they are substantially tautological” because either (a) they are empty of meaning, or 
(b) they are reached by a circular argument. (375) For example, it is circular if one claims that “one ought 
to aim at one’s own good’ and defines ‘good’ as what ‘one ought to aim at’. Parfit also warns us of these 
concealed tautologies. (Parfit 2011: 70) 
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Principle of Justice:  Different “individuals are not to be treated differently, except on 
grounds of universal application”.23 (496) 
There is some controversy regarding how many self-evident principles underlie the Princi-
ple of Rational Benevolence. (Phillips 2011: 96) Although there is one essential self-evident ele-
ment from which the Principle of Rational Benevolence can be derived (SEEB-1), there is also 
another element which David Phillips claims is necessary to be able to see the Principle of Rational 
Benevolence as self-evident (SEEB-2). For now, let me present both these self-evident elements.  
SEEB-1  The “good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point 
of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other”. 
(382)  
SEEB-2 As “a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally … not merely at 
a particular part of it”. (382) 
With SEEB-1, Sidgwick suggests that from the impartial point of view of the universe, 
everyone’s welfare is equally important. If the rationality of an action indeed depends, as Sidgwick 
has suggested, on the benefits it would produce, and the welfare of every individual is equally 
important from the point of view of the universe, then right actions, other things equal, ought not 
to benefit my welfare more than the welfare of others. From SEEB-1, then, Sidgwick can conclude:  
                                                        
23 Although I agree with Phillips when he claims that “Sidgwick explicitly does not give any single-canon-
ical expression of the principle” of Justice, his claim only applies to the chapter “Philosophical Intuition-
ism,” where Sidgwick presents for the first time such a principle. (Phillips 2011: 96) Instead, I believe that 
Sidgwick does present a clear expression of the Principle in the last chapter, and I present it here as such. 
(496) I also present the relation between principles and the self-evident elements differently than does Phil-
lips. 
 26 
Principle of Rational Benevolence: Each “one is morally bound to regard the good of 
any other individual as much as his own”.24 (382) 
SEEB-2, then, is not needed, as Phillips suggests, to derive the Principle of Rational Be-
nevolence. In fact, SEEB-2 could be easily regarded as a concealed tautology. When I claim that 
as a rational being, I am bound to aim at the good generally and not merely at a particular part of 
it, I can mean two things: (a) that when I am aiming at a certain good – the welfare of a human 
being, for instance –, I ought to aim at that good on the whole – the welfare of the human being on 
the whole; or (b) that when I am aiming at a particular good – the welfare of a human being at a 
moment in time, for instance –, and then I learn that the particular good that I am aiming is part of 
a more general good – a human being that persists in time –, I ought then to aim at this general 
good, and not the initial particular good. As far as I can see, (a) is evident insofar as it is a concealed 
tautology: it just says that when one aims at a good, one aims at all that this good is. Instead, (b) 
is not a concealed tautology, but it is not self-evident either. To judge the truth of (b) it is needed 
to ensure that the particular good really belongs to a more general good, and then that it would be 
irrational to promote that particular good without promoting the general good.  
Now, I suggest that Sidgwick does believe that SEEB-2, in the form (b), is a self-evident 
principle. And he actually – implicitly – appeals to it in two occasions. On the one hand, Sidgwick 
uses SEEB-2 to derive the Principle of Prudence from its self-evident element (SEEP). On the 
other hand, as I claim later, Sidgwick assumes that the Principle of Rational Benevolence underlies 
Utilitarianism precisely because he assumes that SEEB-2, understood as (b), is true. 25  
                                                        
24 Sidgwick assumes here that the fact that one is bound to regard the good of any other individual as much 
as his own necessarily entails that one is bound to be concerned about the good of any other individual as 
much as his own 
25 As we will see, Sidgwick claims that the Principle of Rational Benevolence is required as a rational basis 
for Utilitarianism. Insofar as Utilitarianism, in its final form, claims that a right action is that which will 
produce the greatest amount of happiness (good) on the whole, it is not clear, without SEEB-2, how the 
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Let us turn now to the Principle of Prudence and its self-evident element (SEEP): 
SEEP  “Hereafter as such is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now”. (381) 
Principle of Prudence:      One “ought to aim at one’s own good … on the whole”. (381) 
Now, Sidgwick does not explain clearly the connection between SEEP and the self-evident 
Principle of Prudence. (381-382) But in a note to Chapter I of Book II, “The Principle and Method 
of Egoism,” Sidgwick indicates that from SEEP, one can infer that one ought to have “equal and 
impartial concern for all parts of one’s conscious life”. (124n) Sidgwick seems to believe that this 
claim is equivalent to the Principle of Prudence. I am uncertain that this is so. That ‘one is con-
cerned equally for all parts of one’s conscious life’ does not entail that ‘one ought to aim at one’s 
own good on the whole.’  
SEEB-2 is needed. David Brink, without appealing to SEEB-2, precisely suggests that 
Sidgwick can derive the Principle of Prudence from SEEP because Sidgwick relies on the notion 
of the separateness of persons. I will explain this notion in detail when I explain Brink’s account. 
However, the separateness of persons precisely entails that part of what it means to be a separate 
person is that from my position now I cannot be concerned about myself now without being con-
cerned about myself as a whole. (Brink 1997A: 103) This is precisely what was needed for SEEB-
2, in its (b) form, to be justified.26 
At this moment, there are two points to be made. First, while the Principle of Justice is 
directed at ensuring that human beings ought to treat equally everyone who is substantially equal, 
                                                        
Principle of Rational Benevolence can really be required as a rational basis for Utilitarianism. Even in this 
case, as I explain later, I believe the appeal to SEEB-2 is problematic. 
26 Authors such as Derek Parfit have cast doubt upon Prudence, precisely denying the separateness of per-
sons. Parfit claims that the separateness of persons relies in a conception of personal identity that wrongly 
assumes that identity persists over time in a way that I ought to be concerned equally for all the parts of my 
life. This would deny SEEB-2. (Parfit 1987: 215, 263) 
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it does not explain how human beings ought to treat other human beings. In other words, it does 
not specify which actions are right, but it just dictates that whatever other principles dictate what 
is right to do, we ought not to exclude some human beings from being treated in a similar way 
without a reason grounding the difference of treatment. In this sense, Sidgwick leaves both the 
Principle of Prudence and the Principle of Rational Benevolence to determinate right conduct.  
Second, if the definitions of the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence are 
sound, says Sidgwick, “the practical determination of Right Conduct depends on the determination 
of Ultimate Good”. (391) In Sidgwick’s view, the Ultimate Good can be conceived in three ways. 
(A) The Ultimate Good is Virtue 
Sidgwick claims that to define the Ultimate Good in terms of Virtue would lead to a logical 
circularity. After disregarding virtues, which turn into vices when pursued to an extreme (which 
could not possibly be the Ultimate Good precisely because the Principles of Prudence and Rational 
Benevolence would then lead to vice), Sidgwick realizes that the only Virtues (according to Com-
mon Sense), which could be taken as the Universal Good, are Wisdom, Universal Benevolence, 
and Justice. But, none of these virtues could actually constitute the Ultimate Good since, when one 
attempts to define them, their definitions need to appeal to some other Good. Sidgwick claims:  
Wisdom is insight into Good and the means to Good; Benevolence is exhibited in 
the purposive actions called “doing good:” Justice … lies in distributing Good (or 
evil) impartially according to right rules. (393)  
 
As all virtues contain the notion ‘good’ in their definition, Sidgwick claims, defining the 
Ultimate Good in terms of Virtue would be falling into a circular argument. Furthermore, even if 
Virtue could be recognized as an end to be pursued in itself, Sidgwick indicates that it could not 
be taken as the Ultimate Good. Sidgwick shows that human beings often wonder about the limits 
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within which morality requires them to be virtuous. According to Sidgwick, this indicates that 
there is some other (Ultimate) Good which human beings do not want to renounce, even if it is 
required to do so to act virtuously. Thus, according to Sidgwick, this shows that Virtue cannot be 
taken as the sole Ultimate Good. (394)  
(B) The Ultimate Good is Perfection or Excellence 
Sidgwick discards Perfection on the same grounds that he disregards Virtue as the Ultimate 
Good. In Sidgwick’s words:27  
However immediately the excellent quality of such gifts and skills [that conform 
the notion of human Perfection] may be recognized and admired, reflection shows 
that they are only valuable on account of the good or desirable conscious life in 
which they are or will be actualized. (395) 
 
(C) The Ultimate Good is Desirable Conscious or Sentient Life 
Sidgwick claims that desirable conscious life can be understood in two ways: either as (a) 
mere self-preservation (of one’s own life or of the community to which one belongs) or as (b) 
Happiness. (397-8) Sidgwick, as he often does, is quick to discard the option he believes is mis-
guided. In Sidgwick’s view, self-preservation (either of one’s own life or of the community or the 
race to which one belongs) cannot be taken as the Ultimate Good by itself, as (again in Sidgwick’s 
view)human beings only desire their own self-preservation or that of its species inasmuch as they 
assume that such self-preservation will be accompanied with some degree of “Consciousness on 
the whole desirable”. (397) In other words, Sidgwick argues that if human beings would not expect 
any happiness throughout their lives, they would not regard their own preservation as the Ultimate 
                                                        
27 We can see why Sidgwick discarded Perfection as an end that human beings regard as ultimately reason-
able to promote.  
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Good, and an eternal life would appear valueless to them. If this is so, Sidgwick claims, human 
beings regard Happiness or Pleasure as their Ultimate Good.  
Consequently, the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence need to be restated:28 
Principle of Prudence: One ought to aim at one’s own Happiness on the 
whole.  
Principle of Benevolence:  Each one is morally bound to regard the Happiness 
of any other individual as much as his own. 
Philosophical Intuitionism, then, leads us to, on the one hand, a Principle of Justice (fo-
cused on who and not on how) that guarantees equal treatment for substantially equal individuals. 
On the other hand, it leads us to two self-evident principles, Rational Benevolence and Prudence, 
that determine what human beings ought to do. We can see now that Rational Benevolence and 
Prudence differ structurally on how to distribute happiness among different individuals. While the 
Principle of Rational Benevolence is neutral regarding whose welfare matters – everyone’s happi-
ness is equally important – the Principle of Prudence is, instead, biased as to whose welfare matters 
– prioritizing one’s own happiness.29  
Now, in Sidgwick’s view, the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence underlie 
the two other methods of ethics which are actually present in the ordinary practical thought of 
human beings when studying what human beings ought to do: namely, Egoism and Utilitarianism. 
In Sidgwick’s words: 
                                                        
28 Sidgwick does not formulate these principles in these terms. I have substituted the term ‘good’ for ‘hap-
piness’. It is important to clarify here, also, that Sidgwick does not claim that the principles themselves are 
self-evident: as I have explained, these principles are derived from certain self-evident propositions.  
29 I am drawing here from Brink 1997A.  
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The axiom of Prudence, as I have given it, is a self-evident principle, implied in 
Rational Egoism as commonly accepted. Again, the axiom of Justice … belongs in 
all its applications to Utilitarianism as much as to any system commonly called 
Intuitional: while the axiom of Rational Benevolence is, in my view, required as a 
rational basis for the Utilitarian system. (386-387) 
 
Let us move now to these two remaining methods: Egoism and Utilitarianism. First, how-
ever, let me reinforce a point that I made just before I explained Philosophical Intuitionism. I 
claimed then that the word ‘intuition’, when applied to Intuitionism in its third phase, cannot be 
understood in its narrower sense. In fact, the three self-evident ethical intuitions (corresponding to 
the principles of Justice, Prudence, and Rational Benevolence) discovered by the elevation of In-
tuitionism to Philosophical Intuitionism cannot be regarded as intuitions in this narrower sense. 
Instead, they need to be understood in the wider sense: as immediate intuitions regarding what 
ought to be done or aimed at, being as such not only compatible with Egoism and Utilitarianism, 
but, as we just have seen, according to Sidgwick, also intimately connected to these methods.30 
Sidgwick arrives, then, at the conclusion that the Intuitional Method cannot properly be regarded 
as an independent method of ethics. 
On the one hand, Sidgwick claims: “Accordingly, I find that I arrive, in my search for really 
clear and certain ethical intuitions, at the fundamental Principle of Utilitarianism”. (387) On the 
other hand, Sidgwick claims the “axiom of Prudence … is [only] a self-evident principle, implied 
in Rational Egoism”. (386) Sidgwick does not explain, more than by the fact that he is an acknowl-
edged utilitarian, why the Principle of Prudence is only implied in Rational Egoism.  
                                                        
30 The distinction between a narrower and a wider sense of the term ‘intuitional’ only applies to the Percep-
tional and Dogmatic phases of Intuitionism. In the Philosophical phase, Intuitionism ultimately leads to 
Utilitarianism and Egoism. The term ‘intuitional’ is not, with Philosophical Intuitionism, by definition op-
posed to Utilitarianism and Egoism.  
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1.2.2. Rational Egoism 
Sidgwick claims that the Principle of Prudence is implied in the method of Rational Egoism. In 
Book II, Sidgwick explains that Egoism determines that the rational end of action for each indi-
vidual is his own greatest happiness (119). If this is so, it is not difficult to see why the Principle 
of Prudence is implied in Rational Egoism: if I ought to aim at my own greatest happiness, and I 
ought not to prefer a lesser present happiness to a greater happiness in the future, I cannot but aim 
at my own greatest happiness except by promoting my happiness on the whole.31  
1.2.3. Utilitarianism 
Sidgwick indicates that the relation between the Principle of Rational Benevolence and 
Utilitarianism is stronger than the relation between the Principle of Prudence and Egoism. As we 
have seen, according to Sidgwick, the Principle of Rational Benevolence is required as a rational 
basis for Utilitarianism. In Sidgwick’s view, the Principle of Rational Benevolence is the missing 
element needed to complete the proof that John Stuart Mill, “the most persuasive and probably the 
most influential among English expositors of Utilitarianism,” offered for everyone to accept the 
Principle of Utility. (387) Mill’s proof, as Sidgwick explains it, can be schematized in the follow-
ing way. 
John Stuart Mill’s Proof for Utilitarianism: 
1. The only evidence of the desirability of some thing is that people actually desire it.  
2. The only evidence of the desirability of happiness is that people actually desire it. 
                                                        
31  Sidgwick dedicates many pages in The Methods of Ethics to show the weaknesses of Rational Egoism. 
Inasmuch as I am exploring Rational Egoism only in terms of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, and 
Rational Egoism could plausibly respond Sidgwick’s practically oriented criticisms, I do not explain Sidg-
wick’s objections here.  
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3. People do individually desire their own happiness.  
4. General happiness is desired by the aggregate of individuals.  
5. General happiness is desirable.  
Sidgwick indicates that Mill’s aim with this proof is normative and not descriptive. (388) 
Mill not only wants to claim that general happiness is desirable, but also: 
6. Maxim of Utilitarianism:  Human beings ought to desire general happiness.  
However, Sidgwick claims that Mill’s proof, to be able to arrive at 6, is missing its norma-
tive element. (388) As Sidgwick explains, the fact that the aggregate of individuals desires their 
happiness only implies that each of the individuals desires his own happiness, but it does not imply 
that general happiness is desirable for each of the individuals. In other words, Mill is taking the 
aggregate of individuals as a singular unit able to desire general happiness as a Whole and then 
claims that this general desire of this fictitious unit is shared by each of the individuals constituting 
this Whole. 
Sidgwick claims that appealing to the Principle of Rational Benevolence (and by extension 
to the point of view of the Universe) can complete Mill’s proof. (388) However, as I have already 
indicated, I believe that Sidgwick actually needs to rely on SEEB-2 to derive the Utilitarian Maxim 
from the Principle of Rational Benevolence. The argument would go like this: If I am bound to 
regard the Happiness of any other individual as much as my own (Rational Benevolence), and as 
a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, and not at a particular part of it (SEEB-2), 
then, I ought to desire general happiness. This is how the Principle of Rational Benevolence would 
serve as a rational basis for Utilitarianism. 
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However, it is not clear that the appeal to SEEB-2, even in its (b) form, is legitimate here. 
Sidgwick would need to show that my welfare – as a human being – belongs to the sum of every-
one’s welfares in a way that it would be irrational to promote my welfare – in this case, happiness 
– without promoting everyone’s welfare. But this is precisely what Mill’s proof is trying to show.  
In this sense, Sidgwick cannot appeal to SEEB-2. In that case, the only way in which we 
could derive the Maxim of Utilitarianism from the Principle of Rational Benevolence is if the term 
‘happiness’ in Rational Benevolence and the Maxim of Utilitarianism had a commensurable mean-
ing. And I believe it does not. In Rational Benevolence, the term ‘happiness’ refers to the happiness 
of a singular individual, claiming that I ought to regard each individual happiness in the same 
degree. In the Maxim of Utilitarianism, the term ‘happiness’ refers instead to the General Happi-
ness of a supposed Whole constituted by the aggregate of individuals.32 Sidgwick’s argument, 
then, is problematic.  
Let us assume, though, for now, that Sidgwick’s argument is sound.33 This would be, ac-
cording to Sidgwick, of fundamental importance: if the Principle of Rational Benevolence is 
needed as the rational basis for the proof of Utilitarianism, and such principle is obtained as a self-
evident principle when analyzing the Intuitional Method, then the Intuitional method and the Util-
itarian method are complementary. Sidgwick claims:  
We have found that the common antithesis between Intuitionist and Utilitarians 
must be entirely discarded: since such abstract moral principles as we can admit to 
be really self-evident are not only not incompatible with a Utilitarian system, but 
even seem required to furnish a rational basis for such as a system. (496)  
                                                        
32 As Lazari-Radek and Singer claim: “Perhaps … what utilitarians have failed to appreciate is that when 
we properly recognize the separateness of persons, it is no longer possible to add up the sum of the good or 
bad things that may happen to each of them” (Lazari-Radek & Singer 2011: 139). Sidgwick is assuming 
that individual happiness is only a part of some General Happiness, and that is why he claims he is able to 
infer the maxim of Utilitarianism from the Principle of Rational Benevolence.  
33 If my argument is sound, Rational Benevolence and Utilitarianism do not necessarily coincide, as Sidg-
wick assumes. This would be crucial to understand the Profoundest Problem of Ethics without needing to 
appeal to Utilitarianism.  
 35 
Let us recapitulate. As we explained, Sidgwick’s aim in The Methods of Ethics is to analyze 
the relation of the different methods of ethics, to see if their dictates of what human beings ought 
to do, or aim at, are compatible with each other. If Sidgwick were to find that two or more methods 
conflicted, ethics itself would be in peril. Until this moment, we have seen that Intuitionism gives 
three self-evident ethical principles, and in its higher form it is not an independent rational proce-
dure, but rather, on the one hand, it provides the rational basis for Utilitarianism and, on the other 
hand, it provides a principle implicit in Rational Egoism. If my analysis of The Methods of Ethics 
is sound, Sidgwick has shown until now that the antecedent of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics 
is true: that is, that two different rational procedures – namely, Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism 
– dictate different principles.  
Finally, now, we can ask: what is, then, the relation between Rational Egoism and Utilitar-
ianism? Sidgwick analyzes the relationship between these two methods in the last chapter of The 
Methods of Ethics. (386) Before we move to the second chapter of this thesis, we can now give 
definitions of Utilitarianism, Rational Egoism, and Intuitionism in their final forms: 
Intuitionism: Method of Ethics that dictates that we have the capacity to judge 
immediately what ought to be done or aimed at. 
Utilitarianism: Method of Ethics that dictates that the conduct which is objec-
tively right is that which will produce the greatest amount of 
happiness for society on the whole.  
Rational Egoism: Method of Ethics that dictates that the conduct which is objec-
tively right is that which will produce the agent’s own greatest 
happiness on the whole. 
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Chapter 2. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
Sidgwick claims that the dictates of the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence appear 
each as self-evident from their own different points of view. (7, 382) The Principle of Prudence is 
self-evident when we analyze the notion of the Good while taking the point of view of the individ-
ual: it is self-evident that for me, my own happiness is all-important. (420) And, as we will now 
see, if I remain in my individual point of view, in Sidgwick’s view, I cannot self-evidently see that 
I ought to regard the happiness of other individuals as much as my own: I can confine myself 
(without being irrational) to claim that for me, my own happiness is my Ultimate Good. It is only, 
as Sidgwick (cautiously) proposes, when we take the point of view of the Universe (and we lose 
our individual point of view) that the Ultimate Good cannot be my individual happiness. From the 
point of view of the Universe, Sidgwick explains, my “happiness cannot be a more important part 
of Good, taken universally, than the equal happiness of any other person.” (421) In this sense, from 
the point of view of the Universe, the Principle of Rational Benevolence becomes self-evident, in 
detriment of the Principle of Prudence. The two principles are, then, for Sidgwick, incommensura-
ble.34  
                                                        
34 This is not an uncontroversial claim, both exegetically and philosophically speaking. Philosophically 
speaking, interpretations such as Parfit’s or Frankena’s, tend to go around this detail, claiming that the 
principles of Rational Benevolence and Prudence can be asserted without appealing to different points of 
view (Parfit 2011: 135; Frankena 1974: 456). They do so to sustain completely opposite claims: while Parfit 
uses it to maintain that the two principles are not incommensurable, Frankena does so to claim that they 
actually are incommensurable (Parfit 2011: 135; Frankena 1974: 456). Exegetically speaking, there is also 
controversy: for example, while Parfit philosophically dismisses appealing to points of view, he does con-
cede that Sidgwick appeals to them; Frankena, by contrast, claims that Sidgwick does not really appeal to 
different points of view to defend the self-evidence of Prudence and Benevolence (Parfit 2011: 134; 
Frankena 1974: 456). From this, we can infer that exegetical accord is not necessary to provide a philo-
sophically interesting view which departs from Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. I, for example, exegeti-
cally agree with Parfit, but I philosophically agree with Frankena’s regarding the incommensurability of 
both principles. This is why, even though I understand that this claim is controversial, I have opted to 
explain Sidgwick as I read him. If someone does not agree with my interpretation, I do not think it would 
matter much: philosophically speaking one can take different positions independently of the exegetical in-
terpretation that one wants to defend.  
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2.1. Sidgwick’s Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
In Sidgwick’s view, since the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence and the methods 
of Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism, both principles and methods appearing as self-evident only 
from their own respective points of view, dictate respectively to aim at one’s own greatest happi-
ness on the whole and to aim at the greatest general happiness on the whole, Utilitarianism and 
Rational Egoism yield conflicting conclusions. Sidgwick labels the conflict between Rational Ego-
ism and Utilitarianism the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. It is profoundest because this conflict 
violates the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics that, Sidgwick assumes – in what I call the Principle 
of Practical Reason’s Reliability –, is biconditionally related to the possibility to trust our Practical 
Reason. If the conflict between Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism would indeed occur, then it 
would cast doubt upon the reliability of our moral reasoning, and we would be pushed to doubt the 
authority of our rational capacity to determine right conduct.  
Sidgwick seems to have two options if he wants to avoid falling into the Profoundest Prob-
lem of Ethics: either (i) Sidgwick can show that either Utilitarianism or Egoism can be theoreti-
cally rejected or modified; or, (ii) Sidgwick can show that, even if the Principles of Prudence and 
Rational Benevolence yield conflicting conclusions, this conflict is practically irrelevant, because 
acting in accordance with the Principle of Prudence yields the same results as acting in accordance 
with the Principle of Rational Benevolence. In case (ii), then, it would not matter which principle 
one would actually promote, because they would both guarantee one’s own happiness on the whole 
and the greatest general happiness.  
If this is not demonstrated, if one cannot either demonstrate that Utilitarianism or Egoism 
can be rejected or modified, or that the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence are prac-
tically harmonized, Sidgwick’s study of the methods of ethics would lead, as I have indicated, to 
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the conclusion that two of the methods, present in the ordinary practical thought of human beings 
when determining the principles of ethics, directly conflict.  
In that case, claims Sidgwick, we would be forced “to admit an ultimate and fundamental 
contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct; and from this admission 
it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of the Practical Reason, manifested 
in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory”. (508) This contradiction constitutes the 
Profoundest Problem of Ethics. 
Keeping this in mind, I believe that the last chapter of The Methods of Ethics, in which 
Sidgwick presents his full account of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, can be virtually divided 
in two sections. Each corresponds to one of the two options Sidgwick has to avoid the conflict 
between Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism, and the subsequent violation of the Fundamental 
Postulate of Ethics: first, Sidgwick’s attempt to theoretically solve the Profoundest Problem by 
showing that (I) Utilitarianism or Egoism can be rejected or modified; and second, Sidgwick’s 
attempt to practically solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics by showing that (II) the Principles 
of Prudence and Rational Benevolence, although they theoretically conflict, practically yield the 
same outcomes. 
2.1.1. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics Is Theoretically Unsolvable 
Sidgwick renounces from the beginning the possibility of rejecting or modifying Utilitarianism, 
and he attempts to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics by suggesting that Egoism seems vul-
nerable to be overruled by Utilitarianism. In the chapter “The Proof of Utilitarianism,” Sidgwick 
presents a proof, analogous to that presented by Mill, in which Sidgwick attempts to show that 
Utilitarianism can offer an argument to convince the Egoist to join the Utilitarian cause. To do so, 
Sidgwick claims, the Egoist needs to put “forward, implicitly or explicitly, the proposition that his 
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happiness or pleasure is Good, not only for him but from the point of the view of the Universe, - 
as (e.g.) by saying that ‘nature designed him to seek his own happiness”. (420, 421) If the Egoist 
accepts this premise, the Utilitarian can then point out to him that from the point of view of the 
Universe, a part of Good (the egoist’s sole happiness) cannot be more important than the happiness 
of any other part. Then, the Utilitarian can convince the Egoist that if he really wants to aim at the 
general Good, he ought to aim at General Happiness, and thus subscribe to Utilitarianism. (421)  
Sidgwick confesses, however, that his Utilitarian proof is vulnerable to the radical Egoist.35 
If the radical Egoist rejects the premise that, by aiming at his own Good or happiness, he is actually 
aiming at the General Good, the proof would not appeal to him. Sidgwick claims:  
If the Egoist strictly confines himself to stating his conviction that he ought to take 
his own happiness or pleasure as his ultimate end, there seems no opening for any 
line of reasoning to lead him to Universalistic Hedonism as a first principle; it can-
not be proved that the difference between his own happiness and another’s happi-
ness is not for him all-important. (420)  
 
In other words, Sidgwick realizes that although the Utilitarian can convince the Egoist to 
accept the Principle of Rational Benevolence when the Egoist agrees to take the point of view of 
the universe with regard to the Good, there is no rational proof to show the radical Egoist that he 
ought to take such universal point of view. Then, as we have explained, without taking the point 
of view of the universe, the Principle of Rational Benevolence will not be self-evident to him, the 
radical Egoist. More than this, as Sidgwick claims, “even if a man admits the self-evidence of the 
Principle of Rational Benevolence, he may still hold that his own happiness is an end which it is 
irrational for him to sacrifice to any other”. (498) If that is the case, to ensure that morality can be 
                                                        
35 The radical Egoist assumes that he is not promoting the Universal Good, and thus is happy to claim that 
his actions would not be right from the point of view of the universe. The objection of the radical Egoist is 
analogous to my objection against (SEEB-2) in section 1.2.3 Utilitarianism.  
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made completely rational, Sidgwick would need to show that the Principles of Prudence and Ra-
tional Benevolence can be practically harmonized.  
2.1.2. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics Is Practically Unsolvable 
Now, if there is no rational proof to convince the radical Egoist to adopt the point of view of the 
universe, necessary to see the Principle of Rational Benevolence as self-evident, and if the radical 
Egoist could still regard it as irrational to sacrifice his own happiness to the happiness of any other, 
even if he were to recognize the self-evidence of the Principle of Rational Benevolence, then, 
according to Sidgwick, the Profoundest Problem is theoretically unavoidable. But there is still one 
option left to escape the Profoundest Problem of Ethics: show the radical Egoist that the best way 
to aim at his own greatest happiness is by acting in accordance with the Principle of Rational 
Benevolence. If that could be proved, the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence, as 
well as Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism, would be harmonized.  
I. Appeal to the actual state of society 
Sidgwick admits that “in any tolerable state of society the performance of duties towards 
others and the exercise of social virtues seem generally likely to coincide with the attainment of 
the greatest happiness possible for the virtuous agent”. (498) However, according to Sidgwick, 
there is not in the actual state of society an empirical proof able to ensure the universality and the 
completeness of this otherwise observable tendency. (498) In this sense, Sidgwick explains, the 
coincidence between the greatest happiness of the individual and the greatest general happiness, 
when human beings are acting in accordance with the Principle of Rational Benevolence, cannot 
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be guaranteed in the actual conditions of human life. In the actual state of society, Sidgwick ex-
plains, the results yielded by the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence would only 
conflict in rare cases, but the conflict could (and will) still occur. (489-490) 
Additionally, though Sidgwick has shown that Utilitarianism ultimately underlies the ap-
parent self-evident rules of Common-Sense Morality (by showing the transition between Dogmatic 
and Philosophic Intuitionism), Sidgwick admits that Common-Sense is less rigid than Utilitarian-
ism at dictating human beings to aim at the greatest happiness of the whole. (499) While Utilitar-
ianism requires that one always promotes universal happiness, Common-Sense Morality tells one 
to promote universal happiness except in those cases when one’s own happiness is at risk. Then, 
as the harmony between the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence cannot empirically 
be demonstrated, nor does Common-Sense seem to support such harmony, there will be times in 
which human beings, even if not radical Egoists, will have contradictory intuitions regarding what 
they ought to aim at. The Profoundest Problem, then, in the actual conditions of human life and 
thought, cannot be avoided.  
In the actual conditions of human life, then, according to Sidgwick, Practical Reason is 
divided between two conflicting self-evident principles. There is, in Sidgwick’s words, a Dualism 
of Practical Reason. (Sidgwick 1889: 483) Sidgwick explains such dualism explicitly in the article 
“Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies:” 
Along with (a) a fundamental moral conviction that I ought to sacrifice my own 
happiness, if by so doing I can increase the happiness of others to a greater extent 
than I diminish my own, I find also (b) a conviction … that it would be irrational to 
sacrifice any portion of my own happiness unless the sacrifice is to be somehow at 
some time compensated by an equivalent addition to my own happiness”. (Sidgwick 
1889: 483) 
 
According to Sidgwick, even though the Principle of Rational Benevolence is self-evident, 
he cannot but also believe that “the distinction between any one individual and any other is real 
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and fundamental, and that consequently “I” am concerned with the quality of my existence as an 
individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of 
the existence of other individuals”. (Sidgwick 1889: 483) In Sidgwick’s view, both intuitions ap-
pear equally reasonable, and thus Reason is ultimately divided. Inasmuch as these intuitions are 
incompatible and yield contradictory results, the Profoundest Problem of Ethics is deeply en-
trenched in reality.  
The question is: could the Dualism of Practical Reason be dissolved and, subsequently, the 
Profoundest Problem of Ethics be avoided? Sidgwick implicitly seems to contemplate three other 
options that would practically avoid the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. 
II. Change the actual state of society 
 First, Sidgwick considers the option of improving “the adjustment of the machine of Law 
in any society, and so stimulate and direct the common awards of praise and blame, and so develop 
and train the moral sense of the members of the community, as to render it clearly prudent for 
every individual to promote as much as possible the general good”. (499) In this way, the best way 
for the radical Egoist to promote his own greatest happiness would be by acting in accordance with 
the Principle of Rational Benevolence. However, Sidgwick claims, this option, if ever possible, 
would only serve for a future solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics; it would not serve to 
convince a present Egoist that he ought to aim now at the universal good, if he presently wants to 
guarantee his own greatest happiness. (499) 
III. Sympathy 
Sidgwick wonders if appealing to sympathy, that is, the pleasure that we feel due to the 
happiness of others, could show the Egoist that the best way to promote his own happiness is to 
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promote the happiness of the whole. (500) In the rare cases in which the Principles of Prudence 
and Rational Benevolence conflict, Sidgwick asks if the sympathy human beings feel due to the 
happiness of others would guarantee enough pleasure to overrule the sacrifice that they would 
(apparently) be making by aiming at the greatest general happiness and not at their own greatest 
happiness at that moment. In this sense, Sidgwick is appealing to SEEP, arguing that favoring the 
Principle of Prudence when there is a conflict between the Principles of Prudence and Rational 
Benevolence is to favor a smaller pleasure to the detriment of a greater pleasure: the pleasure that 
we feel through sympathy due to the happiness of others.  
Now, Sidgwick recognizes that sympathy does play a crucial role in aiming at one’s own 
greatest happiness and that the radical Egoist could never achieve his greatest happiness without 
sympathy.36 However, Sidgwick claims, sympathy cannot serve as a proof of the practical harmony 
between the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence for three reasons. First, Sidgwick 
explains that sympathy can direct human beings to follow Rational Egoism, if the happiness at risk 
is not our own but that of people we love or with whom we have close ties. Second, sympathy 
cannot be contemplated only with the pleasures it brings about but also with the pain that it pro-
duces: as Sidgwick claims, considering that in the actual state of society the conditions of human 
life involve pain and misery to a great extent, even the philanthropic human beings will feel pain 
due to the negative characteristics of sympathy. (503) Finally, Sidgwick indicates that in some 
cases, the best way for some man to promote universal happiness is by “working in comparative 
solitude,” renouncing the pleasure of sympathy. (503) 
                                                        
36 Sidgwick claims that he could not enjoy the pleasures due to sympathy. He would miss the elevation to 
pursue a wide interest, as well as the secure and serene satisfaction of pursuing an aim that exceeds the 




Having shown that neither (I) the actual state of society, (II) a future improved state of 
society, nor (III) sympathy, can practically avoid the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, Sidgwick 
considers a fourth option: to percieve the “Utilitarian Code (…) as the Law of God,” the compli-
ance (or not) of which will be rewarded (or punished) in the afterlife with happiness (or pain), but 
Sidgwick realizes that this option does not constitute a proof of the harmony between the Principles 
of Prudence and Rational Benevolence. (504) Instead, it simply entrusts Ethics to theology (and, 
ultimately, to faith). Why? Because, according to Sidgwick, although the Principle of Rational 
Benevolence is self-evident, it is not self-evident that such a principle is dependent on an omnip-
otent God who could guarantee such rewards in an afterlife. (507)  
In this sense, Sidgwick claims, we do not cognize the Utilitarian code and Universal Hap-
piness as an end at which we ought to aim as self-evident through the prior cognition of the exist-
ence of God as self-evident, deducing from the cognition of an omnipotent God the Utilitarian 
code to which He normatively constrains us or the Universal Happiness that He would design as 
His end. In the first place, Sidgwick claims, we refer to the notions of ‘right’ and ‘good’ absolutely, 
without any reference to a superior lawgiver. (505) Second, if we were to recognize as self-evident 
Universal Happiness through self-evidently cognizing it as God’s end, it would not still be self-
evident: Why, Sidgwick asks, if God were omnipotent, He did not bring about His end just yet? 
(506) It is in this sense, then, that Sidgwick claims that the assumption of the existence of an 
omnipotent God cannot be rationally proven as self-evident, nor that Rational Benevolence is de-
pendent on God.  
If this is so, the harmony between Prudence and Rational Benevolence cannot be, finally, 
proven; ethics is, consequently, vulnerable to its Profoundest Problem. In this sense, “in the rarer 
cases of a recognized conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided 
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against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side”. (508) In this case, Sidgwick suggests 
that, even though we would not need to give up morality – in its wider sense – all together, we 
need to renounce the practical constraint to make Practical Reason consistent, as well as renounce 
the pretension to rationalize morality completely. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics is, then, still 
waiting for a solution, if that is at all possible. 
 
2.1.3. Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument 
Sidgwick’s conclusion that Ethics is plagued by the profoundest problem cannot be properly un-
derstood without understanding Sidgwick’s appeal to what I call Sidgwick’s Underlying Presup-
positions. In fact, these three assumptions act as the three key premises of an argument that under-
lies Sidgwick’s reasoning throughout The Methods of Ethics and that concludes in the last chapter 
of The Methods of Ethics. I call this argument Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument:   
(1) Principle of Practical Reason’s Authority: Ethics is plagued with a profoundest problem if 
and only if human beings cannot always trust Practical Reason in determining what they 
ought to do. 
(2) Principle of Practical Reason’s Reliability: Human beings can always trust Practical Rea-
son in determining what they ought to do if and only if the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics 
is not violated.  
(3) Fundamental Postulate of Ethics: If two valid rational procedures yield different principles, 
then these principles must not practically or theoretically conflict.  
(4) Two valid rational procedures yield different principles. [as explained in section 1.2] 
(5) The principles theoretically conflict. [as explained in section 2.1.1] 
(6) The principles practically conflict. [as explained in section 2.1.2] 
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Therefore: 
(7) The Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is violated. [by (3), (4), (5), and (6)] 
Therefore: 
(8) We cannot always trust Practical Reason in determining what we ought to do. [by (2) and 
(7)] 
Therefore: 
(9) Ethics is plagued with the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. [by (1) and (8)] 
Two definitions are needed here:  
Theoretical conflict:  Principles theoretically conflict if and only if they are 
either mutually inconsistent, or incommensurable.   
Practical conflict:  Principles practically conflict if and only if one can-
not act in accordance with both principles at the same 
time; one can only perform one action or the other.  
I can now clarify two common confusions that prevent an appropriate understanding of 
Sidgwick’s Profoundest Problem of Ethics. First, regarding Sidgwick’s attempt to solve the Pro-
foundest Problem of Ethics, Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument illustrates that Sidgwick does not 
actually attempt to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, he only attempts to show that the 
problem does not occur in the first place – he would have succeeded if he would have shown that 
either (4), (5), or (6) are false. I argue that this is so because of Sidgwick’s unquestioned acceptance 
of Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions. When one accepts (1), (2), and (3) in Sidgwick’s Un-
derlying Argument, the shadow of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics is pervading Ethics from the 
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beginning. Be that as it may, Sidgwick leaves the Profoundest Problem of Ethics unresolved. And 
this is precisely Sidgwick’s conclusion to The Methods of Ethics. 
Second, there is another argument underlying Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics that, as 
we will see in Chapter III, is often confused with what I call Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument. I 
call it Sidgwick’s Underlying Preoccupation. While in Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument it is Eth-
ics that is at stake, in what I call Sidgwick’s Underlying Preoccupation it is Utilitarianism – Mo-
rality in its narrow sense – that is at stake.37 Sidgwick’s Underlying Preoccupation:  
(I) Principle of Morality’s Authority: If Morality has not full rational authority, Morality 
would be plagued with a profoundest problem.  
(II) Principle of Morality’s Reliability: Morality has rational authority if and only if it is not 
irrational to act as morality requires.  
(III) Principle of Morality’s Rationality: It is never irrational to act as morality requires if and 
only if: 
(i) The principle/s of morality do not practically conflict with other rational principles.  
or 
(ii) One does not have overriding or supreme reasons to act in opposition to Morality.   
(IV) The principle of Morality – Rational Benevolence – conflicts with a rational principle – 
Prudence. [as explained in section 1.2] 
(V) One has supreme reasons to act in opposition to Morality. [as explained in sections 2.1.1 
and 2.1.2] 
                                                        
37 Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument and Sidgwick’s Underlying Preoccupation correspond respectively 
with what Derek Parfit calls the rationalist’s and the moralist’s problem. (Parfit 2011: 143) 
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Therefore: 
(VI) Sometimes it might be irrational to act as morality requires. [by (III), (IV) and (v)] 
Therefore: 
(VII) The rational authority of morality is undermined. [by (II) and (VI)] 
Therefore 
(VIII) Morality – in its narrow sense – is plagued with a profoundest problem. [by (I) and (VII)] 
I call the set of three key premises of Sidgwick Underlying Preoccupation the Fundamental 
Postulates of Morality. I argue that it is Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument, not Sidgwick’s Under-
lying Preoccupation, that leads Sidgwick to claim that Ethics – in its wider sense – is plagued with 
a profoundest problem. Why? Because, in principle, Sidgwick conceives that the Profoundest 
Problem of Ethics could be solved either by showing that ultimately one ought to act in accordance 
with Utilitarianism – not Rational Egoism –, or by showing that ultimately one ought to act in 
accordance with Rational Egoism – and not Utilitarianism. Instead, the Profoundest Problem of 
Morality, as we may call it, can only be solved if the conflict between Rational Egoism and Utili-
tarianism is resolved in benefit of Utilitarianism. Furthermore, the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
as Sidgwick explains does not only cast doubt upon Utilitarianism: It casts doubt upon Practical 
Reason itself and its capacity to determine right conduct. This is why Sidgwick regards it as the 
profoundest problem of Ethics to begin with. 
The confusion between Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument and Sidgwick’s Underlying Pre-
occupation is the reason why, I believe, some of the philosophers that I study in Chapter III – such 
as William Frankena and David Brink – not only fail to offer a solution to the Profoundest Problem 
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of Ethics, but they fail to approach the problem that profoundly concerned Sidgwick in writing The 
Methods of Ethics. When I refer to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, then, I refer to the conclu-
sion of Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument. I believe this is Sidgwick’s conclusion in The Methods 
of Ethics, warning that the conflict between Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism creates a pro-
foundest problem for Ethics – and not only for Morality.  
2.2. Preliminary Analysis of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
2.2.1. A Profoundest Problem of Ethics? 
The question now is: Should we believe Sidgwick’s warning about the Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics? That is, should we be worried about the capacity of our Practical Reason to determine right 
conduct? It seems to me that the answer to these two questions depends on two points. First, quite 
obviously, it depends on whether some author after Sidgwick has solved the Profoundest Problem 
of Ethics. If that were to be the case, we would not need to worry any longer about the Profoundest 
Problem of Ethics. In Chapter 3, I try to explain the attempts of several renowned authors to solve 
the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. However, I argue that they all fail. If my arguments against 
their solutions are sound, then, it seems that we should be concerned about Ethics being plagued 
by a profoundest problem. Unless, second, we deny that there is a Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
to be worried about in the first place. Some could claim, for instance, that Sidgwick’s assumption 
that there are indeed different methods of ethics insofar as we “find” them in the common moral 
reasoning of human beings is not grounded. Similarly, others could claim that Sidgwick’s appeal 
to self-evident principles is not valid, suggesting that Intuitionism cannot be a valid rational pro-
cedure. And others could even deny that there is a Practical Reason to begin with.  
 I do not pretend to defend Sidgwick’s theory. Doing this would require me to have a 
knowledge in meta-ethics and normative ethics that I do not yet have. Honestly, I am not even sure 
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whether I want to defend him against these objections. However, I still believe that we should be 
concerned about what Sidgwick calls the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. In particular, I do believe 
that in our everyday lives we often find ourselves with situations in which, if we judge the situation 
from our own point of view, we see rationally that we ought to perform certain acts, but when we 
judge the same situation from an impartial point of view, we are rationally convinced that we ought 
to act in another – conflicting –way. Is the conflict between intuitions, methods of ethics, rational 
procedures, reasons, principles…? That, I do not yet know.  
2.2.2. Five fundamental distinctions 
I am convinced, though, that at least the conflict between a self-regarding rational procedure and 
an other-regarding rational procedure occurs often in our everyday lives and that it indeed causes 
a profound problem for those of us who are trying to determine rationally what we ought to do. 
The Profoundest Problem of Ethics is, then, ethically relevant. Consequently, so are the attempts 
to solve it – which I study in Chapter 3. Before we move to Chapter 3, though, it is crucial that we 
present certain distinctions that help understand how authors have read and interpreted the Pro-
foundest Problem of Ethics and how they have attempted to solve it.38 The distinctions are: (a) the 
distinction between what Sidgwick did say and what he ought to have said; (b) the distinction 
between Internalism and Externalism; (c) the distinction between the moralist’s and the rational-
ist’s problems; (d) the distinction agent-relative, temporally-neutral theories, agent-relative, pre-
sent-biased theories, and person-neutral, temporally-neutral theories; and (e) the distinction be-
tween conflict-enhancing or conflict-mitigating interpretations of Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical 
Reason. 
                                                        
38 Three of these distinctions – (a), (b), and (e) – are offered by David Phillips. The other crucial distinctions 
– (c) and (d) – are offered by Derek Parfit and David Brink respectively. 
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2.2.2.1 What Sidgwick ought to have said 
As I explain in section 2.2.2.4, David Phillips provides different categories by which different 
interpretations of Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason can be distinguished. However, Phillips 
does not only provide such a classification, but he also argues that some interpretations falling into 
one category are better than others. Importantly, even though he does believe that the interpreta-
tions that he favors are exegetically sound, he understands the exegetical problems of claiming 
that one class of interpretations is better exegetically than others, considering all the different tex-
tual evidence to which one can appeal, and that Sidgwick was not terminologically consistent 
throughout his treatise. Instead, Phillips claims that his interpretation is better philosophically, and 
therefore, “Sidgwick (rationally) ought to have believed” the interpretation that he puts forward. 
(Phillips 1998: 66) For instance, even if Phillips admits that Sidgwick may not have agreed with 
his interpretation, Phillips claims that he philosophically ought to have done so, insofar as it would 
have better served Sidgwick’s own argument. 
In my view, this distinction is useful insofar as it allows us not to get bogged down in 
exegetical niceties and focus instead entirely on the interpretation that is philosophically sound. In 
this sense, even if some of the authors (David Brink, for example) claim that Sidgwick needs to be 
understood as putting forward the kind of interpretation that they put forward, I ignore such claims 
and explain their interpretations as claiming that Sidgwick ought to have agreed with them but not 
that he actually would have agreed. If we do so, we might be able to find which author provides 
philosophically the soundest interpretation, even if departing from Sidgwick’s The Methods of 
Ethics.   
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2.2.2.2. Internalism versus Externalism 
An internalist moral theory, as opposed to an externalist moral theory, establishes a necessary 
correspondence between what is moral – in its narrow sense – and what is reasonable to do.39 For 
an internalist, the rational authority of morality is not open to question: if I judge an action as 
moral, I also judge it as reasonable. (Phillips 1998: 61-62; also, Brink 1992: 202-204) An exter-
nalist theory, on the other hand, questions the rational authority of morality: even if one judges an 
action as moral, one might still wonder if such an action is rational. As we will see, David Brink 
argues that Sidgwick is an externalist and that the Profoundest Problem of Ethics precisely raises 
the question about the rational authority of morality.  
Internalism:  Thesis of morality that assumes the internal connection between ra-
tionality and morality – in its narrow sense. 
Externalism:  Thesis of morality that denies the internal connection between ra-
tionality and morality – in its narrow sense.  
2.2.2.3. The rationalist’s problem and the moralist’s problem 
When approaching Sidgwick’s Profoundest Problem of Ethics, Derek Parfit distinguishes, in Vol-
ume I of On What Matters, between a rationalist’s problem and a moralist’s problem. By distin-
guishing between these two problems, Parfit seems to suggest that the Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics can be better approached by being disassembled in these two more approachable problems. 
(Parfit 2011: 143) The rationalist’s problem, Parfit claims, is to show that, when Duty and Self-
                                                        
39 This distinction is not to be confused with the meta-ethical distinction between Internalism and External-
ism. While Phillips’ distinction appeals to the connection between morality and rationality, the meta-ethical 
distinction contrasts a view that assumes that moral judgments necessarily motivate – Internalism – with a 
view that denies that – Externalism. (Korsgaard 2014: 11n) 
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Interest conflict, reason would always give us guidance in what we ought to do, and that at least 
in some cases, “there would be something that we had most reason to do”. (Parfit 2011: 143) The 
moralist’s problem is to show that reason does not undermine morality. In other words, that we do 
not “have sufficient reasons to act wrongly”.40 (Parfit 2011: 143)  
Rationalist’s problem: It is the rationalist’s challenge to show that reason will al-
ways give us guidance in requiring us what we ought to do; 
and that at least in some cases, there be some actions that we 
have most reasons to do. 
Moralist’s problem: It is the moralist’s challenge to show that the rational author-
ity of morality is not undermined.   
 In my view, the rationalist’s problem is faithful with the problem that Sidgwick foresaw in 
The Methods of Ethics; the problem that renders the conflict between Rational Egoism and Utili-
tarianism profound, and that it is expressed in Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument. The moralist’s 
problem seems to express Sidgwick’s hope that, even if the rationalist’s problem is solved, the 
conflict between Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism will not undermine Utilitarianism. The mor-
alist’s problem is expresses in what I call Sidgwick’s Underlying Preoccupation. As I illustrate in 
Chapter 3, all authors except David Brink and William Frankena understand the Profoundest Prob-
lem of Ethics in terms of the rationalist’s problem – Brink and Frankena claim instead that the 
Profoundest Problem of Ethics expresses what Parfit calls the moralist’s problem. In Chapter 3, I 
present a robust objection against Brink’s and Frankena’s claim.   
                                                        
40 Parfit claims that we have sufficient reasons when our reasons to act in some way are neither weaker nor 
stronger than the reasons to act in another way. (Parfit 2011: 32)  
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2.2.2.4. Three different theories of rationality  
For now, let us just grant that the Profoundest Problem of Ethics needs to be – at least initially – 
understood as the rationalist’s problem. Understood in this way, the conflict between Rational 
Egoism and Utilitarianism, or Rational Benevolence, is a conflict between two different rational 
theories. These two theories of rationality, as I have already claimed, belong to a kind of theories 
of rationality that assume that the rationality of an action is proportional to the value the action 
produces. (Brink 1997A: 97) David Brink suggests that theories within this type differ among each 
other in the way they allocate benefits and harms among persons and among time. (Brink 1997A: 
97) Before determining what is considered as valuable for these theories – for Sidgwick, for in-
stance, happiness –, these theories can structurally differ among themselves in the way they dictate 
that benefits and harms ought to be distributed.  
Brink suggests that, taking into account “what [rational theories] say about whose welfare 
matters” and about “the temporal location of benefits and harms”, different theories of rationality 
can be distinguished. For our interests, three theories are relevant:  
Agent-relative, temporally-neutral, theories:  Theories that claim that the agent’s 
own welfare has a rational significant 
for her that the others agents’ welfare 
do not have for her. At the same time, 
the temporal location of benefits and 
harms ought not to have rational sig-
nificance for her. (Brink 1997A: 98) 
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Agent-relative, present-biased, theories:  Theories that claim that the agent’s 
own welfare in the present has a ra-
tional significance that other’s agent 
welfare or her own welfare at other 
moments in time do not have for her. 
Person-neutral, temporally-neutral, theories: Theories that claim that everyone's 
welfare is equally rationally signifi-
cant, independent of the temporal lo-
cation in which benefits and burdens 
may fall.   
Rational Egoism is agent-biased and temporally-neutral. (Brink 1997A: 98) Rational Be-
nevolence is, in many readings, a person-neutral, temporally-neutral, theory of rationality. As I 
explain, Derek Parfit defends an agent-relative, present-biased, theory of rationality.  
2.2.2.5. Conflict-enhancing versus Conflict-mitigating Interpretations 
Phillips is right, in my view, in claiming that the “basic issue in the interpretation (...) of Sidgwick 
is how to understand the conflict or contradiction between egoism and utilitarianism”. (Phillips 
1998: 58) Phillips distinguishes between two types of interpretations that differ in the way they 
understand the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence: conflict-enhancing interpreta-
tions and conflict-mitigating interpretations.41 (Phillips 2011: 134) In particular, Phillips explains 
                                                        
41 Phillips, in his article “Sidgwick, Dualism, and Indeterminacy of Practical Reason”, suggests another 
classification. Phillips distinguishes three types of interpretations that have been given to Sidgwick’s dual-
ism, which he names as The Standard View – which corresponds to conflict-enhancing interpretations; and 
The Indeterminacy View and Brink’s Externalist View – which together correspond to conflict-mitigating 
interpretations.  
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that a principle can be philosophically understood in different ways depending on their (I) deontic 
force and (II) their content: (Phillips 2011: 115) 
I. Deontic force 
By appealing to the deontic force of the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence, Phillips 
refers us to the force that these principles have in relation to the degree of exigency of the compli-
ance that is derived from accepting such principles as self-evident. In Phillips’ view, there are two 
degrees of deontic force with which the principles can be understood: (i) rational permission and 
(ii) rational requirement.  
(i) Rational permission 
If we understand the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence as granting only rational 
permission, then such principles simply allow individual human beings to perform actions in ac-
cordance with the principles in question. In this case, it would seem that when the Principles of 
Prudence and Rational Benevolence conflict, one would be permitted to act in either of the two 
ways. (Phillips 2011: 116) Conflict-mitigating interpretations, Phillips claims, understand the Prin-
ciples of Prudence and Rational Benevolence in this way. (Phillips 2011: 135) Phillips suggests 
that there are two types of conflict-mitigating interpretations. I will call them standard conflict-
mitigating interpretations and enhanced conflict-mitigating interpretations.42 
The standard conflict-mitigating view claims that when the Principles of Prudence and Ra-
tional Benevolence conflict, performing either act is equally permissible. However, as Phillips 
                                                        
42 Phillips suggests this distinction in “Sidgwick, Dualism and Indeterminacy in Practical Reason,” (Phillips 
1998: 60) 
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actually explains, if we claim that it is rationally permissible to act in accordance with either Ra-
tional Egoism or Utilitarianism, rationality must also permit “any action which can be justified as 
giving some extra weight to one’s own interest but otherwise considering everyone’s interests 
equally”. (Phillips 1998: 60; my emphasis) Phillips suggests that if in case of conflict it is permis-
sible to act either as Egoism or as Utilitarianism requires, it must also be permissible to hold a 
hybrid position, in which we rationally give different weights to the dictates of Utilitarianism and 
Egoism, being permitted to act in either of the ways when there is no conflict. When they conflict, 
we can prioritize one dictate over the other so long as both dictates do not have the same strength. 
Any enhanced conflict-mitigating interpretation holds such hybrid position.  
(ii) Rational requirement 
If we understand the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence as imposing a rational re-
quirement, accepting the principles implies a much stronger claim: one is rationally required to 
act in accordance with such principles; their dictates are binding. (Phillips 2011: 134) Conflict-
enhancing interpretations understand the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence in this 
way. Phillips explains that, according to conflict-enhancing views, the conflict between Rational 
Egoism and Utilitarianism is to be understood as a conflict between two ultimate norms: the norm 
of Rational Egoism dictating to maximize one’s own well-being and the norm of Utilitarianism 
dictating to impartially maximize everyone’s well-being. Phillips claims: 
Ultimate norm:  A norm is an ultimate norm if one is rationally required to 
do anything it … requires. (Philips 1998: 59) 
If the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence are understood as ultimate norms, 
and it is demonstrated, as Sidgwick demonstrates, that such principles conflict, then accepting both 
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principles at the same time can entail a contradiction. Whether in fact accepting the Principles of 
Prudence and Rational Benevolence with “the deontic force of requirement” necessarily entails a 
contradiction depends on how one understands the content of such principles. (Phillips 2011: 116) 
II. Content 
Phillips explains that the content of the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence can be 
understood in two ways: (i) exclusive and (ii) inclusive. (Phillips 2011: 116) 
(i) Exclusive principles 
When the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence are understood as exclusive ultimate 
norms, Phillips explains, then if the two principles conflict, by definition, only one can be true; the 
other needs to be either modified or rejected. (Phillips 2011: 116) Understood exclusively, the 
principles would claim that it is irrational to sacrifice my own happiness for the sake of the happi-
ness of others and that it is irrational to not sacrifice my own happiness for the sake of the general 
happiness of the whole. (Phillips 2011: 117) The contradiction, then, is necessary. I call these 
views first-order conflict-enhancing views. 
(ii) Inclusive principles 
When the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence are understood as inclusive ultimate 
norms, even if the two principles seem to conflict, the conflict would not be effective until, given 
the facts, the dictates of Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism do conflict, in which case both norms 
cannot be accepted at the same time. In this case, the contradiction would only occur if regarding 
my own happiness as the ultimate good is practically incompatible with regarding the happiness 
of the whole as the ultimate good. I call these views second-order conflict-enhancing views.  
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An example may clarify the distinction between conflict-enhancing and conflict-mitigating 
views:  
Airport Dilemma: A drone flying over Gatwick Airport, London, forces to divert 
all flights going to that airport. Insofar as England only has so many airports, these 
other airports quickly become saturated, forcing other flights to land in airports sit-
uated in nearby countries. In MSY airport in New Orleans, there is only one flight 
left that has been given permission to land in England, and the plane has only one 
spot left. You and a stranger are in two parallel lines, waiting to be called to book 
the last seat in this flight. You are both at the front of your respective lines, and the 
last spot could be for either of you. You start talking. You tell him that you have 
received an offer to teach at a very prestigious university near London and that you 
have been told by the university that, if you make it to the interview, you will be 
given the job. It is your dream job at your dream university; job openings at such 
university occur very rarely. If you receive the position, you will be more success-
ful, and you would have, during the rest of your career, both social relations and a 
sense of fulfillment that you would not have had if you were not hired. If you do 
not make it to the interview, they will give the job to another person. The stranger 
tells you that he needs to fly to London to undergo surgery. He has an illness, which 
only a hospital in London has the means to cure. If he undergoes the surgery, he 
will survive, and he will live for many years. If he does not make it to London, he 
will need to reschedule, and he will need to wait another year. He might not survive 
into that year. At that moment, the attendant says: “Next!” 
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What ought you to do? If you act in accordance with the Principle of Prudence, you ought 
to take the spot in the plane and maximize your own welfare. If you act in accordance with the 
Principle of Rational Benevolence, you ought to regard the welfare of the stranger as much as your 
own. Considering that his life is at stake, and that if you would not take the last flight, you would 
only lose the chance to get a job, it is plausible that the Principle of Rational Benevolence would 
dictate you to sacrifice your own welfare in benefit of the stranger. This conflict expresses Sidg-
wick’s Dualism of Practical Reason.  
Conflict-mitigating and conflict-enhancing interpretations disagree on how to understand 
this conflict. Conflict-mitigating interpretations understand the Principles of Prudence and Ra-
tional Benevolence as granting only rational permission. In particular, according to standard con-
flict-mitigating interpretations, in Airport Dilemma, you would be permitted to either take the spot 
or to give the spot to the stranger: both acts would be regarded as equally right. Enhancing conflict-
mitigating interpretations, instead, would permit you to either give more strength to the Principle 
of Prudence or to give more strength to the Principle of Rational Benevolence. You would be 
permitted to act in accordance with both, but acting in accordance with one of the principles would 
be more rational than acting in accordance with the other.  
Conflict-enhancing interpretations, on the other hand, understand the Principles of Pru-
dence and Rational Benevolence as each requiring you to act in accordance with their dictates. In 
Airport Dilemma, insofar as acting in accordance with the Principles of Prudence and Rational 
Benevolence at the same time is practically impossible, all conflict-enhancing interpretations 
would conceive the two principles as contradictory.43 Practical Reason, then, according to these 
views, could not determine univocally what you ought to do.  
                                                        
43 As I have indicated, conflict-enhancing interpretations can be divided in two types: some understand the 
principles as exclusive norms, others as inclusive norms. Understood as exclusive norms, the Principles of 
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Phillips explains that, according to conflict-enhancing interpretations, Practical Reason - 
in what Sidgwick would have called its philosophical phase – is incoherent: it gives at the same 
time two contradictory dictates, leaving the person unable to determine what her Duty is. Accord-
ing to conflict-enhancing interpretations, then, “the conflict is one we cannot live with”. (Phillips 
1998: 59) According to conflict-mitigating-interpretations, on the other hand, Practical Reason is 
only indeterminate.  
Keeping all this in mind, we can now give the following definitions:  
First-order conflict-enhancing views: Views that assume that principles command 
rational requirements. If two different princi-
ples conflict, the principles are necessarily 
contradictory. 
Second-order conflict-enhancing views: Views that assume that principles mandate 
rational requirements. If two different princi-
ples conflict, the principles are contradictory 
only if they also practically conflict. 
Standard conflict-mitigating views:  Views that assume that principles grant only 
rational permission. If two different princi-
ples conflict, one would be equally permitted 
to act in both ways: both acts would be 
equally right.  
                                                        
Prudence and Rational Benevolence would be contradictory, independently of whether the principles prac-
tically conflict; understood as inclusive norms, the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence are 
contradictory only if their dictates practically conflict. 
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Enhanced conflict-mitigating views: Views that assume that principles grant only 
rational permission. If two different princi-
ples conflict, one is permitted to give more 
strength to one of the principles. 
Conflict-enhancing and conflict-mitigating interpretations, in understanding the Principles 
of Prudence and Rational Benevolence differently, attempt to solve the Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics in different ways. However, both interpretations accept Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppo-
sitions, and they attempt to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics within the structure of Sidg-
wick’s Underlying Argument.  
First, all conflict-enhancing interpretations that claim that the antecedent of the Fundamen-
tal Postulate of Ethics is true – clause (4) in Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument: two valid rational 
procedures yield different principles –, understand the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benev-
olence as imposing equally binding incommensurable requirements. In this sense, they claim that 
the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence theoretically conflict – clause (5) in Sidg-
wick’s Underlying Argument. To ensure that the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is not violated 
– clause (7) in Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument –, then, they need to show that Prudence and 
Rational Benevolence do not practically conflict – against clause (6). However, as Sidgwick 
learned, showing the practical harmony of Prudence and Rational Benevolence is not an easy task. 
Precisely, I believe Sidgwick defended a conflict-enhancing view. And this is the reason why he 
found, and could not solve, the Profoundest Problem of Ethics.  
William Frankena and David Brink also defend a conflict-enhancing interpretation. How-
ever, they assume that the Dualism of Practical Reason expresses a conflict between a rational 
theory – namely, Rational Egoism – and a moral theory – namely, Utilitarianism. In this way, they 
deny from the beginning that two valid rational procedures yield different principles – they deny 
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clause (4) in Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument. Why? Because, even though they accept a conflict-
enhancing interpretation, they do not want to give in to the possibility that Practical Reason may 
not be as reliable as they would want. In this sense, although they understand the conflict between 
Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism in its full force, they reject to even give in to the possibility 
that the Profoundest Problem of Ethics occurs in the first place. Instead, they only attempt to solve 
what I have called the Profoundest Problem of Morality. 
Second, conflict-mitigating interpretations already assume that different valid rational pro-
cedures yield two different principles that do not practically nor theoretically conflict – that is, 
they accept clause (4) of Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument, but they deny clauses (5) and (6), 
ensuring that the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is not violated. On the one hand, the Principles 
of Prudence and Rational Benevolence do not practically conflict insofar as they do not issue re-
quirements but permissions. Hence, even if these principles dictate actions that cannot be per-
formed at the same time, the practical conflict does not occur because one is not required to per-
form both actions. In principle, one is permitted to act in both ways. On the other hand, to guarantee 
that the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence do not theoretically conflict, conflict-
mitigating views just need to show that these principles are commensurable or mutually consistent. 
Insofar as these views already conceive Practical Reason as indeterminate, it is not difficult for 
them to show that the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence do not theoretically con-
flict. With these views, then, the solution of the conflict between Prudence and Rational Benevo-
lence, and the solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, is confined to decide what strength 
will one give to these two different principles and provide a justification why one has given weight 
to one principle or the other.  
It is time now to recapitulate. While conflict-enhancing interpretations understand the Prin-
ciples of Prudence and Rational Benevolence with its full force – deontic force of requirement – 
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and then they attempt to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics practically, conflict-mitigating 
interpretations start off watering-down the dictates of the Principles of Prudence and Rational Be-
nevolence to simply show that these principles do not theoretically conflict. In this way, the Pro-
foundest Problem of Ethics is watered-down to only decide what we have most reasons to do, 
hoping that it would not undermine morality. This is why I am inclined to believe that while con-
flict-enhancing views understand the Profoundest Problem in a way that actually demands a pro-
found solution, conflict-mitigating interpretations offer a solution to a problem that, as far as I can 
see, is not the Profoundest Problem of Ethics.  
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Chapter 3. Classical Interpretations of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics and 
their Solutions 
 
In Chapter 3, I present some of the classical attempts to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. 
I consider the solutions of William Frankena, David Brink, Derek Parfit, Owen McLeod, David 
Phillips, Roger Crisp, and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek. To be able to understand their solutions, it 
is crucial to first explain how they understand the relation between the Principles of Prudence and 
Rational Benevolence, and their meaning, and also how they understand the Dualism of Practical 
Reason and the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. I attempt to show, then, that the type of solution 
that such philosophers offer can be derived from certain interpretative claims about the Dualism 
of Practical Reason. I believe that if we pay attention to such claims, the interpretations and solu-
tions offered by these authors can be grouped in different sets, showing that in the end there are 
only two main interpretative views of the Profoundest Problem, that correspond to Phillips’ dis-
tinction between conflict-enhancing and conflict-mitigating interpretations. 
3.1. Conflict-enhancing Interpretations 
As I have explained, conflict-enhancing interpretations can take two forms: one – fist-order – in 
which the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence are understood as exclusive norms – 
independently of the facts –; and the other – first-order – in which the principles are understood 
inclusively – considering the facts. William Frankena and David Brink both defend a second-order 
conflict-enhancing interpretation of Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason.44  
                                                        
44 Phillips suggests that Henry S. Richardson can also be read in a similar way. (Phillips 1998: 65; also, 
Richardson 1991) I have not found any author arguing for a first-order conflict-enhancing view. I think that 
this is not accidental: if one understands the principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence as conflicting 
first-order ultimate norms, the Profoundest Problem cannot, in principle, be solved. 
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3.1.1. William Frankena 
3.1.1.1. Frankena’s Interpretation of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
 
William Frankena understands the Profoundest Problem of Ethics in terms of what Parfit called 
the moralist’s problem. At the same time, Frankena understands what Sidgwick called the Dualism 
of Practical Reason from an externalist second-order conflict-enhancing view: conceiving there-
fore the principles of Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism as ultimate norms that are contradictory 
only when they practically conflict. It is not surprising, then, that Frankena tries to solve the Pro-
foundest Problem of Ethics, arguing that the dictates of Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism do not 
practically conflict. In particular, Frankena claims that in the actual state of society, promoting 
one’s own welfare actually coincides with promoting everyone’s welfare. My objection against 
Frankena is two-fold. First, I argue that Frankena misses what is really at stake in the Profoundest 
Problem of Ethics. Second, I argue that Frankena’s solution of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
is not satisfactory.  
I. Frankena’s second-order conflict-enhancing interpretation 
Frankena defends a second-order conflict-enhancing view of the Dualism of Practical Reason: 
conceiving therefore the principles of Egoism and Utilitarianism as ultimate norms which are sus-
ceptible only to be practically contradictory. In his article “Sidgwick and Practical Dualism,” 
Frankena claims: 
[It] is important to understand that for Sidgwick the two principles in question are not 
merely intuitive or self-evident; each of them is also an ultimate principle of actual or 
absolute duty in Ross’s sense. Neither of them is a principle that holds only prima 
facie, or ceteris paribus, or from a certain point of view. Neither of them admits of any 
exceptions or of being overridden by the other. (Frankena 1974: 456) 
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Frankena is aware that Sidgwick presents the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benev-
olence as self-evident from an individual and a universal point of view, respectively. Frankena’s 
claim, then, needs to be understood not exegetically but philosophically. In his view, what Sidg-
wick labels as the Profoundest Problem of Ethics would only constitute a profoundest problem if 
Sidgwick believed “that both principles are seen to be absolute and be rational from the same point 
of view”. (Frankena 1974: 456) Similarly, Frankena claims:  
For Sidgwick, the two principles are both authoritative, obligatory, and rational as 
such, independently of one another, and equally so. (Frankena 1992: 194)  
 
From these claims, one can only conclude that Frankena believes that Sidgwick defended 
a conflict-enhancing interpretation of the Dualism of Practical Reason; in which two rational ulti-
mate norms – namely, the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence – conflict. However, 
Frankena suggests that it is only when, considering the facts of the world, these principles result 
in conflicting acts that Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason entails a Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics. This suggests that Frankena comprehends Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason as a 
second-order conflict-enhancing view. 
For instance, Frankena claims:  
Is there a “contradiction” in Sidgwick’s system …? I think the answer … is that 
there is a contradiction only if Sidgwick’s two principles may and do conflict in 
practice. There is no problem if they never call for different courses of conduct. 
(Frankena 1992: 194)  
 
Frankena explains that, when these principles are conceived as second-order valid ultimate 
norms, Sidgwick has only certain alternatives at hand to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. 
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In particular, Frankena claims that Sidgwick has two alternatives. On the one hand, Sidg-
wick can accept, as he ultimately does, that there is a fundamental contradiction in our moral rea-
soning when dictating to us what we ought to do, while waiting either for a possible future resolu-
tion of the contradiction or for a future harmony between the Principles of Prudence and Rational 
Benevolence. On the other hand, Sidgwick can postulate such harmony, either because (i) he ap-
peals to theology, or because (ii) he appeals to a state of society in which one aims at his own 
greatest happiness by aiming at everyone’s greatest happiness. Frankena suggests that Sidgwick is 
hoping that the appeal to theology will solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, although he him-
self – Sidgwick – could not demonstrate it in The Methods of Ethics. (Frankena 1974: 458, 467) 
Even though I profoundly disagree with Frankena’s assumption that Sidgwick would have wanted 
to solve the Profoundest Problem by appealing to God, I believe that Frankena’s description of the 
options available for Sidgwick to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics is revealing.45 
It reveals precisely that Frankena is, with Sidgwick, accepting Sidgwick’s Underlying Pre-
suppositions. When accepting these assumptions and understanding the Dualism of Practical Rea-
son under a second-order conflict-enhancing interpretation in which the Principles of Prudence 
and Rational Benevolence are conceived as conflicting ultimate norms, the only option left to not 
violate the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is to show that the dictates of the Principles of Pru-
dence and Rational Benevolence practically coincide. This is why, I suggest, Frankena considers 
that Sidgwick can only solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics either by (i) appealing to a graceful 
God that will compensate our sacrifices in a future life or by (ii) appealing to a state of society in 
which the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence coincide. As I have explained, 
                                                        
45 I profoundly disagree with this claim. I agree with Parfit when he claims that “Sidgwick doubted that we 
shall have a future life”. (Parfit 2011: 142) As I have explained in Chapter 2, I believe Sidgwick is indicating 
that it would be a mistake to try to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics by appealing to theology, as it 
would make Ethics dependent on theology. (507) 
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Frankena suggests that Sidgwick opts for option (i). Frankena attempts to solve the Profoundest 
Problem of Ethics by appealing to option (ii).   
II. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics as the moralist’s problem 
Before I explain Frankena’s solution to his Profoundest Problem, it is crucial to understand that 
Frankena does not understand the Dualism of Practical Reason as Sidgwick does. First of all, 
Frankena conceives morality from an externalist standpoint: Frankena denies that a necessary con-
nection between morality – in its narrow sense – and rationality exists. In Frankena’s view, then, 
it might not be always rational to act in accordance with morality and, in principle, the dictates of 
rationality and morality may not coincide. Frankena understands the Dualism of Practical Reason 
precisely in terms of a conflict between rationality and morality – in its narrower sense:  
[My] view would still involve a kind of dualism of practical reason, between the … 
moral and the rational …, a dualism not between two basic ethical principles or prin-
ciples of rationality … but between the principle(s) of ethics … and the principle[s] of 
rationality. (Frankena 1992: 196) 
 
Frankena, then, “distinguishes between the ethical or moral and the ultimately practical or 
rational.” (Frankena 1992: 196) And he understands his Profoundest Problem as expressing the 
possibility that morality might be undermined by rationality. It is in these grounds that I suggest 
that Frankena conceives the Profoundest Problem in terms of what Parfit called the moralist’s 
problem – in my terminology, the Profoundest Problem of Morality. However, Frankena’s solution 
to his Profoundest Problem indicates that he does conceive the principles of – rational – Prudence 
and – moral – Benevolence as ultimate norms. As I explain below, Frankena considers that in the 
actual state of society, the Principles of Prudence and Benevolence actually coincide; he concludes 
that these facts about the world render the Profoundest Problem of Morality unproblematic. If this 
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is so, Frankena’s own solution to the Profoundest Problem of Morality suggests that Frankena 
himself also holds a second-order conflict-enhancing view.  
3.1.1.2. Frankena’s Solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
In Franken’s view, appealing to God – as Sidgwick allegedly attempted – is no longer needed to 
solve the conflict between Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism. Citing Trilling, Frankena suggests:  
Sidgwick’s… dilemma… between Interest and Duty no longer engages us … because 
the modern morality, in its powerful imagination of the sources of life and the need to 
obtain control over them, denies the contradiction between Interest and Duty. Typi-
cally in our culture, … the individual … assumes that there is a continuity between 
what he desires for himself and what he desires for others. (Frankena 1974: 467) 
 
In Frankena’s view, thus, in the actual conditions of human life, different from those of 
Sidgwick’s, the practical harmony between the Principles of Prudence and Benevolence might 
already be guaranteed. In this sense, rationality does not undermine morality insofar as acting in 
accordance with prudential principles coincides with acting in accordance with moral principles. 
Frankena suggests, then, that in the current state of society, promoting one’s own welfare is com-
patible with promoting everyone’s welfares.  
If this is so, we can summarize Frankena’s interpretation as follows: Frankena considers 
that there is a Dualism of Practical Reason between two ultimate norms; one (or more) of morality 
and another (or more) of rationality, which are contradictory only if the ends they dictate to pro-
mote do not harmonize in practice. However, as in the current state of society, they do harmonize 
in practice, the principles of rationality and morality coincide, and therefore, Sidgwick’s problem 
– understood as the moralist’s problem – does not concern us any longer. It is important to realize, 
again, that it is Frankena’s second-order conflict-enhancing interpretation of the Dualism of Prac-
tical Reason that determines the solution that he offers to the Profoundest Problem of Morality, 
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that is: postulating that the facts are such as to allow the coincidence of two, otherwise potentially 
contradictory ultimate dictates.  
 
3.1.1.3. Objections to William Frankena 
Frankena misses what is primarily at stake for Sidgwick when defining the Profoundest Problem 
of Ethics. If my suggestion that Sidgwick is accepting Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions is 
correct, then, for Sidgwick, what is primary at stake when warning us about the Profoundest Prob-
lem of Ethics is not that Utilitarianism may be undermined, but instead that Practical Reason is not 
able to rationally give us a univocal answer about what we ought to do. Sidgwick considers that 
Practical Reason yields two ultimate norms that, insofar as they both theoretically and practically 
conflict, should not be valid at the same time. However, he cannot but confess that both principles 
are valid, and thus conclude that Practical Reason is not as reliable as we once thought. It is, I have 
explained, this doubt upon the reliability of Practical Reason that makes the conflict between Ra-
tional Egoism and Utilitarianism profound, not primarily that Utilitarianism might be undermined.  
 In this sense, Frankena is mistaken in perceiving the Profoundest Problem of Ethics pri-
marily as the moralist’s problem. The question is: why does Frankena perceive it in this way? In 
my view, it is for two reasons: first, because Frankena is an externalist about morality. In this 
sense, it is in principle open to question if the rational authority of morality is guaranteed. Second, 
I believe that Frankena is constrained by the acceptance of Sidgwick’s Underlying Presupposi-
tions, while at the same time not wanting to give in to the possibility that Practical Reason is 
incoherent. Let me explain this step-by-step. I have explained that Frankena conceives the Princi-
ples of Prudence and Benevolence as second-order ultimate norms. As such, if he would discover 
that these principles practically conflict, he would need to admit, with Sidgwick, that Practical 
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Reason yields contradictory principles about what we ought to do. This would not only undermine 
morality but Practical Reason itself.46 
 In fact, Frankena’s solution to his Profoundest Problem does not hold. The appeal to the 
actual state of society, unfortunately, does not guarantee that the Principles of Prudence and Ra-
tional Benevolence always coincide. Sidgwick himself admitted that, even in his time, in any tol-
erable state of society acting in accordance with the principle of benevolence may generally likely 
coincide “with the attainment of the greatest happiness possible for the” agent. (498) However, 
this is not what needs to be shown. Without an empirical proof able to ensure the universality and 
the completeness of the coincidence between Prudence and Benevolence, the Profoundest Problem 
of Ethics is not solved. It would only take one occasion in which these principles require incom-
patible actions, and the Profoundest Problem of Ethics would reappear in its full force. Let us take 
the example that I explained above: Airport Dilemma. In that case, it is not at all clear that sacri-
ficing your dream job would coincide with the attainment of your greatest happiness. If so, how 
would Frankena convince the radical Egoist that he ought to leave the last spot in the last flight to 
London to the dying stranger? The answer is simple: Frankena could not.  
3.1.2. David Brink 
3.1.2.1. Brink’s Interpretation of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
David Brink himself admits that he follows William Frankena in understanding the Dualism of 
Practical Reason from an externalist standpoint. (Brink 1988: 291) I suggest that Brink, knowingly 
or not, follows Frankena much further. In my view, like Frankena, Brink defends a second-order 
conflict-enhancing interpretation of Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason, a dualism that he 
also conceives as the conflict between a rational principle – Prudence – and a moral principle – 
                                                        
46 I provide more evidence for this objection when I object to Brink’s position. 
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Benevolence – constituting the moralist’s problem; a problem that Brink also attempts to solve – 
as Frankena did, though more sophisticatedly than he – by arguing that the Principles of Prudence 
and Benevolence practically coincide. I argue that Brink does not solve his Profoundest Problem 
of Morality. First, I argue that, like Frankena, in conceiving the Profoundest Problem of Ethics as 
the moralist’s problem, Brink misses what is really at stake in the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. 
Second, I argue that, in his attempt to solve the moralist’s problem, Brink commits an equivoca-
tion: understanding the notion person in two incommensurable ways. Third, I argue that, even if 
my first and second objections would not be sound, Brink does not satisfactorily show that the 
Principles of Prudence and Benevolence coincide. If my objections are sound, Brink left the Pro-
foundest Problem of Ethics unresolved.  
I. Brink’s second-order conflict-enhancing interpretation 
David Phillips suggests that Brink ought to be read as taking a conflict-mitigating approach to the 
Dualism of Practical Reason. (Phillips 2011: 137) I profoundly disagree with Phillips. In particular, 
Brink indicates that he needs to be read as holding a conflict-enhancing interpretation of Sidg-
wick’s Dualism of Practical Reason when he argues that Sidgwick was – or ought to have been – 
an externalist. Externalism, as defined by Brink in opposition with Internalism, “denies the internal 
connection between morality and rationality; it says that the rationality of moral considerations 
depends upon factors external to the concept of morality”. (Brink 1988: 292; Brink 1992: 202-204; 
see also Phillips 1998: 61-62)  
Keeping this distinction in mind, Brink explains, the Dualism of Practical Reason could be 
understood in two ways. On the one hand, when accepting Internalism, the dualism represents “a 
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conflict between competing moral [and thus also rational] theories”; on the other hand, when ac-
cepting Externalism, the dualism represents “a conflict between (the utilitarian’s account of) mo-
rality and (an egoist theory of) rationality”. (Brink 1988: 291)  
Brink argues that the Dualism of Practical Reason cannot be understood from an internalist 
standpoint, because when doing so, the Principles of Prudence and Benevolence would “make 
incompatible claims about the same subject matter”. (Brink, 1992; 205) According to Brink, then, 
if one does not want to accept from the beginning that Practical Reason is incoherent, yielding 
self-evident and inconsistent intuitions about what we ought to do, one needs to be committed to 
an externalist approach to Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason. (Brink 1988: 304-305) Ac-
cepting the externalist reading, Brink suggests that to accept the Dualism of Practical Reason does 
not entail accepting that Egoism and Utilitarianism are mutually inconsistent. 
If Brink argument in favor of an externalist reading of the Dualism of Practical Reason is 
analyzed properly, it is clear that Brink seems to be accepting certain – unarticulated – assumptions 
about the nature of Practical Reason, and about the deontic force of the principles that Practical 
Reason yields. First of all, only if Brink understands the Principles of Prudence and Benevolence 
with deontic force of requirement, he would argue that the – conflicting – Principles of Prudence 
and Benevolence are mutually inconsistent – with deontic force of permission, the Principles of 
Prudence and Benevolence are not necessarily inconsistent. Similarly, only if Brink is accepting 
Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions, he would conclude that the conflict between Prudence 
and Benevolence – understood as ultimate norms – entails that Practical Reason is incoherent – 
and that it could not be trusted. Brink’s understanding of the Dualism of Practical Reason from an 
externalist approach suggests, then, that he conceives the Principles of Prudence and Benevolence 
as ultimate norms. Brink’s attempt to solve this conflict, suggesting that the Principles of Prudence 
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and Benevolence may practically coincide, suggests that Brink defends a second-order conflict-
enhancing interpretation.  
II. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics as the moralist’s problem 
Brink suggests that the externalist reading of the Dualism of Practical Reason compels us to un-
derstand the conflict between Egoism and Utilitarianism as a conflict between a rational – egoistic 
– and a moral – utilitarian – theory, ultimately “raising the issue about the rational authority of 
morality”. (Brink 1992: 204) According to Brink, Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason urges 
us to take seriously, and answer, the amoralist sceptic question: Why should I do what morality 
requires? (Brink 1988: 303-305) Brink’s reading of The Methods of Ethics, then, grasps at least 
one of the worries that Sidgwick certainly had, a worry that Parfit expressed in the moralist’s 
problem. (Sidgwick 1981: 6; Parfit 2011: 143) Brink suggests that to solve the Profoundest Prob-
lem, as he understands it, he only needs to show that morality – namely, Utilitarianism and the 
Principle of Benevolence – is not undermined by rationality – namely, Rational Egoism and the 
Principle of Prudence. Taking into account that Brink conceives the Principles of Prudence and 
Benevolence as second-order ultimate norms, the solution of Brink’s Profoundest Problem – of 
Morality – demands showing that these principles practically coincide.47  
3.1.2.2. Brink’s Solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
David Brink is a rational egoist. As an agent-biased theory of rationality, Rational Egoism requires 
one to be initially weary to sacrifice one’s own welfare in benefit of another, even if the other’s 
                                                        
47 This indicates that Brink is also accepting what I have called the Fundamental Postulates of Morality. In 
this sense, to solve the Profoundest Problem of Morality he shows that the dictates of Morality practically 
coincide with the dictates of Rationality – against clause (IV) of what I call Sidgwick’s Underlying Preoc-
cupation.  
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benefit would be greater than one’s own. As a temporally-neutral theory, Rational Egoism requires 
one to sacrifice a present benefit for a greater one in the future, even if it is a distant future and the 
future benefit is slightly greater than the present one.48 According to Rational Egoism’s hybrid 
structure, then, while it makes all the difference on whom a benefit falls – me or not me –, it does 
not make any difference when it falls – as long as it contributes to my own overall welfare. (Brink 
1997A: 101) Brink suggests that Rational Egoism is ultimately grounded in the separateness of 
persons.  
I. The Separateness of Persons 
In particular, Brink focuses on what he calls the normative aspect of the separateness of persons, 
according to which being a separate person “requires me to adopt patterns of concern that exhibit 
a bias towards myself”.49 (Brink 1997A: 103)  
As Brink claims: 
[P]art of what it is for me to be a distinct, temporally extended person is for me to 
have a particular perspective on the world that displays concern for my past and 
future self that is not proportional to the impersonal value of my activities. But then 
part of what it is for me to be a separate person is for me to be unwilling to sacrifice 
my interests without appropriate compensation. (Brink 1997A: 105) 
 
Being a separate entity involves, for persons, being the epicenter of action of the entity that I am 
now in a way that I form a particular – first-person – perspective on the world. (Brink 1997A: 103) 
And as Brink explains, to have and act from such particular perspective “involves forming and 
                                                        
48 David Brink, following Sidgwick, labels this feature of Rational Egoism the Compensation Principle. 
(Brink 1997A: 108; also, Sidgwick 1889: 483) The Compensation Principle states that a sacrifice of one’s 
own welfare is rational if it is at some time compensated by an equivalent or greater benefit for me at another 
moment in time. 
49 For Sidgwick, claims Brink, to accept the separateness of persons is to claim that the distinction between 
me and any other individual is metaphysically and normatively deep. (Brink 1997A: 103) Brink does not 
explicitly deny the metaphysical aspect.  
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acting on intentions and goals in ways that display self-concern” for the past and future of both my 
perspective on the world and the epicenter of action that I am. (Brink 1997A: 103) In other words, 
being a separate person entails that I act and think now as a I were a person that persists in time. 
Part of what it means to be a distinct person that acts from a particular perspective on the world, 
then, is that I display concern in a way that, while I do not conceive the distinction between me 
now and myself in the past or the future as fundamental, I do conceive the distinction between me 
and other persons as fundamental.  
 According to Brink, the separateness of persons justifies Rational Egoism’s agent-relative, 
temporally-neutral structure against philosophers, such as Parfit, who claim that Rational Egoism’s 
hybrid structure is arbitrary. (Parfit 1987: 139; also, Sidgwick 1981: 418) At the same time, Brink’s 
appeal to the separateness of persons safeguards Rational Egoism against another objection raised 
by Parfit: that Rational Egoism is grounded in a conception of personal identity that is at odds with 
another conception of identity that characterizes more appropriately, at least according to Parfit, 
what we really are.  
II. A reductionist account of personal identity 
Brink argues that, insofar as Rational Egoism’s hybrid structure is not grounded, as Parfit assumed, 
in a common-sensical conception of personal identity, Rational Egoism is not vulnerable to Parfit’s 
objection. However, Brink goes a step further: He argues that Rational Egoism is compatible with 
a reductionist account of personal identity. (Brink 1997A: 96) Why? Because in Brink’s view, if 
he is able to show that Rational Egoism and Reductionism are compatible, he will be able to use 
later Reductionism to show that our interests ultimately are – as Frankena suggested – continuous 
with the interests of others. In this sense, Brink believes that he will able to solve the Profoundest 
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Problem of Morality if he can show that Rational Egoism and a reductionist conception of identity 
are compatible. 
 Let us start by saying a few words about Reductionism, a conception of personal identity 
presented by Parfit in his masterpiece Reasons and Persons. Reductionism, explains Parfit, states 
“(1) that the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more par-
ticular facts. [And] (2) that these facts can be described without either presupposing the identity of 
this person, or explicitly claiming that the experiences of this person’s life are had by this person, 
or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. These facts can be described in an impersonal 
way.” (Parfit 1987: 210) 
In particular, Parfit argues that a person’s identity can simply be explained in terms of the 
continuity over time of certain psychological connections between experiences and memories; 
without the need to appeal to any further fact or to assume that these psychological connections 
are experienced by a person who exists independently of these experiences and memories. In this 
sense, Parfit claims that to trace the continuity of a person’s identity over time, it is only necessary 
a psychological criterion that traces certain psychological continuity. (Parfit 1987: 204) Now, Par-
fit defines psychological continuity as “the holding of overlapping chains of strong [psychological] 
connectedness”, and psychological connectedness as “the holding of particular direct psychologi-
cal connections”.50 (Parfit 1987: 206) 
When accepting a reductionist account, I can only assume that I have now certain experi-
ences and memories, that I can trace these experiences and memories in the past, and that different 
but continuous experiences and memories will be had for future selves that will be related to me 
only in terms of the connections between our memories and experiences. However, Parfit explains 
                                                        
50 The psychological criterion states that “X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if and 
only if (2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, … and (4) it has not taken a ‘branching form’. (5) 
Personal identity over time just consists in the holding of facts like (2) or (4)”. (Parfit 1987: 207)  
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that insofar as experiences and memories now are increasingly less strongly connected with past 
or future experiences and memories the further these experiences and memories are from me-now, 
psychological continuity decreases over time.51 And insofar as psychological continuity decreases 
over time, psychological continuity, under the reductionist view, is a matter of degree. Personal 
identity is not. Psychological continuity and personal identity, then, do not coincide.  
Keeping this in mind, continues Parfit, insofar as a person’s identity only consists in the 
holding of certain psychological connections, it is about these connections, which Parfit names as 
Relation R, about which one ought to be concerned; not personal identity in itself.52 (Parfit 1987: 
215, 263)  
Brink suggests that Rational Egoism and Reductionism are compatible. As I have explained, 
Brink claims that Rational Egoism’s agent-biased, temporally-neutral, structure rests on the hybrid 
patterns of self-concern that are involved in one being a separate person who acts and thinks from 
a first-person perspective in the world, not in a non-reductionist conception of personal identity. 
                                                        
51 My experience now of the screen of my computer is strongly connected to my experience five minutes 
ago of the screen of the computer. I can trace the connections between these experiences and claim that 
they are strongly connected. I cannot say the same about my experience when I saw my first computer 
screen when I was five. I may still trace certain connections between my experiences, but they will be much 
weaker than the connections between my experiences five minutes apart.  
52 Parfit shows so by appealing to hypothetical cases in which psychological continuity takes a branching 
form. Parfit argues that, in those cases, what matters is not identity, but Relation R. This is Parfit’s argument 
to show that his own conception of identity undermines the conception of personal identity upon which 
Rational Egoism rests. (Parfit 1987: 245-263) Parfit believed that Reductionism cast doubt upon Rational 
Egoism’s temporally-neutral structure. Insofar as (a) I cannot assume, as non-reductionism does, that I am 
always the same person with an extended identity over time, (b) I can only assume that I have now experi-
ences and memories, (c) it is Relation R that really matters, not personal identity, and (d) psychological 
continuity is a matter of degree such that I am not fully the same person than myself in the past nor in the 
future; then (x) it is not clear that I ought now to be equally concerned with myself now than “myself” at 
another moment in time. If psychological continuity is indeed a matter of degree, the concern that I ought 
to have now for another self – related to me – at another future moment in time is proportional to the 
strength of the phycological connection between myself now and “myself” at that other time. This estab-
lishes a Discount Rate for concern that, pace Rational Egoism’s temporally-neutral structure, indicates that 
it is not rational for me to sacrifice a present benefit for a greater one in the future. (Brink 1997A, 118) 
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This entails that Rational Egoism’s hybrid structure is not necessarily incompatible with a reduc-
tionist view about personal identity. In fact, Brink suggests that it is possible to claim, with Re-
ductionism, that a person’s identity over time consists in the holding of certain, more particular 
facts that can be described in an impersonal way and at the same time claim, with Rational Egoism, 
that it is only rational to be concerned about my welfare as a whole.  
Now, the key to Brink’s argument is how one ought to conceive oneself at the time of 
displaying concern toward oneself in the past or in the future.  
Parfit assumes that I can only be concerned about my past and future from my position in 
the present. From my temporally-relative position – in the present –, my experiences and memories 
now are more strongly connected with experiences and memories of temporally-adjacent selves 
than the experiences and memories of distant selves. Insofar as I cannot assume that my identity 
persists over time, Parfit assumes that I have more reasons to be concerned for my temporally-
adjacent selves than my temporally-distant selves. This Discount Rate would undermine the tem-
porally-neutral structure of Rational Egoism. 
Brink does not deny Parfit’s claim that I can only be concerned about my past and future 
from my position in the present. However, by appealing to the separateness of persons, Brink 
suggests that part of what it means to be a separate person is that I can only act and think from my 
position in the present by adopting patterns of concern that exhibit a bias toward myself as a whole. 
Even though Brink admits that “practical reasoning is necessarily temporally indexed”, and that 
what it is rational for me to do is always “on the basis of my current beliefs, aims and values”, this 
does not entail that I ought to regard myself as an agent with the same temporal extension than the 
beliefs, aims, and values which ground my reasons for action. (Brink 1997A: 111) Quite the op-
posite. Part of what it means to be a separate person is to act and think now as an entity projected 
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to the future and prolonged to the past that “will persist long enough to perform actions or receive 
the benefits of actions”.53 (Brink 1997A. 112)  
If Brink’s argument is sound, Rational Egoism’s structure is compatible with Parfit’s Re-
ductionism: while Rational Egoism’s structure makes a claim about the patterns of concern that 
persons adopt as agents, Reductionism makes a claim about the continuity of a person’s identity 
over time. In this sense, Rational Egoism conceives persons from the first-person perspective when 
appealing to the separateness of persons, and Reductionism conceives persons from an impersonal 
point of view when claiming that a person’s identity can be described by only appealing to facts 
that can be described impartially. They may conceive person’s differently, but they are not making 
claims about the same subject matter. This is why Rational Egoism and Reductionism can be com-
patible.  
III. A reductionist account of welfare 
Brink suggests that Rational Egoism is only able to respond to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
insofar as it accepts – pace Sidgwick, which regarded welfare as happiness – an objective concep-
tion of welfare that identifies a person’s welfare with the possibility to exercise certain capacities 
for practical deliberations – such as “formulating, assessing, revising, choosing, and implementing 
projects and goals”. Brink follows here “an important philosophical tradition that insists that we 
ought to modify our pretheoretical understanding of self-interest on metaphysical grounds”. (Brink 
                                                        
53 Brink explains that psychological continuity as defined by Parfit “demonstrates only a fact about the 
relation among the parts of my life, not a fact about the relation between these parts and me.” (Brink 1997A: 
121) Only if I conceive myself as a fictional system of coherent phenomena experienced by what Brink 
labels as person-slices or a person-segments, it follows that reductionism implies a discount rate for con-
cern. However, Brink claims “it is persons, and not person-slices or segments, who are agents” able to be 
concerned about their past and future selves. (Brink 1997A: 121) 
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1997B: 124) According to this tradition, my interests are not only causally, but also metaphysi-
cally, interdependent with the interests of others.54  
Brink labels this view metaphysical egoism. According to this view, insofar as a person’s 
welfare depends on her possibilities to exercise certain deliberative capacities, and insofar as it is 
not possible for her to develop these capacities without interacting with others, people’s interests 
are metaphysically interdependent. In other words, insofar as it is not possible for me to promote 
my own overall welfare without relying on the deliberative capacities of others, then it is not pos-
sible for me to promote my own welfare on the whole without promoting, derivatively but not 
instrumentally, the welfare of others.  
Brink grounds his metaphysical egoism – a conception about welfare – in Reductionism.55 
From a reductionist view, under Brink’s interpretation of Parfit’s psychological criterion, a person 
is nothing more than the holding of certain deliberative connections between continuous selves at 
different moments in time – connections that can be described in an impersonal way. However, 
Brink argues that insofar as an agent’s deliberative capacities are interdependent with other agents’ 
deliberative capacities, the agent now might be more continuous with other agents now than to her 
self in the distant future. (Brink 1997B: 142). 
Under Brink’s conception of welfare, then, my welfare is extended to – and continuous 
with – the persons with whom I interact. In other words, I cannot separate my welfare from the 
                                                        
54 This sort of view, explains Brink, “is familiar from the Greek eudaemonist tradition, especially in the 
work of Plato and Aristotle, and from the British idealist tradition, especially the work of T.H. Green.” 
(Brink 1997B: 124) 
55 Insofar as Brink has shown that Rational Egoism and Reductionism are compatible, Brink assumes that 
now he can appeal to Reductionism to ground metaphysical egoism. I will show that it is in this step that 
Brink commits an equivocation. Brink gives three reasons why these deliberative capacities cannot be de-
veloped in isolation. First, because my capacities for practical deliberation, and the content of such delib-
erations, depend on the content of the deliberations of the persons with whom I regularly interact. (Brink 
1997B: 149) Second, because interacting with persons similar to me allows me to “appreciate my own 
qualities from a different perspective”. Third, because interacting with persons different from me contrib-
utes to self-criticism, “improv[ing] my own practical deliberations”. (Brink 1997B: 145) 
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welfare of the people on whom my psychological continuity depends. If this is so, I can only 
gradually separate my interests from those on whom my psychological continuity depends, in a 
similar way that I cannot separate my interests from those of my future selves. In this sense, Brink 
explains, in some cases what it might be rational to do as a rational egoist is to promote the welfare 
of the agents with whom I interact to guarantee that I can exercise my capacities for practical 
deliberation, even if promoting their welfare entails that I need to slightly sacrifice my own wel-
fare.  
This, Brink claims, would not undermine Rational Egoism’s agent-relative, temporally-
neutral structure. Under the rational egoist’s perspective, acting in this way would be no different 
from sacrificing my own future minor benefit for a major present benefit.  
Brink concludes, then, that under his conception of welfare, and his appeal to Reduction-
ism, the dictates of Rational Egoism are not necessarily incompatible with the dictates of Moral-
ity.56 Insofar as my welfare is interdependent with the welfare of others, promoting my own wel-
fare will not necessarily conflict with promoting the welfare of others.  
Now, Brink himself admits that his own metaphysical egoism is not always able to accom-
modate other-regarding moral requirements to the egoist’s rationale. Even though he does indicate 
that interpersonal psychological continuity is not confined to intimates and the circle with which 
one regularly interacts and that it extends further than we think, Brink admits that, inasmuch as 
interpersonal psychological continuity may gradually diminish with distant people or people with 
whom we may never interact, a form of Parfit’s Discount Rate applies to interpersonal concern. 
(Brink 1997A: 153) Accordingly, there are going to be times in which the rational authority of 
morality will be undermined. Therefore, Brink’s metaphysical egoism, constructed upon Parfit’s 
                                                        
56 Ultimately, my rational decision will be determined by the degree of connectedness between myself now 
and myself at other moments in time, and myself now and others.  
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reductionism, does not achieve the purpose that Brink conceives, and he himself admits that this 
is so. However, Brink hopes that the Profoundest Problem, as he conceives it – as the moralist’s 
problem –, can be solved if we take into account that practical reason has both impartial and pru-
dential dimensions. (Brink 1997B: 156; Brink 1997C) Brink hopes, then, that a Principle of Pru-
dence, in which promoting my own welfare metaphysically entails promoting the welfare of others, 
combined with a Principle of Rational Benevolence, will ultimately coincide with the Principle of 
Moral Benevolence.  
3.1.2.3. Objections to David Brink 
As Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer suggest, even if Practical Reason would have both 
impartial and prudential dimension, Brink’s argument would not prevent Rational Egoism from 
undermining Morality. (Lazari-Radek & Singer 2011: 165-166) Instead, by appealing to different 
dimensions of Practical Reason to argue that the combination of two rational principles – one 
prudential, another benevolent – will coincide with one moral – benevolent – principle, Brink un-
knowingly sinks his account in a deeper problem than the one Sidgwick warned us about.  
I. The Profoundest Problem of Rationality and the Dualism of Morality  
In this objection, I suggest that Brink’s appeal to two different dimensions of Practical Reason 
opens the possibility that Brink’s account might be vulnerable to two different dualisms: on the 
one hand, a dualism between the rational Principle of Prudence and the rational Principle of Be-
nevolence; on the other hand, a dualism between a Moral principle of prudence and a Moral prin-
ciple of benevolence.  
 Let us start with a possible conflict between rational Prudence and rational Benevolence, 
which I label as Brink’s Profoundest Problem of Rationality. Brink suggests that the appeal to a 
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benevolent principle of rationality is necessary because the Principle of Prudence, even with 
Brink’s reductionist conception of welfare, does not completely guarantee that promoting every-
one’s welfare will always compensate the sacrifices that one might make. As the example Airport 
Dilemma suggests, it might be possible that Morality requires you to perform an action in which 
you benefit a stranger that you might not see anymore. In this case, even if in normal conditions 
you benefit from having people around you with whom you can exercise and develop your capac-
ities for practical deliberation, this – alleged – psychological continuity with others does not assure 
you that sacrificing your dream job in benefit of the stranger will promote – in the long run – your 
deliberative capacities. Quite the opposite.  
As I explained in the example, getting the job at your dream university would allow you to 
meet people with whom you have always wanted to interact. Assuming that the conversations with 
these people would exponentially increase your deliberative capacities, as a rational egoist acting 
in accordance with the Principle of Prudence, it still would be rational to promote your own wel-
fare, even if that means that the stranger will die. This is why Brink needs to appeal to a rationally 
benevolent principle. 
However, insofar as the Principle of Rational Benevolence qualifies the Principle of Ra-
tional Prudence when this principle conflicts with Morality, then, do not the Principles of Rational 
Benevolence and Rational Prudence conflict? In other words, does not Brink, in his attempt to 
solve the Profoundest Problem, falls in an equally problematic Profoundest Problem of Rationality 
that expresses a conflict between two rational ultimate norms? At best, Brink may understand this 
conflict from a conflict-mitigating interpretation. Similar claims could be made about Morality. If 
rationality is divided against itself, can it also be the case that Morality has both prudential and 
impartial dimensions? It is true that Brink suggests that inasmuch as acting as Egoism dictates 
entails to aim at one’s own good and not that of others, it is difficult to take Egoism as a moral 
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theory. (Brink 1988: 300-302) Still, this does not mean that it is inconceivable. If so, would need 
to face also a Dualism of Morality? 
II. An Equivocation: two incommensurable notions of person 
I have suggested that Brink uses the notion person with different meanings that, at first, seem 
commensurable insofar as these notions are playing different roles. While Reductionism makes a 
claim about persons focusing on their identity, the separateness of persons makes a claim about 
persons focusing in the patterns of concern that persons adopt as agents. Brink answers the Re-
ductionist’s objection appealing to the separateness of persons and showing, precisely, that an 
agent’s patterns of concern need not be related to a particular view of personal identity. I do not 
see a fallacy here.  
 The trouble begins when Brink attempts to ground metaphysical egoism in Reductionism. 
Metaphysical egoism is a conception about welfare. Therefore, it affects the rational distribution 
of benefits and harms that Rational Egoism’s hybrid structure defines. With Brink’s attempt to 
ground metaphysical egoism in Reductionism, then, Brink uses Reductionism not as an account 
about personal identity, but to make a claim about how Rational Egoism, insofar as it accepts 
Reductionism and metaphysical egoism, ought to distribute benefits and harms among persons and 
among time.  
 With this step, Brink, when talking about the same subject matter – displaying concern –, 
uses the notion of person with two meanings that are incommensurable. Brink explained that Ra-
tional Egoism’s structure finds justification in the first-person perspective on the world of an agent 
that acts and thinks – deliberates – as a separate temporally-extended entity that cares about herself 
as a whole. In terms of the separateness of persons, being a person entails being an agent with a 
first-person point of view that deliberates in a continuous way with myself as an agent in the future 
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and in the past.57 However, the deliberations that I have now as a separate person with the delib-
erations that I had in the past or that I will have in the future are connected only insofar as I am 
continuous with myself from this first-person perspective on the world. In other words, it is not 
clear that the connections that hold myself together as a separate person could be explained in an 
impersonal way without losing its normative force, that is, without losing the concern toward my-
self that the separateness of persons was supposed to guarantee. 
 It is for this reason that Brink cannot, as he does, appeal to Reductionism to ground meta-
physical egoism. Reductionism explains the – deliberative – psychological connections between 
different selves in the impersonal way that Rational Egoism cannot allow if it wants to keep the 
normative force that justifies its hybrid structure. Using Reductionism to explain how deliberative 
connections between different agents ground the metaphysical interdependence between these 
agents’ welfares is to understand these deliberative connections, and these agents, in two different 
incommensurable ways – when talking about the same subject matter.  
In particular, it is to claim that these agents are concerned, from their first-person point of 
view, with their own welfare as a whole, but that when they regard this welfare – from a third-
person point of view –, they realize that their welfare as a whole includes other agents’ welfare. 
However, it is not clear why, when they changed to the third-person point of view, they would still 
regard that they ought to care for their own welfare as a whole: it seems that the reasons they had 
to care about themselves as temporally-extended entities would lose their force. Similarly, from 
their first-person point of view, even though they might be able to understand that their welfare is 
interdependent with the welfare of others, they could not regard this interdependence with others 
                                                        
57 Brink seemed here to claim, with Korsgaard, that agency cannot be understood, as for instance Hume and 
Parfit do, as only an “important form of experience”, including “actions and activities among the things that 
happen to us”. (Korsgaard 1987: 102) Instead, Brink seemed to assume that it is only when I conceive my 
actions and thoughts as something that I do, and not that I experience, that self-concern for myself as a 
temporally extended person with a particular perspective is inseparable from me being a separate, distinct 
person. 
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of the same category than the interdependence that they have with themselves. Brink, then, asks 
the agent to conceive herself from the first-person perspective to ground the normative force of 
her agent-relative, temporally-neutral patterns of concern, then to use this strength, from the third-
person perspective, to care about others as if they were a part of her own overall welfare; an overall 
welfare that the agent is only able to conceive from a first-person point of view.58 In other words, 
Brink is asking the agent to conceive herself both as a separate person and as a mere holding of 
psychological connections at the same time. This is, I have argued, not possible.  
III. Rational Egoism’s Underlying Problem  
Brink’s equivocation is not an accident. In my view, Brink is falling into one of the burdens of 
accepting Rational Egoism. Rational Egoism is structurally opposed to other-regarding Morality; 
no matter what theory of welfare one decides to accept. Rational Egoism’s hybrid structure con-
strains the rational egoist to either ground the agent-relative, temporally-neutral, structure of Ra-
tional Egoism in a conception that relies on a first-person point of view in which the relationship 
with myself is for me all important, or to regard myself from an external point of view – as Sidg-
wick would say, the point of view of the universe – in which I am only one human being among 
other human beings. (Sidgwick 1981: 382, 420-421; Brink 1997A: 102; Parfit 1987: 144) It cannot 
do both. However, it is only when one conceives oneself as one human being among other human 
beings that other agents’ welfare might be for me as important as my own. In other words, it is 
only from the point of view of the universe that rationality and other-regarding Morality may co-
incide.  
                                                        
58 Even though it might be true that without others one cannot develop one’s capacities for practical delib-
erations, a necessary normative aspect of forming these capacities is that my relation to them is not imper-
sonal – experiencing them – but personal – thinking with them and being able to do things with them. 
Therefore, even when I regard myself as a deliberative agent, I am concerned about my welfare in a way 
that I am not about the other agent’s welfare. 
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 Brink attempted to elude this fact by suggesting a theory of welfare in which one, as a 
rational egoist, needed to promote one’s own welfare by promoting other agents’ welfare, insofar 
as everyone’s welfare is interdependent. The problem is that to conceive my own welfare requires 
me, to begin with, to conceive myself as a person from a first-person perspective that precludes 
me to see the interdependence between myself and others – understood from the point of view of 
the universe – as important for me as the interdependence between myself now and myself at other 
moments in time. It is in this sense that Rational Egoism is structurally incompatible with other-
regarding Morality. It is in this sense, then, that Rational Egoism and other-regarding Morality 
seem to necessarily conflict. 
 Now, is this not another form of the Dualism of Practical Reason? Does not Brink, in his 
attempt to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, fall in another profoundest problem, as un-
solvable as the one that Sidgwick found? I suggest that all attempts to solve Sidgwick’s problem 
commit the same error. 
IV. The oblivion of the rationalist’s problem 
Brink claims that Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason only raises the question of the rational 
authority of morality. Brink suggests that, if the Dualism of Practical Reason would be understood 
differently, Sidgwick’s conclusion in The Methods of Ethics would undermine Practical Reason to 
an extent that Sidgwick would – and could – not have wanted: Practical Reason would be incoher-
ent, and we would probably lose our trust in our moral reasoning. Indeed, I agree that Sidgwick 
would have probably wanted only to take amoral skepticism seriously, and he probably would not 
have wanted to give in to a possible violation of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics. However, it 
seems that Sidgwick was profoundly concerned because his analysis of the methods of ethics did 
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not yield the results that he would have wanted. This is why there is a Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics to begin with.  
 What is important to realize is that, again, it is Brink’s acceptance of Sidgwick’s Underly-
ing Presuppositions that constrains Brink to deny the rationalist’s problem. When one holds a con-
flict-enhancing interpretation of the Dualism of Practical Reason, while at the same time assuming 
the biconditional relation between the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics and the possibility to trust 
Practical Reason, the only way to secure Practical Reason is to deny that Practical Reason is at 
stake to begin with. One needs to deny that the Dualism of Practical Reason expresses the conflict 
between two rational procedures and assume that the Profoundest Problem of Ethics express the 
conflict between rationality and morality. In other words, Brink’s interpretation of the conflict 
between Prudence and Benevolence is determined by Brink’s denial to accept that Practical Reason 
might be at stake. As I explain below, conflict-mitigating share the same burden. However, unlike 
Brink and Frankena, they do not need to deny that the Profoundest Problem of Ethics expresses 
the rationalist’s problem because, to begin with, they understand the Principles of Prudence and 
Benevolence as granting only deontic force of permission.  
3.2. Conflict-mitigating Interpretations 
3.2.1. Derek Parfit 
3.2.1.1. Parfit’s Interpretation of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
Derek Parfit defends a conflict-mitigating interpretation of the Dualism of Practical Reason. Inso-
far as Parfit conceives morality from an internalist standpoint, Parfit claims that there is an internal 
connection between rationality and morality. In this sense, Parfit believes that the fact that an ac-
tion is regarded as morally wrong gives us reasons to not act in such a way. However, insofar as 
persons have other types of reasons that may conflict with those that compel us to be moral, Parfit 
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suggests that it is not clear, on the one hand, that the conflict between these different kinds of – 
commensurable – reasons will be such that we will have a clear direction about what we ought to 
do, nor on the other hand, that we will always have most reasons to act in accordance with morality. 
As I have explained above, Parfit labels these two possibilities the rationalist’s and the moralist’s 
problem, respectively. Parfit understands the Profoundest Problem of Ethics in terms of these two, 
more particular problems. In Parfit’s view, then, what Sidgwick called the Profoundest Problem 
of Ethics could be solved if one is able to solve the rationalist’s and the moralist’s problem. I argue 
against this claim. I argue that, even if the rationalist’s and the moralist’s problem would be solved, 
the conflict between Rational Egoism and Utilitarianism would still constitute the profoundest 
problem for ethics.  
I. Conceptual Background 
According to Parfit, reasons are based on facts that “count in favor of our having some attitude, or 
our acting in some way”. (Parfit 2011: 165) In this sense, Parfit says, when “we must choose 
between different possible acts, our reasons may conflict, and they can differ in what we can call 
their force, strength or weight”. (Parfit 2011: 32)  
According to the weight of the conflicting reasons, reasons can be decisive, strongly deci-
sive, or sufficient. This terminology is crucial.  
Decisive reasons:  A reason is a decisive reason when it is stronger than other 
reasons to act in another way, “and acting in this way is 
what we have most reason to do”. (Parfit 2011: 32)  
Strongly decisive reasons: When a decisive reason is much stronger than a conflicting 
reason. (Parfit 2011: 32) 
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Sufficient reasons: When our reasons to act in some way are not weaker than 
the reasons to act in another way, but they are not decisive 
either. (Parfit 2011: 32) 
When we have decisive reasons to act in some way, Parfit explains, “this act is what we 
should or ought to do in what we can call the decisive-reason-implying sense”. (Parfit 2011: 33) 
We would have, Parfit says, relevant, reason-giving facts to act in that way. (Parfit, 34) At the 
same time, some possible act is “rational if we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth 
would give us sufficient reasons to act in this way”. (Parfit 2011: 34) If we would perform that act, 
we would be acting rationally. (Parfit 2011: 35) However, an act would be irrational if we would 
have decisive reasons not to perform that act, and despite these decisive reasons, we acted in that 
way.  
Keeping this in mind, according to Parfit, we “have self-interested reasons to care about 
our own well-being, and altruistic reasons to care about the well-being of other people”. (Parfit 
2011: 40) In particular, we have two types of self-regarding reasons: personal reasons to care about 
ourselves and partial reasons to benefit the persons with whom we have close ties. (Parfit 2011: 
136) These reasons correspond to what Sidgwick called Rational Egoism. We also have impartial 
reasons, which are reasons to care about everyone’s well-being, even if they are not related to us. 
(Parfit 2011: 136) These reasons correspond to what Sidgwick called Rational Benevolence.  
II. Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason 
Parfit recognizes, then, a Dualism of Practical Reason similar to that which Sidgwick recognized 
between the Principle of Egoism and the Principle of Utilitarianism. Here is what Parfit calls the 
Dualism of Practical Reason: 
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[We] always have most reason to do whatever would be impartially best, unless 
some other act would be best for ourselves. In such cases, we would have sufficient 
reasons to act in either way. If we knew the relevant facts, either act would be ra-
tional. (Parfit 2011: 131) 
 
When they conflict, Parfit claims, and as we have explained, Sidgwick believes that reason 
would offer us no guidance. (Parfit 2011: 142) Parfit understands Sidgwick’s pessimism as Sidg-
wick claiming that impartial reasons and partial, or personal, reasons for acting are fully incom-
mensurable. (Parfit 2011: 131-132) This is revealing. If one takes into consideration Phillips’ dis-
tinction between conflict-enhancing and conflict-mitigating interpretations, Parfit seems to suggest 
that Sidgwick himself defended a conflict-mitigating interpretation. Why? Because in case of con-
flict between what would be impartially best and what would be best for ourselves, Parfit suggests 
that we would have sufficient reasons – permission – to act in both ways, and not decisive reasons 
– requirement – to act in accordance with one type of reason in particular. In this sense, according 
to Parfit, Sidgwick could not resolve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, because he thought that 
the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence were incommensurable, not because he 
thought that they were either first-order or second-order ultimate norms. 
In particular, Parfit argues that Sidgwick’s thesis of incommensurability between impartial 
and self-regarding reasons rests upon three ideas: first, that different kinds of reasons cannot be 
compared; second, an appeal to the separateness of persons; and third, that Sidgwick believes that 
we can only have impartial reasons when we take a universal point of view, while we can only have 
personal or partial reasons when we take a personal point view. (Parfit 2011: 131, 133) From our 
personal first-person point of view, in which we usually live our lives, our self-regarding reasons 
are supreme; from the universal point of view – the point of view of the universe – insofar as we 
take the point of view of an external observer, impartial reasons are supreme. Why? Because as 
we are not affected by the separateness of persons, my well-being is not for me all-important, and 
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since the difference between others and myself is not fundamentally different, then we have rea-
sons to care equally about the well-being of other people.  
Parfit recreates what he believes is Sidgwick’s argument about the incommensurability of 
reasons in what Parfit labels the Two Viewpoints Argument: 
(A) When we try to decide what we have most reason to do, we can rationally ask this question 
from our own personal point of view or from an imagined impartial point of view.  
(B) When we ask this question from our personal point of view, the answer is that self-interested 
reasons are supreme.  
(C) When we ask this question from our impartial point of view, the answer is that impartial 
reasons are supreme. 
(D) To compare the strength of these two kinds of reason, we would need to have some third, 
neutral point of view. 
(E) There is not such point of view  
Therefore: 
Impartial and self-interested reasons are wholly incomparable. When such reasons conflict, 
no reason of either kind could be stronger than any reason of other kind. 
Therefore: 
In such cases, we would have sufficient reasons to do either what would be impartially best, 
or what would be best for ourselves. If we knew the facts, either act would be rational. (Parfit 
2011: 134) 
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 In Parfit’s reading of Sidgwick, Sidgwick considers that impartial and self-regarding rea-
sons are “wholly incomparable”, inasmuch as the neutral point of view, which we would need to 
compare the personal point of view, from which personal or partial reasons are self-evident, and 
the point of view of the universe, from which impartial reasons are self-evident, does not exist. 
(Parfit 2011: 132) Nevertheless, Parfit claims that the Two Viewpoints Argument is not sound. 
Parfit claims that impartial and partial or personal reasons are “only very imprecisely comparable”, 
but comparable nevertheless. (Parfit 2011: 137) Thus, Sidgwick’s dualism is not as unsolvable as 
Sidgwick thought.  
III. Parfit’s Objections to Sidgwick 
In Parfit’s view, the Two Viewpoints Argument is exposed to three objections: an objection to 
premise (A); an objection to premise (B); and, an objection to premise (D). First, as to objection 
to premise (A), Parfit claims that we actually do not need an imagined universal point of view to 
be able to have impartial reasons. (Parfit 2011: 135) From our actual point of view, Parfit explains, 
we have impartial reasons to regard other’s well-being. (Parfit 2011: 137) Second, as to objection 
to premise (B), and by inference to the objection to premise (A), Parfit claims that partial and 
personal reasons are not always supreme from our personal point of view. According to Parfit, to 
affirm that from our personal point of view we only have self-regarding reasons leads us to coun-
ter-intuitive implications. For example, if we accept (B), if we were to choose between (a) saving 
the life of many people or (b) preventing oneself from a little cut, (b) would be the only rational 
option, but of course, Parfit claims: “This horrendous act would not be rational”. (Parfit 2011: 135) 
Finally, as an objection to premise (D), and by implication of the objection to premise (A) and (B) 
together, Parfit claims that we do not actually need a neutral point of view to compare impartial 
and partial or personal reasons. (Parfit 2011: 135) As we have both impartial and personal and 
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partial reasons from our actual point of view, we just need a neutral criterion to compare such 
reasons from such “actual, personal point of view”.59 (Parfit 2011: 135) 
Impartial and self-regarding reasons are comparable. In Parfit’s view, the difficulty of 
comparing these reasons is only because “these reasons are provided by very different kinds of 
facts” (Parfit 2011: 138), not because each is considered supreme from different points of view. 
Parfit explains that these kinds of facts are two: person-neutral, which are facts that need not refer 
to us and, thus, provide impartial reasons for action; and person-relative, which are facts that must 
refer to us and, thus, provide self-interested reasons (Parfit, 138). Parfit claims, in a postulate re-
sembling the separateness of persons, that I have a different relation to a fact when it affects me 
(person-relative) than when it doesn’t (person-neutral).60 
However, Parfit seems to suggest that, even though occasionally these different kinds of 
facts may give different force to personal and partial reasons than to impartial reasons, this does 
not imply that, once the degree of force that each type of fact gives to each type of reason is 
determined, these different types of reasons are not comparable. Quite the contrary. Parfit suggests 
that with a neutral criterion, which Parfit regards as reasons themselves, and in particular their 
comparable strength, impartial and self-regarding reasons are actually comparable. (Parfit 2011: 
146, 148)  
                                                        
59 In my view, Parfit’s objection to (A), (B), and (D) rest in Parfit’s reductionist account of personal identity. 
As I have suggested, Parfit considers that the agent can only have reasons for action at the time of acting. 
(Parfit 1987: 144) Insofar as the agent is only psychologically continuous with her future selves in terms of 
the psychological connectedness she has with those future selves, it is possible that the agent is more psy-
chologically connected with other agents with whom she has close ties or agents that share her same nature. 
This would explain why Parfit believes that different points of view are not really needed.  
60 Husain Sarkar has suggested that Parfit, with this step, may have injected subjectivism in his otherwise 
objective theory. (Sarkar 2018: 22-23) In section 3.2.1.3, I extend Sarkar’s argument, and I suggest that, 
with the difference between person-neutral and person-relative facts, Parfit ultimately relies on the two – 
incommensurable – points of view that his objection to Sidgwick’s Two Viewpoints Argument pretended 
to deny.  
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Parfit goes a step further. According to Parfit, not only is Sidgwick wrong in appealing to 
different points of view, but he is also wrong in thinking that if the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
were to arise, it would be between impartial and self-regarding reasons. It rather arises between 
moral and non-moral reasons. (Parfit 2011: 147) In Parfit’s view, for instance, sometimes we act 
wrongly motivated by other-regarding reasons. When someone with whom we have close ties is 
in danger, we may act wrongly to save them, but the act would not, Parfit explains, be driven by 
self-regarding reasons. At the same time, Parfit continues, we might have impartial reasons to act 
wrongly. (Parfit 2011: 143) We might kill someone to save the lives of five people, an act which 
Parfit would regard as wrong.61  
We can see here that Parfit conceives morality from an internalist standpoint. According 
to Parfit, if we regard a certain action as wrong, we have reasons to not perform that action.62 
Another issue – the issue that concerns Parfit – is that it is in principle possible that we have other, 
equally strong, or maybe even stronger, reasons to act in a way that undermines morality.  
IV. Parfit’s Dualism of Practical Reason 
In Parfit’s view, the profoundest problem would arise only if, in case of a conflict between moral 
reasons and non-moral reasons, the neutral criterion, the strength of such reasons, would not give 
us guidance. We would have neither sufficient nor decisive reasons to act in either way. (Parfit 
2011: 143) I believe Parfit deems this problem, which he labels as the rationalist’s problem, as 
equivalent to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. In Parfit’s view, another profound problem would 
arise if we would have sufficient reasons to act wrongly. (Parfit 2011: 147) Parfit names this the 
                                                        
61 I am taking here the suggestion of Husain Sarkar on how to understand Parfit in this passage (Sarkar 
2018, 18, 26-28). Sarkar recruits this terminology from Parfit’s difference between a decisive-moral-reason 
sense and the morally-decisive-reason sense (Parfit 2011, 166-167; Sarkar 2018, 17-19). 
62 Parfit claims: “For morality to matter, we must have reasons to care about morality, and to avoid acting 
wrongly.” (Parfit 2011: 148) Parfit also claims that when some act is wrong in the mustn’t-be-done sense, 
we have always decisive reasons to not perform such an act. (Parfit 2011: 173) 
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moralist’s problem. (Parfit 2011: 148) Lazari-Radek and Singer do not, in my view, pay sufficient 
attention to this difference, and they claim that Parfit solves Sidgwick’s problem with a view that 
Parfit claims to take from Sidgwick, namely, a wide value-based objective view: (Lazari-Radek & 
Singer 2011: 161-163) 
When one of our two possible acts would make things go in some way that would 
be impartially better, but the other act would make things go better either for our-
selves or those to whom we have close ties, we often have sufficient reasons to act 
in either way. (Parfit 2011: 137) 
 
However, as I have explained, Parfit’s rationalist’s and moralist’s problems do not appeal 
to impartial and partial reasons or personal reasons (as the wide value-based objective view does). 
There is actually another theory to which Parfit explicitly appeals in his section “The Profoundest 
Problem”. (Parfit 2011: 141, 142) Parfit says in what he calls the Dualism of Duty and Self-Interest: 
If duty and self-interest never [practically] conflict, we would always have most 
reason both to do our duty and to do what would be best for ourselves. But if we 
had to choose between two acts, of which one was our duty but the other would be 
better for ourselves, reason would give us no guidance. In such cases, we would not 
have stronger reasons to act in either of these ways. If we knew the relevant facts, 
either act would be rational. (Parfit 2011: 142) 
 
3.2.1.2. Parfit’s Solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
I claim Parfit’s answer to the rationalist’s problem needs to be understood as something in between 
a wide value-based objective view and the Dualism of Duty and Self-Interest. Parfit has claimed 
that not all self-regarding reasons are non-moral, and Parfit associates Duty with moral reasons.63 
If this is so, we can state a Parfitian-like theory: 
                                                        
63 Parfit understands Duty as what “we ought morally to do, when it would be wrong for us to not act in 
this way.” In parallel, wrong would be understood as the opposite of what we ought morally to do. (Parfit 
2011, 165) 
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Dualism of moral and non-moral reasons: If moral and non-moral reasons never 
practically conflict, we would always have decisive reasons to act according to both 
moral and non-moral reasons. But if we had to choose between two acts, for one of 
which we had moral-reasons counting in its favor, and for the other we had non-
moral reasons counting in its favor, we would have sufficient reasons to act in either 
way.  
 
With the Dualism of moral and non-moral reasons, the rationalist’s problem is solved: we 
always have at least sufficient reasons to act in some way. What about the moralist problem? The 
moralist’s problem is not yet solved; it is still possible that we might have sufficient reasons to act 
wrongly. I believe, though, that Parfit does think that he is able to solve the moralist’s problem. 
Parfit claims: “Morality might have supreme importance in the reason-implying sense, since we 
might have always decisive reasons to do our duty, and to avoid acting wrongly”. (Parfit 2011: 
149) Just after this, Parfit claims: “In the rest of this volume, I shall mostly discuss morality”. 
(Parfit 2011: 149) If one assumes that the rationalist’s problem is solved with a Dualism of moral 
and non-moral reasons, one might claim that Parfit, in “the rest of the volume,” in which he 
“mostly” discusses “morality,” is attempting to solve the moralist problem. This is an unsubstan-
tiated claim, but it might be an interesting thought to pursue on another occasion.   
3.2.1.3. Objections to Derek Parfit 
I. Two Viewpoints Assumption 
Parfit’s conflict-mitigating interpretation relies on the assumption that moral and non-moral rea-
sons are commensurable. According to Parfit, moral and non-moral reasons are ultimately either 
personal, partial, or impersonal reasons – without assuming that there is a correspondence between 
non-moral and personal or partial reasons and between moral and impartial reasons. At the same 
time, Parfit suggests that personal, partial, and impersonal reasons are commensurable insofar as 
they are based on facts that, these, are commensurable. In particular, Parfit distinguishes between 
 100 
person-relative and person-neutral facts, suggesting that an agent has a relation with person-rela-
tive facts that she does not necessarily have with person-neutral facts and that this different relation 
might affect the way these different facts transmit weight to their respective types of reasons. One 
can ask here how the weight of these reasons ought to be assigned.  
 Husain Sarkar has actually suggested an objection against Parfit in just these terms. (Sarkar 
2018: 22-23) As Sarkar suggests, Parfit seems to have two options. On the one hand, (a) Parfit can 
concede that the agent has some power in determining the weight of certain types of reason – 
personal or partial reasons – such as that she gives a special weight to the well-being of certain 
persons. In my view, this would account for Parfit’s so called person-relative facts; with which the 
agent seems to have some special relation. However, as Sarkar suggests: “if, ultimately, what 
weight to assign is dependent on the moral agent, then it injects a significant element of subjectiv-
ism, à la Korsgaard, into Parfit’s moral theory that is quite foreign to it.” (Sarkar 2018: 23) On the 
other hand, (b) Sarkar suggests that the other option seems to be to determine the weight of all 
reasons objectively by only appealing to facts that are regarded impartially, independently of the 
moral agent. In my view, this would account for Parfit’s person-neutral facts. And, according to 
Sarkar, this would suit happily with Parfit’s intention to provide an objective moral theory.  
Sarkar does not suggest if Parfit ought to choose specifically between (a) and (b); he does 
suggest, however, that Parfit needs to make a choice if he wants to explain precisely how the 
weight of reasons – which supposedly determines how the conflict between them needs to be re-
solved – is assigned. I want to go a step further. In my view, if Parfit wants to provide a plausible 
– and somewhat Sidgwickian – theory of rationality, Parfit needs to accept that there are different 
types of reasons – personal, partial, and impartial – and different types of facts – person-relative 
and person-neutral. However, as Sarkar suggests with his objection, Parfit can only recognize these 
different types of reasons and different types of facts if the agent in his theory of rationality, at the 
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same time, holds two different points of view that, not surprisingly, correspond with the two – 
incommensurable – points of view that generated Sidgwick’s Profoundest Problem of Ethics in 
the first place.  
In this sense, I suggest that what Sarkar calls a subjectivist injection in Parfit’s objective 
theory is, truly, Parfit’s appeal to a first-person perspective in order to explain the special weight 
that person-relative facts give to personal and partial reasons. Without appealing to this first-person 
point of view and determining the weight of all reasons only from an impartial point of view – 
Sidgwick would say the point of view of the universe –, all reasons would be impartial. Similarly, 
without appealing to the impartial point of view, all reasons would be personal or partial. Parfit, 
therefore, needs to appeal to two different points of view from which the weight assigned to rea-
sons would very likely be quite different. If my suggestion is right, then, Parfit might unknowingly 
be falling into another Sidgwickian Dualism of Practical Reason between self-regarding and other-
regarding reasons. In fact, once the agent needs to appeal to two different points of view that con-
ceive the facts differently, it seems that the agent would be left with conflicting intuitions about 
how to conceive these; and, ultimately, she would be left without being able to determine what she 
ought to do. This dualism would not necessarily mirror a conflict between moral and non-moral 
reasons. However, once the conflict between personal, and impartial reasons occurs, it is conceiv-
able that the dualism of moral and non-moral reasons would be difficult, if not impossible, to solve.   
II. The disappearance of reasons 
From the previous objection, another objection against Parfit – also suggested by Sarkar, but that 
I have extended – follows. As Sarkar claims: 
The “only way to factor [the agent, and her point of view] out of the picture … is 
to assume that reasons are commensurate and that there are agent-independent, ob-
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jective, normative facts that will provide the “normative force” … or “a truly nor-
mative reason” … for what [the agent] must do. But, then, one might say, why not 
just suppose that? (Sarkar 2018: 14) 
 
Sarkar’s objection is pungent. It is not clear why Parfit appeals to Sidgwick’s dualism in 
the first place if he ultimately relies on objective facts – that can be explained impartially – to 
determine the weight of certain conflicting reasons. However, as I have suggested in the objection 
above, it does appear that Parfit needs to appeal to different points of view to explain the difference 
between the agent’s agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons.  
Now, if Parfit gives in to the possibility that we might need different points of view – that 
at least seem incommensurable – to explain the different weights that the agent’s reasons get from 
person-relative and person-neutral facts, it is not clear then on what grounds Parfit seems to assume 
that, when two different – only very imprecisely comparable – reasons conflict, we need to assume 
that the reasons that are not decisive will simply vaporize. (Sarkar 2018: 14) At best, if they are 
indeed somewhat comparable, and even if I would have most reason to act in a certain way, the 
other type of reason would not vanish precisely because I would still have that reason from the 
other point of view.  
In this sense, even if I actually would know what I have most reasons to do, this would not 
avoid that my Practical Reason would be pitted against itself. I understand this is a strange claim. 
But I believe it actually sheds light onto the very nature of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. The 
problem is not about being able to rely on Practical Reason, or about Morality possibly being 
undermined. The problem, in my view, is about an inescapable duality of standpoints to which, as 
human beings that live in the first-person perspective but that are able to think impartially – from 
the point of view of the universe –, are condemned. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics, then, 
might suggest that the sources of normativity are divided and pitted against themselves.  
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III. The problem with conflict-mitigating interpretations 
Conflict-mitigating interpretations, I have suggested, only solve a watered-down version of what 
Sidgwick called the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. With Parfit’s solution, we can now understand 
why. Conflict-mitigating interpretations, while accepting – or maybe precisely because they accept 
– Sidgwick’s Underlying Presupposition and the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics, they understand 
the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence in a way that their conflict is already unprob-
lematic. In other words, they try to understand these conflicting principles in a way in which they 
already do not practically nor theoretically conflict.64 Why? I can only suggest here a conjecture: 
it might be because they do not give in to the possibility, as Sidgwick did, that we might not be 
able to trust Practical Reason in determining what we ought to do. If one accepts Sidgwick’s Un-
derlying Presuppositions, but at the same time assumes the reliability of Practical Reason, one has 
only so many options to guarantee that the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is not violated.  
In my view, Parfit’s own understanding of Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason gives 
away Parfit’s denial to take seriously the Profoundest Problem of Ethics: to suggest that Sidgwick 
considered that the conflict between Egoism and Utilitarianism was only between two theories 
granting rational permission is to not be able to perceive the tone of alarm penetrating The Methods 
of Ethics, nor – most importantly –  being able to recognize Sidgwick’s Underlying Presupposi-
tions. In fact, Parfit’s Two Viewpoints Argument, which allegedly outlines the reasoning that lead 
Sidgwick to find the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, only outlines Sidgwick’s claim that the Prin-
ciples of Prudence and Rational Benevolence theoretically conflict – that is, clause (6) in what I 
call Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument.  
                                                        
64 Sarkar himself explains that, as Parfit defines it, the rationalist’s problem “is relatively simple, if not 
almost trivial, compared to the moralist’s problem.” (Sarkar 2018: 25) This claim is not accidental. Once 
one understands the conflict between the Principles of Egoism and Utilitarianism from a conflict-mitigating 
view, the only deep problem is to safeguard morality.   
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It is not arbitrary, then, that Parfit objects to Sidgwick’s thesis of incommensurability in 
the Two Viewpoint Argument. As I have explained, conflict-mitigating views, to “solve” the Pro-
foundest Problem of Ethics, only need to show that the Principles of Prudence and Rational Be-
nevolence do not theoretically conflict. If we remember the definition provided above of theoret-
ical conflict, Prudence and Benevolence theoretically conflict if and only if they are either mutually 
inconsistent, or incommensurable.   
 The question is: why is this really important? Because the conflict between the Principles 
of Prudence and Rational Benevolence, when understood in their full force, from their respective 
points of view, reveals a problem even deeper than the one Sidgwick conceived, a problem that 
goes beyond the possibility to trust or not our Practical Reason, or the rational authority of moral-
ity. It instead speaks about the nature of our Practical Reason. I suggest that Sidgwick noticed this 
problem but constrained by his unquestioned acceptance of Sidgwick’s Underlying Presupposi-
tions, he did not perceive the deepness of the problem that he had found. Conflict-mitigating in-
terpretations make a huger error. Constrained by their acceptance of Sidgwick’s Underlying Pre-
suppositions, and by their denial to question Practical Reason, they have forgotten the profound-
ness of the conflict between self-regard and Duty; and they have turned the conflict into a rational 
game in which one simply needs to justify the weight given to each principle.  
3.2.2. Owen McLeod 
3.2.2.1. McLeod’s Interpretation of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
Owen McLeod defends an internalist enhanced conflict-mitigating view of Sidgwick’s Dualism of 
Practical Reason. However, McLeod claims that his view is not conflict-mitigating. As I try to 
explain, McLeod is not really against conflict-mitigating views but against standard conflict-mit-
igating views. Ultimately, McLeod argues that, with his view, the conflict between Egoism and 
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Utilitarianism does not constitute a Dualism of Practical Reason – insofar as, McLeod claims, 
Practical Reason does not dictate two sets of inconsistent principles.  
I. Sidgwick’s problem 
McLeod, following Jerome Schneewind’s interpretation of Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Rea-
son, understands the Profoundest Problem of Ethics as a problem “of being stuck with a logically 
inconsistent set of propositions”.65 (McLeod 2000: 284) In particular, according to McLeod, Sidg-
wick is attracted to the following set of propositions:  
U: An act is morally right iff it maximizes utility.  
E:  An act is prudentially right iff it maximizes agent-utility.  
P1:  An act is reasonable iff it is morally right or prudentially right; an act is not reason-
able iff it is morally wrong or prudentially wrong. 
P2: It is possible for an act that maximizes utility to fail to maximize agent-utility, and 
vice versa. (McLeod 2000: 284) 
McLeod claims that Sidgwick’s problem is that he cannot accept all four propositions at 
the same time insofar as they form an inconsistent set: if one accepts P2, and indeed an act that 
maximizes utility fails to maximize agent-utility, then, in accordance with U and E, this act is 
morally right but prudentially wrong. But now, in accordance with P1, this act is reasonable and 
not reasonable at the same time. This is what Sidgwick called, according to McLeod, the Dualism 
of Practical Reason.  
                                                        
65 For the interpretation of Schneewind, see Sidgwcick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosphy. In particu-
lar, Part II.  
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II. McLeod’s objection against standard conflict-mitigating views 
Conflict-mitigating views, claims McLeod, are not able to solve Sidgwick’s problem as he under-
stands it. McLeod suggests that conflict-mitigating views can be stated in the following principle:  
(IW)  An act is rationally permissible iff it is morally required or prudentially re-
quired. (McLeod 200: 285) 
Conflict-mitigating interpretations, then, according to McLeod, understand the notion rea-
sonable in P1 as rational permissibility – assuming that Reason is indeterminate –, such that P2 
does not make the set of propositions inconsistent. According to McLeod, though, Sidgwick should 
not accept, with conflict-mitigating interpretations, that Reason is indeterminate.66 (McLeod 2000: 
286) McLeod gives to two reasons to support his claim. First, (IW) generates implausible results, 
as it only declares an act as rationally permissible if and only if it is rationally required either 
morally or prudentially. But, McLeod wonders: what if, when deciding between two acts, both are 
only morally and prudentially permitted? According to (IW), such acts would not be rationally 
permissible, since neither option is morally or prudentially required. (McLeod 2000: 287) This, 
McLeod claims, is absurd.  
And McLeod might be right. However, I believe it is not difficult to amend all conflict-
mitigating views by including an additional clause that dictates that, when deciding between two 
alternatives, both morally and prudentially permitted, at least one act – or more plausibly both – 
are rationally permissible. (McLeod 2000: 287)  
                                                        
66 In particular, McLeod objects to what Phillips calls the Indeterminacy View in “Sidgwick, Dualism and 
Indeterminacy in Practical Reason”, which later labels, in Sidgwickian Ethics, as conflict-mitigating inter-
pretations.  
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However, this would lead us to McLeod’s second objection against conflict-mitigating in-
terpretations. Second, McLeod claims that (IW)’s “implication that conflicts of moral and pruden-
tial obligation will always or necessarily resolve themselves into rational ties is implausible”. 
(McLeod 2000: 287) According to McLeod, two options being morally and prudentially permitted 
does not necessarily entail that both options are equally rationally permissible. According to 
McLeod, Sidgwick’s problem needs to be solved in a way that the set of propositions to which 
Sidgwick is attracted is not inconsistent and one can, at the same, have still more reasons to act in 
a certain way.  
III. McLeod’s enhanced conflict-mitigating interpretation 
This second objection is, in my view, very revealing; while McLeod believes he is objecting to 
conflict-mitigating interpretation, he is only at best objecting to standard conflict-mitigating views 
– which in fact Phillips already considers less plausible than enhanced conflict-mitigating views. 
(Phillips 1998: 60) Enhanced conflict-mitigating views are not vulnerable to McLeod’s second 
objection. Why? Because, as I have explained, they precisely indicate that when two principles 
that grant only rational permission conflict, one is permitted to give more strength to one of the 
principles. The question, then, is how one assigns weight to each principle such that their conflict 
does not always result in a rational tie. I have explained that Parfit believes that the weight of 
reasons is based on the force of certain facts. McLeod appeals to a similar – although vaguer – 
criterion. McLeod claims:  
Normative weight of acts: Normative weight is a property of acts. Acts inherit this 
weight in virtue of their normative status. (McLeod 2000: 
287) 
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McLeod does not explain the relation between the normative status of an act and the weight 
that the act has. He just assumes that the fact that an act is morally or prudentially right gives that 
act certain normative weight. McLeod admits that it might be epistemologically complex to assign 
each act its specific weight; but he nevertheless assumes that these weights of all reasonable acts 
are commensurable.67 (McLeod 2000: 288)  
3.2.2.2. McLeod’s Solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
To understand McLeod’s solution, it is necessary to introduce some of his terminology: 
Morally right acts:   An act is morally right iff it maximizes utility. (McLeod 
2000: 288) 
Prudentially right acts: An act is prudentially right iff it maximizes agent-utility. 
(McLeod 2000: 288) 
Prima facie reasonable act: An “act is prima facie reasonable if and only if it is morally 
or prudentially right”. (McLeod 2000: 287)  
All-reasonable acts:  An “act is all-reasonable if and only if it is prima facie rea-
sonable, and no alternative has more normative weight than 
it”. (McLeod 2000: 288) 
                                                        
67 McLeod admits that the “central (and controversial) assumption here, of course, is that normative weights 
are commensurable." (McLeod 2000: 288) However, McLeod does not justify this claim.  
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Uniquely all-in reasonable acts: An “act is uniquely all-in reasonable if and only if it 
is prima facie reasonable, and it is the most norma-
tively weighty alternative”. (McLeod 2000: 288) 
 The key of McLeod’s alternative interpretation is the substitution of Sidgwick’s notion of 
reasonable act for prima facie reasonable act. With this substitution, McLeod accepts the follow-
ing set of propositions: 
U: An act is morally right iff it maximizes utility.  
E:  An act is prudentially right iff it maximizes agent-utility.  
P1*:  And act is prima facie reasonable iff it is morally right or prudentially right; and act 
is not prima facie reasonable iff it is morally wrong or prudentially wrong. 
P2: It is possible for an act that maximizes utility to fail to maximize agent-utility, and 
vice versa. (McLeod 2000: 288) 
This set of propositions is not inconsistent. One can accept – P2 – that there might be an 
act that maximize agent-utility and not utility; that consequently – because U and E – this act is 
prudentially right and morally wrong and still be able to claim that P1* is true. In this case, to 
accept P1* would entail that this act is prima facie reasonable and prima facie not reasonable.68 In 
such cases, the normative weight of the act will either determine the act as uniquely all-in reason-
able – being required to perform that act – or it will determine that act as all-reasonable – being 
permitted to perform this act. According to McLeod, the problem would be if two acts would be, 
at the same time, uniquely all-in reasonable and uniquely all-in not reasonable. (McLeod 2000: 
288) However, by definition, this is not possible.  
                                                        
68 But this is not a contradiction as, apparently, holding that an act is reasonable and not reasonable at the 
same time is. 
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There can only be one act that it is most weighty. If there would be two, no alternative 
would have more normative weight than the other, and these acts both be considered, by definition, 
all-reasonable acts. With his interpretation, then, McLeod believes that not only is Ethics safe from 
Sidgwick’s profoundest problem, but also that Practical Reason does not fall into a dualism.  
3.2.2.3. Objections to Owen McLeod 
As I have suggested, I do not want to repeat the objections that I have already presented to 
conflict-mitigating interpretations when objecting Parfit’s view. Again, it is clear to me that 
McLeod is not able to perceive the deepness of the problem that Sidgwick found, and he only 
solves a watered-down version of the problem. I do believe that McLeod, as well as Parfit, offer a 
satisfactory solution to their problem. But this does not entail that they are solving the Profoundest 
Problem of Ethics. As I have suggested, Parfit’s and McLeod’s assumption that the normative 
force of acts is commensurable seems to be the problem.  
As well as their unquestioned acceptance of Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions. It is 
crucial here to notice that McLeod seems to almost explicitly accept a form of Sidgwick’s Funda-
mental Postulate of Ethics. Only in this way, I believe, one can understand McLeod’s claim that 
the set of propositions to which Sidgwick was attracted {U, E, P1, PE} is inconsistent. McLeod 
justified his claim, suggesting that accepting the set entails that one act can be reasonable and not 
reasonable at the same time. And this seems to be sufficient reason for him to provide another – 
conflict-mitigating – notion of reasonableness in which a modified set of propositions would not 
be no longer inconsistent. McLeod’s approach, then, is to avoid the problem that Sidgwick found 
and define rationality in a way in which the conflict between prudence and morality is not prob-
lematic to begin with. But the question is: why should it be problematic that one act is prudentially 
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reasonable and morally reasonable at the same time? Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions 
seems to be, again, lurking in the background.  
3.2.3. David Phillips 
3.2.3.1. Phillip’s Interpretation of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
David Phillips defends an enhanced conflict-mitigating interpretation of Sidgwick’s Dualism of 
Practical Reason.69 He is also an internalist. I do not present any particular objection to Phillips. 
However, as I have already indicated, insofar as Phillips defends a conflict-mitigating view, the 
objections presented against Parfit and McLeod are applicable to Phillips’ position.  
I. Phillips’ enhanced conflict-mitigating view 
Enhanced conflict-mitigating interpretations of Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason differ 
from standard conflict-mitigating interpretations in the way they assign weight to the Principles of 
Prudence and Rational Benevolence. While standard conflict-mitigating interpretations claim that, 
when these principles conflict, it is – equally – rationally permissible to act in accordance with 
Egoism and Utilitarianism; enhanced conflict-mitigating interpretations claim that, if it is already 
rationally permissible to act in accordance with either of both theories, it must also be rationally 
permissible to give “some extra weight to one’s own interest but otherwise considering everyone’s 
interests equally”; or vice versa. (Phillips 1998: 60; my emphasis) Enhanced conflict-mitigating 
views, then, give different normative force to the dictates of Utilitarianism and Egoism. When 
                                                        
69 As I have suggested, The Indeterminacy View is another name to express what we have explained as a 
conflict-mitigating view. In “Sidgwick, Dualism and Indeterminacy in Practical Reason” Phillips uses the 
notion of The Indeterminacy View, and in Sidgwickian Ethics Phillips uses the notion conflicting-mitigating 
view. Phillips explains that the Indeterminacy View is inspired by Parfit’s interpretation of Sidgwick’s 
dualism. (Phillips 1998: 75) The enhanced conflict-mitigating view is a term that I use to refer to Phillips’ 
enhanced conflict-mitigating view.  
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their dictates do not conflict, one is permitted to act in accordance with either principle. When they 
conflict, the different weight already assigned to the principles will determine the principle in ac-
cordance with which we ought to act.  
3.2.3.2. Phillip’s Interpretation of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
Phillips, drawing from Parfit, defends a form of the enhanced conflict-mitigating view, which he 
labels as The Qualified Permissive View. (Phillips 2011: 148) According to such a view: 
(i) It is not rationally permissible to ignore the well-being of others when choosing 
between two options exactly equally as good for oneself. (Phillips 2011: 148)  
(ii) It is not permissible to choose an option trivially better for you that is seriously 
worse for others. (Phillips 2011: 148)  
(iii) In cases “of choices between options that are equally good or roughly equally 
good for everyone, but much better or worse for the agent” one is “rationally re-
quired” to choose the option that is much better for him or avoid the option that is 
much worse for him. (Phillips 2011: 148, 150) 
As we can see, Phillips’ Qualified Permissive View permits all acts that do not conflict with 
(i) and (ii) but rationally requires (iii). In this sense, Phillips claims:  
On the view I advocate, and I take it on the views advocated both by Parfit and 
Crisp, (a) it would be rational to choose to save my own life even at the cost of 100 
strangers’ lives, and (b) it would be rationally permissible to sacrifice my own life 
to save the lives of two strangers. (Phillips 2011: 150)  
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 In Phillips’ view, (a) and (b) do not conflict with (i), (ii), or (iii). It is not much worse, at 
least in Phillips’ view, to lose my life against two strangers losing theirs. I am not rationally re-
quired, then, to choose to save my own life. At the same time, as losing my life is not trivially 
better for me, I would also be permitted to choose my own life over 100 strangers’ lives.  
3.2.3.3. Objection to David Phillips 
I. An injection of subjectivism 
I borrow here again Sarkar’s remark against the way Parfit seemed to assign weight to reasons. As 
I have argued, extending Sarkar’s objection, Parfit seems to need two different – incommensurable 
– points of view to give different normative force to different types of reasons. A similar claim 
could be made here against Phillips. In particular, it is not clear how Phillips’ can assign different 
weights to the Principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence without appealing to different – 
we may say – normative sources.  But, if Philips would do so, as I have indicated with Parfit and 
McLeod, Phillips would be falling into a similar dualism as the one that made Sidgwick claim that 
Ethics was afflicted by a profoundest problem.  
II. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics persists 
I am not offering here new particular objections to David Phillips that I have not offered yet against 
Parfit or McLeod. My only intention here is to restate these objections in different forms to allow 
them to sink in; and to illustrate, we may say, all the faces of the same prism. I want to suggest 
here, briefly, that with Phillips’ conflict-mitigating interpretation a profound solution to the Pro-
foundest Problem of Ethics is not really offered. Let us appeal to Airport Dilemma. In particular, 
it is not clear that Phillips’ Qualified Permissive View would resolve the conflict between, on the 
one hand, your reasons to get the job of your dreams and, on the other hand, your reasons to save 
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the life of the stranger. In Phillips’ view, considering the example that he suggests, it would be 
both rationally permissible to give the last spot in the plane to the stranger as well as it would be 
rationally permissible to take that spot for yourself. Insofar as, supposedly, the life of a person is 
more valuable than a job offer – even if it is your dream job –, it is conceivable to think that 
prudential reasons have some more weight than benevolent reasons.  
However, two questions still need to be answered. First: How are these weights assigned? 
If one can assign to one’s well-being more weight than to the other’s well-being, how ought one 
to do so? Again, it seems that Phillips finds himself with a similar problem to Parfit and McLeod. 
An old dualism seems to be in the background of one’s possibility to assign different importance 
to one’s well-being than to the other’s well-being. But, if that dualism cannot be avoided, it is not 
clear that the conflict between prudential and benevolent reasons that one would have in Airport 
Dilemma would be resolved.  
3.2.4. Roger Crisp 
3.2.4.1. Crisp’s Interpretation of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics  
Roger Crisp also defends an enhanced conflict-mitigating interpretation of Sidgwick’s Dualism of 
Practical Reason, only differing from those of Phillips or McLeod in the way Crisp assigns partic-
ular weights to the Principles of Prudence and Benevolence. However, pace Parfit, Phillips, and 
McLeod, and like Brink and Frankena, Crisp conceives morality from an externalist standpoint.  
I. Crisp’s Externalism 
Crisp is not an externalist like Frankena and Brink. On the one hand, Frankena and Brink are 
externalists insofar as they simply deny the internal connection between rationality and morality. 
As I have explained, they appealed to their externalism to understand the conflict between Rational 
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Egoism and Utilitarianism as a conflict between rationality and morality and to understand the 
Profoundest Problem as if the rational authority of morality was at stake. On the other hand, Crisp 
is an externalist insofar as he claims that one can understand the conflict expressed in the Dualism 
of Practical Reason without the necessity to appeal to moral terminology, nor “moral properties as 
reason-giving in themselves” (Crisp 2006: 17; also 16, 61, 126).  
II. Crisp’s Dualism of Practical Reason 
In fact, Crisp suggests that Sidgwick’s dualism can be better approached when one dismisses mo-
rality as an aspect to be considered in the conflict between Prudence and Benevolence; and regards 
the Profoundest Problem of Ethics as a conflict between two rational principles: one principle that 
promotes self-regard and another principle that promotes regard for others, both being rationally 
self-evident. (Crisp 2006: 126, 131-135). According to Crisp, then, the Dualism of Practical Rea-
son is a dualism between reasons of two different but commensurable kinds: self-regarding reasons 
to care about one’s own well-being and other-regarding reasons to care about the well-being of 
others. (Crisp 2006: 136-139)  
3.2.4.2. Crisp’s Solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics  
The solution of Crisp’s profoundest problem is arrived at by simply deciding how to weigh and 
compare these two different kinds of reasons. After many attempts to decide how two weight one’s 
own well-being in relation to the well-being of others, Crisp concludes, as a solution to the Pro-
foundest Problem of Ethics, in what he calls his Sufficiency Theory. The Sufficiency Theory, by 
means of what Crisp calls the Sufficiency Principle, states: “Special concern for any being B is 
appropriate up to the point at which B has a level of well-being such that B can live a life which is 
sufficiently good.” (Crisp 2006: 160) 
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Now, Crisp assumes as a ‘bedrock principle’ that one has normative reasons to promote 
one’s own well-being. (Crisp 2006: 56-61) With his Sufficiency theory, Crisp suggests, then, that 
other things equal, one is rationally required to promote one’s own well-being. However, if a being 
B does not live a life that can be regarded as sufficiently good, one is rationally required to help 
such a being B. If helping that being conflicts with promoting one’s well-being, one is rationally 
permitted to act in both ways. I will not present any particular objections against Crisp’s solution. 
The objections presented above against Parfit, McLeod and Phillips can be also raised to Crisp.  
3.2.5. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer 
3.2.5.1. Lazari-Radek’s and Singer’s Interpretation of the Profoundest Problem  
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer believe that what is profoundly problematic in what 
Sidgwick called the Profoundest Problem of Ethics is the risk that what Parfit called the moralist’s 
problem may not be able to be solved. Considering what is at stake with the Profoundest Problem 
of Ethics – the possibility to trust our Practical Reason – when one understands it from a conflict-
enhancing interpretation, I suggest that Lazari-Radek and Singer, in claiming that the moralist’s 
problem is the profoundest problem of ethics, implicitly support a conflict-mitigating interpreta-
tion. Still, their approach to solve their Profoundest Problem of Ethics is different than those of 
Parfit, McLeod, Phillips, or Crisp. Lazari-Radek and Singer attempt to dissolve the Dualism of 
Practical Reason by suggesting a distinction between normative and motivating reasons; and indi-
cating that only moral reasons are normative. I argue that, under scrutiny, Lazari-Radek’s and 
Singer’s argument does not hold.  
I. Lazari-Radek’s and Singer’s objection against any Dualism of Practical Reason 
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Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer believe that any dualism of practical reason under-
mines morality. (Lazari-Radek & Singer 2011: 163) Why? Because at worst – when understanding 
the Dualism of Practical Reason from a conflict-enhancing interpretation –, Sidgwick’s dualism 
will entail a contradiction within Practical Reason; that is: Practical Reason would be incoherent, 
and any of its dictates – morality included – would be undermined. On the other hand, at best – 
when understanding the Dualism of Practical Reason from a conflict-mitigating view –, it will 
entail that Reason is indeterminate and we would have at best only rational permission to act as 
morality requires. (Lazari-Radek 2011: 163) That is: at best, we will only have sufficient reasons 
to act morally, and moral reasons have only deontic force of permission. (Phillips 2011: 115; Parfit 
2011: 137)  
In Lazari-Radek’s and Singer’s view, then, even conceiving the Dualism of Practical Reason 
from a conflict-mitigating view, the[ir] Profoundest Problem of Ethics cannot be fully solved: in 
case of conflict between prudence and benevolence, we may never be required to act as morality 
requires.70 They claim:  
Parfit’s wide value-based objective view, which can allow that we often have deci-
sive reasons to do what morality requires, is less damaging to the importance of 
morality than Sidgwick’s ‘wholly incomparable reasons’ view. Nevertheless, if we 
want morality to be truly important, we need to be able to do better in overcoming 
the dualism. (Lazari-Radek & Singer 2011: 163) 
 
Considering that Lazari-Radek and Singer claim that any dualism damages the importance 
of morality, it is not surprising that they attempt to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics by 
dissolving the Dualism of Practical Reason. In this sense, although they depart from a similar 
position than Parfit’s, they attempt to disregard all non-moral reasons as not reliable.  
                                                        
70 Notice that this objection can be directed against Parfit, Phillip, Crisp, and McLeod.  
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3.2.5.2. Lazari-Radek’s and Singer’s Solution to the Profoundest Problem  
In particular, Lazari-Radek and Singer attempt to cast doubt on the origins of non-moral reasons. 
(Lazari-Radek & Singer 2011: 174) Lazari-Radek and Singer appeal to Sidgwick’s idea, in The 
Methods of Ethics, that it “may (…) be possible to prove that some ethical beliefs have been caused 
in such a way as to make it probable that they are wholly or partially erroneous”. (Lazari-Radek 
& Singer 2011: 176) Although Sidgwick does not believe that the validity of Ethical intuitions can 
be discarded en block by providing a genealogy of their physical causes, Sidgwick does believe 
that one can cast doubt on an ethical belief if it is shown that the causes that produce it tend to 
produce false beliefs. (211-213)  
Lazari-Radek and Singer suggest that, with the current literature on the origins of morality 
and of our moral intuitions, not available at Sidgwick’s time, it is possible to claim that some kinds 
of ethical beliefs, beliefs derived from the rationality of Egoism, may be invalid, as it can be shown 
that the psychological process that causes them tends to cause false beliefs. (Lazari-Radek & 
Singer 2011: 179) In particular, Lazari-Radek and Singer regard three “elements in the process of 
establishing that an intuition has the highest possible degree of reliability”: (Lazari-Radek & 
Singer 2011: 195) 
1. Careful reflection leading to a conviction of self-evidence.  
2. Independent agreement of other careful thinkers.  
3. Absence of a plausible explanation of the intuition as a non-truth-tracking psycholog-
ical process.  
While they understand that failing to comply only with the third requirement cannot 
demonstrate that an intuition is false, but it can only cast doubt on its reliability, they nevertheless 
assume that “if an intuition that met the first two requirements but not the third were to clash with 
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an intuition that met all three, we would have ground for preferring the intuition for which there 
was no evolutionary explanation”.71 (Lazari-Radek & Singer 2011: 195) In this sense, Lazari-
Radek and Singer claim that, while there is not nowadays a plausible evolutionary view to explain, 
in Parfit’s terminology, moral reasons, there are instead some plausible explanations of non-moral 
reasons being caused by non-truth-tracking psychological processes. (Lazari-Radek & Singer 
2011: 179-194)  
In particular, Lazari-Radek and Singer suggest that while there are evolutionary explana-
tions that explain the evolutionary advantage that the rationality of Egoism brought about, these 
explanations actually cast a doubt on the reliability of such psychological processes. (Lazari-Radek 
& Singer 2011: 183) In other words, the fact that a psychological process was evolutionarily ad-
vantageous at a certain time does not mean that it is advantageous now and that we still have 
reasons to act according to such beliefs. In this sense, Lazari-Radek and Singer reject what Parfit 
called personal and partial reasons, when non-moral reasons, as only motivating reasons, but not 
actually normative reasons. (Lazari-Radek & Singer 2011: 198) In their view, only moral – im-
partial – reasons can be counted as normative, and thus when impartial reasons and partial or per-
sonal reasons conflict, impartial reasons are decisive reasons for action. 
3.2.5.3. Objections to Katarzyna Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer  
I. The Transparency Objection 
                                                        
71 Lazari-Radek’s and Singer’s The Point of View of the Universe was first published in 2014. The year 
their book was published is relevant because their claim – that there are not “today” plausible evolutionary 
explanations for moral reasons – seems to be contradicted by many authors that suggested, before 2014, 
that there might be, pace Lazari-Radek and Singer, plausible evolutionary explanations for moral reasons. 
I explain this in more detail in the objections against Lazari-Radek and Singer. 
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Christine Korsgaard, in The Sources of Normativity, defines three conditions that a theory needs 
to provide an answer to what she labels as the normative question. (Korsgaard 2014: 16-17) 
Korsgaard defines the normative question as the question that the agent might ask when one tells 
her that she ought to do something; that is: why ought I to do what morality required me? 
(Korsgaard 2014: 13) Korsgaard suggests that the answer to the normative question needs to give 
a justificatory explanation to the morally skeptic question about what one ought to do what moral-
ity requires. As I have just said, Korsgaard claims that the answer to the normative question needs 
to comply with three conditions: (i) it needs to appeal to the first-person perspective of the agent; 
(ii) it needs to be transparent; and (iii) it needs to appeal to our sense of identity. I believe condition 
(ii) undermines Lazari-Radek’s and Singer’s attempt to solve the[ir] Profoundest Problem of Eth-
ics.  
 Korsgaard claims, regarding the transparency condition:  
If a theory’s explanation of how morality motivates us essentially depends on the 
fact that the source or nature of our motives is concealed from us, or that we often 
act blindly or from habit, then it lacks transparency. … A normative moral theory 
must be one that allows us to act in the full light of knowledge of what morality is 
and why we are susceptible to its influences, and at the same time to believe that 
our actions are justified and make sense. (Korsgaard 2014: 17) 
 
 Keeping the transparency condition in mind, I suggest that Lazari-Radek and Singer, pre-
cisely in trying to undermine non-moral reasons by indicating that there is a plausible explanation 
that traces their origins in non-truth-tracking psychological processes, Lazari-Radek and Singer 
actually compromise morality itself. Why? Because Lazari-Radek’s and Singer’s “defense” to mo-
rality is merely that, at least for now, there is not yet a plausible explanation indicating that the 
origin of moral reasons rests in a non-truth-tracking psychological process. In this sense, in their 
attempt to defend morality, Lazari-Radek and Singer sacrifice the transparency of the – alleged – 
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unique normative reasons. In this sense, once they have cast doubt on non-moral reasons, moral 
reasons risk being undermined in just the same way.  
II. An evolutionary explanation of moral reasons 
In fact, even when Henry Sidgwick was writing The Methods of Ethics, another author, Peter Kro-
potkin, was writing two treatises – Mutual Aid and Ethics: Origins and Development, in which he 
claimed, allegedly following Charles Darwin, that an inherent moral instinct, mutual aid, is not 
only a predominant fact of nature, but it is a predominant factor in the evolution of human beings. 
(Kropotkin 2005: 5, 61) Moreover, Kropotkin claims that one can trace the development of this 
instinct in, first, moral feelings of sympathy and, then, the idea of justice and equity – among all 
individual human beings – that grounds the conception of morality that we – or at least so claims 
Kropotkin – have today. (Kropotkin 1934: 14-15)  
To be clear, I am not suggesting that Kropotkin’s claims had, at that time, any validity. 
However, I do believe that Kropotkin suggests an interesting idea that might undermine the origin 
of morality – at least as Lazari-Radek and Singer conceive it. Kropotkin claims: “in the animal 
world we see how the personal will of individuals blends with the common will”. (Kropotkin 1934: 
65) In fact, suggests Kropotkin, many examples in the animal kingdom illustrate that “the co-
ordination of the individual will with the will and the purpose of the whole”.72 (Kropotkin 1934: 
65) If this is so, Kropotkin continues, the instincts of self-preservation of the individual – and the 
origins of the rationality of Egoism – might actually coincide with the instincts of cooperation that 
might be in the origin of the rationality of Morality.73  
                                                        
72 Kropotkin supports this claim with innumerable examples. Actually, most of Chapter I and II of Mutual 
Aid: A Factor of Evolution is dedicated to show that mutual aid is indeed the norm not only in social animals 
but also in the so-called animal predators. (Kropotkin 2006: 8-45) 
73 Some contemporary research might support Kropotkin’s claim. Brice Huebner, for instance, explains that 
certain colonies of ants or honeybees act as they had a single group mind, and not as they had different 
minds that cooperate together. (Huebner 2011: 4-6) Other authors, such as Karl Widerquist and Grant S. 
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I am not saying that there is now a valid explanation that casts doubt upon the origins of 
morality. I am just suggesting that a kind of plausible explanation might be available one day 
following Kropotkin’s path. This is precisely the profound problem with Lazari-Radek’s and 
Singer’s “solution” to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics: that it leaves the possibility to undermine 
morality always open. It might just be a question of time.    
3.3. Formal Analysis of the Classical Interpretations of the Profoundest Problem  
 
In sections 3.2 and 3.3, I have argued that all classical interpretations of the Profoundest Problem 
of Ethics accept Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions. I have also suggested that it is precisely 
their acceptance of these assumptions that constrains all classical interpretations into the structure 
of Sidgwick’s Underlying Argument, within which they can only “solve” the Profoundest Problem 
by understanding the conflict between Prudence and Rational Benevolence without taking it in its 
full strength: that is, denying that the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is violated. I believe this 
can be better seen if we express these assumptions formally. 
First, the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics can be formally expressed as (n → (t ∨ p)0. 
Where: 
n: Different valid rational procedures yield different principles each.  
t: The principles do not theoretically conflict.  
                                                        
McCall, are also relying in Kropotkin’s notion of mutual aid. (Widerquist & McCall 2017) Now, as Lazari-
Radek and Singer indicate, many authors have argued that unselfish behavior is a fundamental fact of our 
biological nature. (Lazari-Radek & Singer 2011: 186-187; see also Singer 2015: 76 and Sober & Wilson 
1998) However, they suggest that the Principle of Rational Benevolence requires to act in a way that goes 
beyond the kind of altruistic behavior that can be explained in terms of group selection. I am not sure their 
claim is substantiated. It might be true that biologically determined altruism for the good of the species 
cannot explain all human altruistic behavior. However, as Kropotkin actually suggests, it might explain 
enough to understand how, once we acquired certain concepts – justice and equity, for instance – this ini-
tially biologically determined altruism became universal altruism.  
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p: The principles do not practically conflict. 
The Principle of Practical Reason’s Reliability can be expressed with the form: (f ↔ r). 
Where:  
f: Fundamental Postulate of Ethics.  
r: It is possible to always trust Practical Reason to determine right conduct. 
The Principle of Practical Reason’s Authority can be expressed with the form: (¬r ↔ e). 
Where:  
e: Practical Reason is plagued with a profoundest problem. 
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Table I illustrates the interpretation of each philosopher in terms of the truth values that they would assign to Sidgwick’s Underlying 
Presuppositions.
 
n: Different valid rational procedures yield different princi-
ples each. 
t: The principles do not theoretically conflict. 
p: The principles do not practically conflict. 
 
f: Fundamental Postulate of Ethics. 
r: Possibility to trust Practical Reason to determine right 
conduct. 
e: The Profoundest Problem of Ethics.  
 
 (f ↔ r) n t p (t ∨ p) 
 
'n → (t ∨ p), r e 
Sidgwick 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
-  1 
 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
-  1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Parfit, Phillips, Crisp, McLeod 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
-  1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Brink, Frankena 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
-  1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Lazari-Radek & Singer 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
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Table II illustrates, in terms of the truth values exposed in Table I, that the arguments of all classical attempts to solve the Profoundest 






Frankena Brink McLeod Phillips Crisp 
Lazari-Radek & 
Singer 
1. Principle of Practical Reason’s Authority: (¬r ↔ e) 
2. Principle of Practical Reason’s Reliability: (f ↔ r) 
3. Fundamental Postulate of Ethics: 'n → (t ∨ p), 
4. n is true. 4. n is false.  4. n is false.  4. n is true.  4. n is true.  4. n is true. 4. n is false.  
5. t is false. 5. t is false.  5. t is false. 5. t is true.  5. t is true. 5. t is true. 5. t is true. 
6. p is false.  6. p is true. 6. p is true. 6. p is true. 6. p is true. 6. p is true. 6. p is true. 
7. 'n → (t ∨ p), is false. 
7. 'n → (t ∨ p), 
is true. 
7. 'n → (t ∨ p), 
is true. 
7. 'n → (t ∨ p), 
is true. 
7. 'n → (t ∨ p), 
is true. 
7. 'n → (t ∨ p), 
is true. 
7. 'n → (t ∨ p), 
is true. 
8. r is false. 8. r is true. 8. r is true. 8. r is true. 8. r is true. 8. r is true. 8. r is true. 
9. e is true. 9. e is false.  9. e is false.  9. e is false.  9. e is false.  9. e is false.  9. e is false.  
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Table III classifies each author in terms of seven key categories. 
                                                        
74 I am aware that each author uses different names to refer to principles or reasons, not Prudence and Rational Benevolence as Sidgwick did. I 












 Frankena Conflict-enhancing Externalist Actual Prud. and Ben. No Yes No  




Actual Prud. and Ben. Yes Yes No  
Phillips Conflict-mitigating Internalist Actual Prud. and Ben. Yes Yes No  
McLoed Conflict-mitigating Internalist Actual Prud. and Ben. Yes No No  











I. An unresolved Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
Even though all classical interpretations seem to disagree in fundamental claims, disagreements 
that would lead one to believe that no agreement is possible between them, I have argued that all 
their interpretations share a similar structure; they all tacitly accept what I have called Sidgwick’s 
Underlying Presupposition and the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics. I have also explained that 
Sidgwick had also accepted these two assumptions. However, unlike Sidgwick, all classical inter-
pretations claim that the Profoundest Problem of Ethics can be solved. Why? What is the differ-
ence between Sidgwick and the classical interpretations? 
  I have been trying to suggest an answer in some of the objections to the classical interpre-
tations. The answer is: while both Sidgwick and the classical interpretations accept Sidgwick’s 
Underlying Presuppositions, only Sidgwick took seriously the possibility that Practical Reason 
might really be at stake. This is not, I believe, an unsubstantiated claim.  
On the one hand, David Brink, explicitly declaring to be following William Frankena, ar-
gues that the Dualism of Practical Reason cannot be a dualism between Rational Egoism and Ra-
tional Benevolence insofar as, if that would be so, Practical Reason would be requiring to act in 
accordance with inconsistent conflicting principles – both with deontic force of requirement. As 
this would entail that we may need to mistrust Practical Reason, they claim, it must be that what 
Sidgwick called the Dualism of Practical Reason needs to be understood as a conflict between a 
rational principle – Prudence – and a moral principle – Benevolence. In this sense, conflict-en-
hancing interpretations, even though they understand the conflict between Rational Egoism and 
Utilitarianism in its full force, they refuse to consider this conflict the Profoundest Problem of 




fear, we might discover that Practical Reason might not be as trustworthy as we once assumed. 
Accordingly, they reduce the Profoundest Problem of Ethics to what Parfit called the moralist’s 
problem.  
 On the other hand, Derek Parfit, Owen McLeod, David Phillips, and Roger Crisp reject the 
possibility that we might not be able to trust Practical Reason even more strongly than David Brink 
and William Frankena actually did. In understanding Practical Reason as “just regrettably indeter-
minate”, as Phillips would say, they deny that the conflict between Rational Egoism and Rational 
Benevolence is one that we ought to rationally be seriously worried about. (Phillips 1998: 59) As 
Husain Sarkar claims, when examining Parfit’s solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics: the 
rationalist’s problem “is relatively simple, if not almost trivial, compared to the moralist’s prob-
lem.” (Sarkar 2018: 25) Sarkar is indeed right. However, the rationalist’s problem is almost trivial 
only insofar as Parfit, along with McLeod, Phillips, and Crisp, understands Practical Reason in a 
way that the rationalist’s problem is not really a problem to begin with. The Profoundest Problem 
of Ethics, again, seems to be reduced to the moralist’s problem. And still, as Katarzyna de Lazari-
Radek and Peter Singer claim, when understanding Practical Reason from a conflict-mitigating 
standpoint, morality is never completely protected. At best, we will be only required to act as 
Rational Benevolence dictates when Rational Benevolence and Rational Egoism do not conflict, 
and when they conflict, we will be permitted to act in both ways. This led Lazari-Radek and Singer 
to try to cast doubt upon the origins of Rational Egoist’s rationale. I attempted to show in my 
objection that their argument can be used to undermine morality as well.  
 To recapitulate, I have argued that both conflict-enhancing and conflict-mitigating inter-
pretations, in accepting Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions, while rejecting the possibility that 
Practical Reason might be at stake, have not approached the Profoundest Problem of Ethics as 




problem – that, while important, it is not the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. Besides, they have 
all failed to solve even the watered-down versions of their problem: they either appeal to inherently 
wrong arguments – as Frankena and Lazari-Radek and Singer do – or they fall into another un-
solvable dualism. 
I now want to argue that the fact that they are not approaching the Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics, and the fact that they have failed to solve the moralist’s problem, are closely connected. As 
Parfit actually understood, the key to Sidgwick’s argument in The Methods of Ethics lies in Sidg-
wick’s assumption that our Practical Reason can adopt two different points of view – personal and 
impartial – from which it yields different – though apparently valid – conflicting principles. Parfit 
attempted to object to Sidgwick’s Two Viewpoints Argument arguing that all reasons are based 
on facts that can be accessed from our actual point of view. However, following Husain Sarkar, I 
have argued that to preserve any form of Sidgwick’s dualism, even when understood in a conflict-
mitigating way, one needs to appeal to two different points of view to give different weight to 
personal-neutral and person-relative facts. David Brink’s argument, as I have suggested, ultimately 
also rested in conceiving persons from two different incommensurable points of view.  
I do not think that it is accidental that both Brink’s and Parfit’s arguments – and all other 
classical interpretations – ultimately lead to similar dualisms between two incommensurable points 
of view; dualisms that are quite similar to the Dualism of Practical Reason that originated the 
Profoundest Problem of Ethics. What I claim, then is that all classical interpretations, in denying 
the possibility that Practical Reason might yield conflicting, inconsistent principles, have not been 
able to perceive the depth of what Parfit called Sidgwick’s Two Viewpoints Argument, and they 
have fallen into the same profoundest problem that Sidgwick found – while thinking that they were 
actually solving it. Only Frankena and Lazari-Radek and Singer seemed to see out of the corner of 




philosophers. Still, the solutions that they provided were no better: they still failed to perceive that 
the origin of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics might be rooted in the nature itself of Practical 
Reason. If this would be so, the Profoundest Problem of Ethics would express an even deeper 
problem than what Sidgwick might have thought. 
 
II. A new approach to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
I have argued that Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions structurally underlie The Methods of 
Ethics. I have also argued that it is precisely the acceptance of these assumptions that, on the one 
hand, prevented Sidgwick to offer a solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics and, on the 
other hand, forced all classical interpretation that attempt to solve the Profoundest Problem of 
Ethics while rejecting the possibility that Practical Reason might be at stake, to only offer only a 
watered-down solution to a problem that it is not really profound. I want to suggest now that, if 
one rejects Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions, the conflict between Rational Egoism and Ra-
tional Benevolence is cast in a new light. 
In fact, Sidgwick himself doubted about the rational validity of what I call the Principle of 
Practical Reason’s Reliability: that is, he seems to consider that the violation of the Fundamental 
Postulate of Ethics may not necessarily entail that we need to distrust Practical Reason. Sidgwick 
offers on the second to last page of The Methods of Ethics a distinction that I have not seen any 
author give it the weight that I think it has. Considering possible the harmony between Prudence 
and Rational Benevolence, Sidgwick claims:  
I also judge that in a certain sense this result ought to be realized: in this judgment, 
however, ‘ought’ is not used in a strictly ethical meaning; it only expresses the vital 
need that our Practical Reasons feels of providing or postulating this connexion of 




This citation precedes one of Sidgwick’s most famous citations, in which Sidgwick claims 
that if “this connexion” cannot be shown, “the apparently intuitive operation of Practical Reason, 
manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory”. (506) In this sense, this citation 
casts the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics and the Principle of Practical Reason’s Reliability in a 
new light. 
Sidgwick seems to suggest that, if we have indeed a faculty such as Practical Reason that 
has as its operation determining what we ought to do, we would expect that the principles that 
Practical Reason dictates would not conflict. This expectation is expressed in what Sidgwick calls 
the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics. However, when we analyze the nature of this expectation, 
we realize that only if we already make certain assumptions about the nature of Practical Reason, 
the violation of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics becomes a problem for Practical Reason. In 
other words, we would prefer that Practical Reason would dictate what we ought to do in a way in 
which all our acts could be deemed as right and rational – and we could never be exposed to blame 
or criticism. We would want that we would never find ourselves in a situation in which we deemed 
two actions as equally right from two different points of view, and we would be forced to choose 
an act that is necessarily wrong from the other point of view within our Practical Reason. However, 
it is only when we assume that Practical Reason cannot be in the way that we do not want it to be 
that the conflict between Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence becomes a problem for Prac-
tical Reason. In this sense, the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics and the Principle of Practical Rea-
son’s Reliability, as Sidgwick and all classical interpretations understand them, impose a descrip-
tion upon Practical Reason that makes the conflict between Rational Egoism and Rational Benev-
olence a profound problem for Practical Reason. By doing so, I argue, they miss what is really at 




In the citation above, Sidgwick seems to be offering a distinction that hints that what is at 
stake in the conflict between Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence is not Practical Reason 
itself, or the possibility to trust in its dictates, but our lives. In particular, Sidgwick seems to dis-
tinguish between (a) a vital need to show that the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics is not violated 
by demonstrating the theoretical or practical harmony between the Principles of Prudence and 
Rational Benevolence; and (b) a rational need to show so.  
The rational need to show the harmony between the Principles of Prudence and Rational 
Benevolence refers to the description that Sidgwick and all classical interpretations impose upon 
Practical Reason to claim that Practical Reason cannot do what they do not want it to do: that is, 
requiring to act in accordance with two conflicting principles at the same time. In accordance with 
this reading, the violation of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics necessarily entails that we cannot 
always trust Practical Reason insofar as it is already assumed that a Practical Reason that would 
lead to a violation of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics could not be trusted to begin with. In 
this way, the conflict between Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence casts doubt upon the 
authority of Practical Reason in a way in which we believe that Ethics itself as a study of what is 
right or what ought to be done might not be worth of rational pursuit. It is important to realize here, 
though, that insofar as it is Practical Reason that seems to be at stake with this understood of 
Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions, it is not surprising then that conflict-enhancing and con-
flict-mitigating interpretations attempt to solve Sidgwick’s problem by understanding the princi-
ples of Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence in a way in which Practical Reason is not at 
stake. However, I have claimed, they still miss what is really at stake in the Profoundest Problem 
of Ethics – and for this reason they all fall in similar dualism than the Dualism of Practical Reason.  
Sidgwick’s appeal to a vital need to demonstrate the harmony between the Principles of 




Sidgwick’s appeal to a vital need as expressing a kind of psychological necessity akin to our human 
necessity to make friends, to be loved, to feel safe... In this sense, Sidgwick seems to suggest that 
what is really at stake if the conflict between the principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence 
could not be solved is not that we may not be able to trust Practical Reason in determining what 
we ought to do – or that Practical Reason may be incoherent –, but the consequences in our lives 
that would derive from the head-on conflict between Rational Egoism and Rational Benevolence.  
It seems that Sidgwick is suggesting that the need to avoid the violation of the Fundamental 
Postulate of Ethics is practical – or vital. Not rational. If my reading is sound, Sidgwick is casting 
doubt upon the conditional relation that he himself established in the Fundamental Postulate of 
Ethics between the fact that different valid rational procedures yield certain principles and the 
impossibility that these principles practically or theoretically conflict. In accordance with the ra-
tional reading of the citation above, the violation of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics neces-
sarily undermines the rational authority of Practical Reason. In accordance with the vital reading 
of the citation, the violation of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics – which, on this reading, ceases 
to be a fundamental postulate – does not undermine the rational authority of Practical Reason. It 
only undermines the vital need that we humans have to have a clear, non-conflicting, dictates about 
what we ought to do. 
Airport Dilemma here may be useful. I have explained that, in this example, you have 
conflicting intuitions about what you ought to do: either give your spot in the last plane to the 
stranger or take it for yourself. If one understands Sidgwick’s Underlying Presuppositions in terms 
of a rational need, the violation of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics by your conflicting reasons 
necessarily entails that you cannot trust your Practical Reason, in that case, at all; and that your 
decision will be based on non-rational impulses, such as your compassion for the stranger, your 




On the other hand, if one understands the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics in terms of a 
vital need, the violation of the Fundamental Postulate of Ethics by your conflicting intuitions just 
means that you would have preferred that your reason would have given you a clear answer about 
what you ought to do; maybe even that you would have preferred that these reasons would coin-
cide. Still, you would still have both intuitions about what you ought to do, and you would have 
no reason to doubt your Practical Reason. In other words, it is not that Practical Reason is leaving 
you without any direction at all.  
Practical Reason is giving you two principles that are required from two different points of 
view; and yes, you need to decide one option knowing that, whatever you decide, the action will 
be regarded as wrong from the opposite incommensurable point of view.  
Sidgwick, Frankena, Brink, Parfit, McLeod, Phillips, Crisp, Lazari-Radek and Singer… 
seem to believe that this is not plausible. The question that I ask of them is: is it – rationally – 
implausible or is it – vitally – profoundly inconvenient? It is true that Sidgwick, in indicating that 
the object of his treatise would be to study the relation between methods, trying to define when 
they conflict as much as possible, seemed to hope that he would be able to show that ethics is not 
actually far from, for instance, mathematics, and that he hoped that the conflict between incon-
sistent principles would be able to be harmonized. Sidgwick’s hope for a solution to the Profound-
est Problem of Ethics, I believe, needs to be read in this way. But if this is so, as far as I can see, 
this hope expresses a vital necessity to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics; a vital necessity 
to show that a study as important as Ethics, with which we determine what we ought to do, is not 
actually far from mathematics. In this sense, I suggest that the Profoundest Problem of Ethic might 
be profound, pace Sidgwick, not because the conflict between Rational Egoism and Rational Be-
nevolence may question the rational authority of Practical Reason, but because it is profoundly 




to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics: because they fail to see what is really at stake if Prac-
tical Reason is really divided against itself.  
III. A solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics 
The Profoundest Problem of Ethics needs to be understood as a vital problem, expressing a psy-
chological necessity, and not as a rational problem, expressing a logical necessity to solve the 
conflict between Rational Egoism and Benevolence.  
We would want that if two rational procedures yield conflicting conclusions, only one is 
valid. We would want that our Practical Reason would be such that it would not allow that different 
valid rational procedures yield conflicting conclusions. But, it would be a mistake to confuse this 
vital need with a rational or logical necessity. And it would be a mistake to claim that there is a 
Profoundest Problem because it turns out that the rational necessity that one has assumed is not 
satisfied after all. This is, I am afraid, the real shadow that casts over Ethics: a deep denial of what 
might be, for all we know, an inherently human trait; that our Practical Reason yields conflicting 
dictates about what we ought to do.  
If we accept this duality in Practical Reason, we may understand that the solution to the 
Profoundest Problem of Ethics does not depend in us being able to show that, if we act in accord-
ance with Practical Reason, our actions will be always right. Instead, a solution of the Profoundest 
Problem of Ethics, understood under my new approach, might give us an answer to the question: 
what is the action that, considering both points of view, is less wrong? That action would be the 
most rational action. One might here demand: does this mean that none of our actions can be com-
pletely right considering both points of view? There is, in fact, this unpleasant possibility.  
However, I believe that being conscious that our actions may be wrong when regarded 




mitigating views do, assigning different weights to different incommensurable reasons to be able 
to – falsely – guarantee that one is in the right. I fear that this type of reasoning may lead to pro-
cesses of justification of our own actions in which what is at stake is no longer acting rightly, but 
not being exposed to blame or criticism. Under their conception, we may be able to justify – give 
reasons for – acts that may be inherently wrong. As for myself, I prefer to live with the burden of 
knowing that each of my acts can be regarded as wrong from one of the points of view within my 
Practical Reason than justify my actions with a self-made principle that ensures that my Practical 
Reason is not incoherent.  
In my view, the Profoundest Problem of Ethics does not cast doubt upon the authority of 
Practical Reason. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics is our initial situation as ethical beings that 
can conceive other human beings, and ourselves, from two incommensurable points of view within 
our Practical Reason. The solution to the Profoundest Problem of Ethics is not, then, to deny this 
conflict. It is to embrace the practical problem that it presents in a way that, still, we attempt to do 
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